After Honda and Nissan announced that they would build factories in the United States, Toyota began to become the target of public criticism. Masaaki Sato said in Toyota Leader: "Everyone feels that unless Toyota moves its automobile production to the United States, the automobile conflict between the United States and Japan will continue and will never be resolved, and this incident has risen to a political issue." "Toyota Yingzhi began to feel the pain of being abandoned by everyone. ..... He has realized that it is an inevitable trend for Toyota to set up a factory in the United States, but there are still some considerations that make him hesitate. Even if Toyota transfers its automobile production to the United States to meet the requirements of the United States, he is still worried about whether the production base in the United States can guarantee the product performance to reach the level of Japanese production. If this cannot be guaranteed, it will greatly threaten Toyota's brand reputation. "After all, American workers and Japanese workers are completely different. Japanese companies implement a lifelong employment system. Workers have undergone rigorous training, have a sense of responsibility, and have a better sense of mission in the hope of enterprise development. Many American workers work just to earn money. "Toyota Yingzhi felt lonely for the first time after in-depth conversation with the company's top management."
Toyota's only action is to entrust Nomura Research Center, Arthur Rio Tinto and Stanford Research Center to conduct feasibility studies, but the responses of these think tanks are not as clear and clear as Rand's reply to Honda, which is "unpredictable".
1980 In May, Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira met with US President Carter at the White House. Carter proposed a solution to the conflict between the two countries' automobile industries: Japan and the United States set up a joint venture company.
Just then, Toyota accepted the new Ford President Donald Peterson (1980) as the company's president and chief operating officer. 65438+1February 1985), chairman and CEO of Ford Motor Company, expressed his wish to visit Toyota.
Donald Peterson
Toyota Yingzhi patted his thigh: "That's it."
Toyota Yingzhi personally drafted the framework of cooperative production, and sent Tanabe Shou (senior managing director of Denso Corporation, providing parts for the three major American automobile companies) to Ford headquarters.
Tanabe asked, "Why is it a joint venture with Ford instead of General Motors?"
Toyota Hideki said: "GM is too big to cooperate. The anti-monopoly law of the United States may not allow our two families to form an alliance. "
Sato Masaaki believes that Toyota Yingzhi chose Ford as a partner to "repay the debt". 1950 Toyota and Ford have negotiated a cooperation plan to introduce Ford cars and produce them in Japan. Toyota Yingzhi went to Detroit to sign a joint venture agreement, but the Korean War broke out in the middle, and the US government stopped foreign investment in the automobile industry and prohibited senior managers and technicians from going abroad. When the joint venture project fell through, Ford sympathized with Toyota, so he accepted Toyota Yingzhi's "technical training".
With this experience, Toyota Yingzhi knows Ford better.
Toyota will provide a Camry with a displacement of 2000cc, which is specially developed for the American market. At the same time, it can provide TPS (Toyota production mode) training.
1June, 980, Peterson visited Toyota headquarters, accompanied by two vice presidents.
Negotiations are going on, and Toyota Hideki, who is full of hope, suddenly feels that something is wrong. In the process of joint venture negotiations with Toyota, Ford and UAW filed a complaint against Japanese car dumping with the US International Trade Commission. Toyota Yingzhi was shocked by this and protested to Ford through the negotiating team.
Negotiations are also deadlocked: Ford wants the joint venture to produce the Taurus sedan that Ford has just developed, and Taurus itself is developed for the Japanese car Camry. Ford also asked Toyota to modify the design of Camry to avoid direct competition with Taurus. Toyota emphasizes that Camry's development is aimed at the American market, not at Taurus. If the design is modified, it is equivalent to asking Toyota to change its marketing strategy, which is unacceptable.
There is also a message that stimulates Toyota Yingzhi: Volkswagen "goes to Maicheng" in the United States.
1955, Volkswagen sold 28,907 vehicles in the American market, 1959, rising to120,000 vehicles. At that time, imported cars accounted for 8% of the American market, half of which were Volkswagen.
1964, Volkswagen's total global sales increased to1030,000, becoming a large automobile enterprise with annual sales of over one million vehicles. Sales in the United States rose to 307,000 vehicles, and the United States became Volkswagen's largest overseas market.
Although some American car critics think that Volkswagen Beetle is not a serious car at all (Beetle is a nickname given to the public by Americans, which is very contemptuous), driving this kind of car is the biggest insult to American personality, but this does not prevent American young people from liking it.
