The Nanjing Defence War and the Nanjing Massacre were continuous in time, and its failure led to the fall of Nanjing, followed by the terrible Nanjing Massacre. The National Government failed to evacuate the citizens of Nanjing, leaving a serious security risk for the civilians and failing to deploy defense for Nanjing, which led to the chaotic retreat of troops and a large number of China soldiers stranded in the city. These factors have enlarged the scale of the victims of the Nanjing Massacre.

In fact, since the Battle of Songhu in August 1937, Nanjing has become an important target of Japanese air strikes. The National Government carried out publicity and education on air defense and War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, and various social organizations also carried out various forms of anti-Japanese propaganda and donation activities. On the eve of the fall of Nanjing on February 13, the city basically operated in an orderly manner. But in fact, the national government's preparations for war are limited, especially how to resettle and protect citizens after the fall of Nanjing, and there is no detailed plan. Residents stranded in Nanjing also lack basic awareness of self-protection and assistance. This situation has a lot to do with the misleading propaganda of the National Government. After the outbreak of the All-round Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government made a high-profile statement about their resolute attitude to the war of resistance, and cooperated with relevant measures and propaganda, leaving the public with the impression that the National Government adhered to Nanjing. For example, on the day of the fall of Shanghai, the Central Daily published an editorial "Tell the People of Beijing", saying: regarding Nanjing, the government "has set up the Nanjing garrison commander to direct the military and civilian organs and the people of the whole city to formulate plans to defend the country." Since then, the official reports have been made by Chiang Kai-shek and Tang Shengzhi. They will persist until the end of the Anti-Japanese War in Nanjing. Under the appearance of persistence, facing the Japanese army's pressing step by step, the national government did not have a detailed plan on how to resettle and protect Nanjing citizens.

Before and after the fall of Nanjing, most national government agencies were busy with the relocation of government agencies and did not pay attention to the aftermath after the fall of Nanjing and the safety of the people. Chiang Kai-shek's high-profile stance of sticking to Nanjing made it impossible for Nanjing citizens to have a correct estimate of the state of war, and to have corresponding material and psychological preparations after the defeat. Before and after the fall of Nanjing, a large number of refugees flocked to the international security zone in the city. Prior to this, the national government did not give enough support to the international security zone, and the security zone was not recognized by Japan. Therefore, their assistance to the safety and life of refugees is very limited.

During the Nanjing Massacre of the Japanese invaders, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians were massacred by the Japanese, including 70,000-90,000 soldiers from China. The capture and slaughter of such a large-scale army is closely related to the strategic decision-making and command mistakes in the defense of Nanjing. On the one hand, the national government's decision-making mistake of massing heavy troops to stick to Nanjing is the fundamental reason why a large number of China soldiers stayed in Nanjing. Nanjing is located in the south of the Yangtze River, and the Japanese army surrounded Nanjing by dividing troops. It is obviously a major mistake in military strategy to assemble hundreds of thousands of troops to stick to Nanjing when the national government does not have enough strength to ensure the safe and orderly evacuation of Nanjing defenders. Chiang Kai-shek knew that Nanjing could not be defended, but he made a high-profile statement to defend Nanjing, which was actually a "abandonment and disposal" of the participating troops. On the other hand, Tang Shengzhi, as the commander of Nanjing garrison, how to organize the evacuation in an orderly way after the city fell was also thoughtless. In order to cater to Chiang Kai-shek, he put forward the slogan of "swearing to survive in the city", stopped the army from retreating to the Yangtze River in Yijiangmen, and detained the ships crossing the river. According to Tang Shengzhi, this is: give it death and regenerate later. Thus, "death" is formed, but "afterlife" is futile. Coupled with the defects of military decision-making and command system, the defenders of China could not form effective resistance and orderly retreat after the fall of Nanjing, which directly led to the collapse of the organization of the officers and men stranded in the city, and tens of thousands of officers and men were captured and became the targets of cruel slaughter by the Japanese army.

Nanjing Defence War is a continuation of the Battle of Songhu and a helpless choice. If we want to analyze the battle of Nanjing, we must first look at the battle of two battles in Shanghai. The Battle of Shanghai and Songsong was a helpless political battle, and it was also the prelude of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, which opened the prelude of the all-round war of resistance.

The battle between Shanghai and Song Dynasty was the most united in the country at that time. Chiang Kai-shek sent three of his most elite armored soldiers at that time, and warlords from all walks of life did their best. The current propaganda is biased. I really want to know this history. I suggest watching Xiao Shuo's battle of two battles in Shanghai to learn about the passion and heroism of the people at that time.