There is a thought-provoking phenomenon in the government procurement work in a certain place. Suppliers and their brands selected by local leaders have indeed won the bid, and government procurement can know the results in advance. During the operation, the purchaser's representative listens to the instructions of the leader and asks the centralized procurement organization to handle it. However, centralized procurement institutions, no matter who they are, dare not neglect the instructions of the leaders of the municipal government. Leaders have to order their subordinates to act according to the plan, but the operating system of government procurement cannot be obviously violated, and that kind of misplaced public mistakes cannot appear. Information public release, uncertain brand procurement and inviting judges to bid evaluation must be handled in strict accordance with the system. Under such a premise, it is really difficult to ensure that the suppliers determined by the leaders win the bid, and the procurement agency has done it. Whether it is coincidence or deliberate arrangement, from the whole process of things, every aspect reflects the weakness of the government procurement system. We can further imagine that if the procurement agency does not determine the winning bidder according to the leader's intention, will the leader directly cancel the results of the collective selection by the judges, go from behind the scenes to the front desk, and directly specify the list of successful suppliers, or at least deny the work of the government procurement agency in a dignified manner and ask for reorganization of the bid opening? These are unpredictable things. Although government procurement has made some achievements under the attention of all parties, it still lags far behind the requirements of the system. Why are the provisions of the system not implemented? As a departmental law, does the Government Procurement Law have no binding means for leaders at all levels and government agencies? These problems are still inconclusive, but through disguised leadership, we obviously feel the defects in the system and the implementation of the system. Why is it difficult to guarantee the independence of the government procurement system, and why are the provisions of the system repeatedly suppressed by the leadership authority and not extended? The government procurement system stipulates that the independence of government procurement is inviolable, and no unit or individual may interfere with or destroy it, including the free entry of suppliers, the respect of the successful candidate determined by the jury according to the scoring method, and the strict implementation of the operating procedures of government procurement. In turn, there are mandatory provisions: First, the government procurement supervision department shall not set up centralized procurement institutions or participate in the procurement activities of government procurement projects. With the understanding of the separation of management and procurement in place, the practices formed in actual operation, as well as the implementation and reality of different units, are basically normal, but even so, most centralized procurement institutions still exist in the regulatory department, that is, the financial department, which makes us a little worried. Second, there must be no subordinate relationship or other interest relationship between the procurement agency and the administrative organ. This provision is necessary for social intermediary. Obviously, the system makers have seen the great harm of intermediary institutions and administrative institutions. However, in the absence of practical experience in government procurement, legislators have not yet realized or fully realized the harm of centralized procurement institutions belonging to the administrative departments. It can be said that at present, most centralized procurement institutions belong to administrative departments, so the loss of independence is inevitable in theory, because centralized procurement institutions want an independent practical foundation. Since the implementation of the Government Procurement Law, a series of problems have been ignored and contradictions have been accumulating. Maybe we can only wait until there is a big problem, or it is completely corrupt. At this time, if we brainstorm and make a decision, how can we know whether it is legal or not? It is unknown how the independence of centralized procurement institutions is embodied, but the only thing we know is that the departments set up by centralized procurement institutions have a great relationship with their work results. In other words, the quality of government procurement is not determined by the degree of effort, but by the size of the relationship and power. Therefore, some people say that if centralized procurement institutions are under the control of the Commission for Discipline Inspection, many problems will be solved. The tendency of leaders to control the calibration of government procurement is still obvious, but centralized procurement institutions are in a dilemma. Party and government leaders at all levels are behind the scenes. High-sounding slogans demand that government procurement be fair and just, and improve the satisfaction of buyers, suppliers and the masses. However, instructions, bills and orders are correct, requiring a supplier to win the bid, requiring a brand to purchase, and even interfering with the details of the scoring method, such as requiring the purchaser to conduct bid evaluation after determining several successful candidates. However, the obedient procurement organization has satisfied the leader's claim that this is illegal. Moreover, the leader is also a fair and just image spokesperson. Leaders take it for granted that purchasing agencies should do what they want. Once they go against the leadership's wishes, purchasing agencies and leaders at all levels will be criticized, and some will even be robbed of their jobs. Leaders can't see the pressure of professional evaluation brought by strict law enforcement by centralized procurement institutions, let alone realize the importance, urgency and necessity of government procurement. Government procurement is special. According to the normal evaluation procedure, the procurement center will always be backward, because most buyers and suppliers will not be satisfied because the procurement organization has to standardize the procurement behavior and special operating