During the period of 1970, the sales volume of Volkswagen in the United States reached 583,000, which was the peak period of Volkswagen in the United States. This year, almost one out of every two Volkswagen cars sold in the world was sold in the United States. The Beetle contributed the main sales volume, reaching 560,000 vehicles.
However, American companies fought back. General Chevrolet? Vega 1972 * * *, with a sales volume of 520,000 vehicles, successfully hit the Volkswagen classic car Beetle. At the same time, Japanese cars are flooding into the American auto market.
Under the double attack, Volkswagen lost in the competition and its sales in the United States entered the downward channel. 1972, Volkswagen sold 492,000 vehicles in the United States; 1976 only sold 203,000 vehicles; 1979 even fell to 13000 vehicles. This decline did not end until 1995, and Volkswagen only sold 50,000 vehicles in the United States.
Carl H. Hahn, who just became CEO of Volkswagen, immediately stopped the new factory project in Strintes, Detroit, and decided to move the westmorland factory in Pennsylvania to China (later FAW Audi project).
Carl Hahn
"I am 1982 1 to Volkswagen as the chairman. As soon as I arrived, there were two projects that I needed to instruct as soon as possible, one was the Spanish Pavilion and the other was the China Project. These two projects were very unpopular at that time, and the following people suggested not to do them. I talked to the directors about my thoughts on China. At that time, China experienced the' Ten-year Cultural Revolution' and its economic conditions were very poor. On the other hand, I also see that China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping is very different from before. I believe the China government can let the public and China partners cooperate in a fair way. Fortunately, at that time, I was the only one in the world automobile industry, whether in the United States, Europe or Japan, who believed in the prospects of China's reform and opening up and was optimistic about the prospects of China. Therefore, we have developed happily alone in China for almost 20 years. "
What makes Toyota Yingzhi hesitate is the information from China.
At the end of 1978, China leader Deng Xiaoping approved the establishment of joint ventures between the automobile industry and foreign countries. More than one China car company found Toyota and was turned away.
Sato Masaaki wrote: "Toyota Yingzhi tossed and turned, and I don't know how to choose. Even the public has suffered in America. Can Toyota succeed in producing cars in the United States? China is indeed a market with great potential, but after all, it is a market that can only be profitable for a long time. " "
Chen Zutao, the former general manager of China Automobile Industry Group Company, said in his memoir My Automobile Career: "We searched for partners all over the world, organized a group of experts, circled the earth twice, and visited the world's major automobile companies such as Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, Renault, Nissan, General Motors and Ford. Western automobile powers almost don't respect us, or they are unwilling to cooperate or ask for prices. "
A German Volkswagen once said that a Toyota person told him privately that Toyota regretted rejecting the cooperation request in Shanghai.
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Masaaki Sato wrote in Toyota Leader: "When Toyota announced that it would jointly produce cars with Ford, GM Chairman roger smith almost felt that GM would lose its leading position in the industry from now on. If Ford, the second largest automaker, and Toyota, the third largest automaker, jointly become a reality, GM will face a subversive situation. "
"At first, GM has been watching the situation change. With the negotiations between Ford and Toyota deadlocked, GM began to have a strong interest in Toyota. However, due to its status as the world's number one car, GM has been extremely cautious because it has a deep sense of pride and glory. "
"At this moment, J·W· Chai, vice president of Itochu Corporation, shot. He is an outstanding business person and has played an extremely active role in the cooperation between GM and Isuzu. "
198 1 year 1 1 month, Chai came to Japan to attend the Tokyo Motor Show, and Masaaki Sato said, "The three of us (Masaaki Sato, head of overseas sales of Toyota, J.W.? Chai) sat together and ate a meal, and began to exchange all kinds of information during the dinner. Shenwei and J.W. Chai hit it off and chatted happily, just like an old friend who had been in contact for more than ten years. Shenwei did not hide too much, and told Toyota's concerns in detail, while J.W.? Chai also publicly pointed out many problems that may be encountered in cooperation with GM. Their conversation covered many topics. When talking about the economic policies pursued by the newly appointed Reagan team, the tone of the two became very dignified. "
"Reagan's election as president largely relied on his slogan of' reviving the glory of the United States'." Chai said, "In order to revive the profitability of private enterprises, he will certainly flexibly apply the most stringent US antitrust laws in the world. That's why I think Toyota GM's cooperation will ... "
Sato Masaaki said: "Sitting aside and listening to the dialogue between the two sides, I estimated in my mind that if the anti-monopoly law in the United States is so strict, the cooperation between the largest automobile companies in the two countries will be just a dream, but as their conversation deepened, I suddenly began to imagine other possibilities."