procedures, but the satisfaction rate of the procurement organization is in the hands of the above-mentioned personnel, and there is no system guarantee to require them to conduct a fair evaluation. The procurement agency is actually a scapegoat for the leader's calibration opinion, because the leader is absolutely correct at any time, so it is really difficult for the procurement agency to do things, not only to meet the procedural requirements, but also to achieve the goal according to the leader's intention. In the meantime, a lot of organization and coordination work needs to be done, which is a secret front. Once the behind-the-scenes information is leaked, the purchasing agency will bear great risks, the leaders must build archways, and the pressure on the purchasing agency will be concentrated. Government procurement does not allow centralized procurement institutions and purchasers to pay too much attention and care to a supplier, otherwise the concept of fair competition will be seriously challenged to some extent. In order to achieve the expected goal, purchasing organizations and purchasers should do a lot of preparatory work. When drafting the tender, we should try our best to balance the preferences, technical parameters, scoring rules, payment tolerance, price standards, etc. of the potential winning bidder, and even need to discuss with suppliers in advance, which obviously violates the principle of government procurement; Some details of participating in bidding should also be reminded to bidders repeatedly, and such bidders are often arrogant because they have leaders as their backers and even think that they don't need to bother to prepare. The result has been decided, including the details of the bidding documents, the number of copies, the writing and sealing of the words, and some matters needing attention. Special attention should be paid to the provisions on invalid bids and invalid bids, which are excluded in the hope of reducing the competitive pressure due to the mistakes of other bidders. I also hope that suppliers can strictly follow the requirements of procurement documents and strive for a beautiful bid. However, with such thoughtful arrangements, suppliers often don't sell their accounts, which brings certain hidden dangers to the later contract performance. It is necessary to guide the important parts of the bidder's tender, such as the price should not be too high, and some details that match the scoring method must be paid attention to. Although it can play the trend of effective competition, compared with other suppliers, it is obviously partial to one side. Some practices of purchasing institutions and purchasers violate the principle of fairness and justice, and the effective competition order of suppliers has been greatly challenged. How can the judge's professional consciousness in the decisive link of government procurement be guaranteed in the form of system, and how can this guarantee reflect the positive and negative aspects of restricting discretion and ensuring the operation of rights? It is necessary to carry out institutional innovation. In order to meet the requirements of leaders, procurement agencies must coordinate certain aspects, such as making some explanations to the judges, but not too explicit. It should be clear that the opinions of government leaders can't be named, and the judges should be able to take care of them under the same conditions, and they can't directly determine the winning bid, and they should strictly follow the scoring method. Some judges simply ignore the greetings from the purchasing agency, because they know that they have to bear the responsibility of cheating, and there is no need to influence the image of the judges for the sake of the face of the purchasing agency. We know that once a judge is bribed, the government procurement system will fall apart in essence, because the biggest highlight of the government procurement system is collective selection, which is the most effective way and has nothing to do with stakeholders, and is the soul of government procurement. True and strict collective selection is the best way to clear all obstacles. If the judge follows his feelings and the purpose of the procurement agency is easy to achieve, then the judge will become a shield for the irregular operation of government procurement. The establishment of the system is to hope that judges will enforce the law fairly, so where is the guarantee for the effective implementation of the system? Don't! The judges are part-time, operate according to the scoring method, can choose freely within the scope of discretion, and are most easily controlled by subjective emotions, because the interests of the judges are related to the choice of procurement institutions in some aspects. If we can set up a dual control system in terms of discretion and rights protection, which can not only ensure that the operation is not interfered by the outside world, but also prevent human tendency, then the purchaser and the procurement institution controlled by the leadership consciousness will be powerless. The supervision power of the government procurement supervision department has been partially weakened, and the bidding management office can also supervise the government procurement business. The chaotic supervision system will inevitably lead to poor supervision. It should be said that the statutory government procurement supervision department has done its best for the healthy development of the government procurement system. However, with the development of government procurement, we gradually found that the function of the statutory supervision department to supervise government procurement is shrinking, while the so-called bidding management office is in full bloom, taking up the opportunity of spring, so the bidding management office, which is not stipulated in the government procurement law, has become a supervision department, which stands out from others and can have centralized procurement institutions without any basis to guide government procurement practice. This is the tip of the iceberg of chaotic government procurement. The natural result of this situation is that the financial department's supervision of government procurement has been significantly reduced, and its enthusiasm and methods have faded. Therefore, the requirements of leaders can be carried out unimpeded under the operation of centralized procurement institutions without external control. This is the weak link of the government procurement system.