"It is no exaggeration to say that the cooperation negotiations between Toyota and GM officially began from this moment. What Shenwei will do next is to lobby Toyota Hideki, and what Chai will do is to judge whether GM is willing to cooperate with Toyota. Because both of them have very heavy daily work, and there is a time difference of 14 hours between Japan and the east coast of the United States, it is not as easy as it is said to keep close contact between them. So, I became the mouthpiece between them, conveying the ideas that Ying Er heard from Shenwei to Chai. Then pass on what Chai has learned to Shenwei. "
Chai felt that at that time, GM encountered many problems in the development of small cars and made slow progress, while Toyota's American strategy seemed to have reached a dead end, which was an opportunity for GM and Toyota to cooperate.
When meeting with Smith, Chai proposed the cooperation between GM and Toyota. Smith said, "I am not familiar with the internal situation of Toyota, so I entrust you as our plenipotentiary to directly arrange my meeting with the president of Toyota."
Chai first arranged for Kato Keiji, president of Toyota Motor Sales Company (who used to work in GM Japan Branch) to visit Smith at GM headquarters before Christmas. Kato Keiji formally expressed Toyota's willingness to establish a joint venture with General Motors.
1982 1 at the beginning of the month, Chai secretly went to Toyota Company to meet with Toyota Yingzhi, and reported on GM's joint venture plan: 500,000 Corolla cars were produced by using the idle factory located on the west coast (that is, the fremont factory), and the finished cars were distributed 50%: 50%, which were sold in their respective sales channels under the brands of GM and Toyota respectively.
Akio Toyoda thinks the plan is attractive, but he doubts whether GM has given Chai so much power in the joint venture negotiations.
The negotiation between Toyota and Ford is actually a public performance, which is watched by the whole world inside and outside the automobile industry. By analyzing the background of this negotiation and the respective plans of both parties, Toyota's interests can already be judged. Therefore, GM has been very clear about Toyota's thinking and predicament. The brand played by GM must be "the right medicine": it can not only use Toyota's small car resources to increase GM's sales, but also save a factory sentenced to death.
In order to avoid the media's overly curious "attention" and hard hype, Toyota Yingzhi had to "hide the sky from the sea." In order to cover up the action of Toyota Yingzhi, Toyota decided to hold a temporary dealer meeting in Canada, and Toyota Yinger will attend the meeting, so that it can swagger to North America.
At the Lincks Club in Manhattan, the talks between the two giants lasted for four hours. Chai, a temporary interpreter for GM, accompanied Toyota Yingzhi back to the hotel and couldn't wait to call Masaaki Sato, who was far away in Japan, and truthfully relayed the contents of the summit meeting.
On March 8, the third day after Toyota Hideki returned to Japan after attending the Canadian dealer meeting, the morning newspaper Nihon Keizai Shimbun published an exclusive news, reporting the news that the two companies entered the cooperation negotiation process.
Negotiations with GM are also quite difficult. 1in the autumn of 1982, Masajun Morita, the leader of the Toyota negotiating team, felt that it seemed impossible to talk about it and suggested to Toyota Yingzhi to give up the project.
Toyota Yingzhi didn't hesitate this time: "We can't waver in entering the American market, we can't cooperate with Ford, we can't cooperate with GM, we can only rely on our own strength. Do you have confidence in opening the American market by ourselves? If Toyota wants to become a multinational enterprise, it must rely on this cooperation. Negotiation needs patience, and we should continue to stick to it until we find a solution. I hope you will consider it carefully. "
In order to facilitate the negotiation, Toyota Yingzhi wrote a personal letter and entrusted executive vice president Yamamoto to personally hand it over to Smith. Smith made some concessions accordingly. 1983 In February, the board of directors of both parties approved the joint venture agreement.
Roger smith suggested that the name of the new company must include "United Auto" (United Auto is a parts company, and 197 1 was acquired by General Motors. It's no big deal, but I don't know why Smith has a unique love for United Auto).
On April 4th, 1985, fremont factory unfurled colorful flags and held the opening ceremony of United Automobile Company. President Reagan promised to attend the opening ceremony by visiting relatives, but in the end the schedule could not be arranged. Akio Toyoda visited President Reagan the day before the ceremony.
Akio Toyoda (left) attended the opening ceremony of NUMMI, a joint venture between General Motors and Toyota Motor Corporation, and roger smith, chairman of General Motors (1985), was on the right.
This article comes from car home, the author of the car manufacturer, and does not represent car home's position.