At the end of the first quarter of 2022, the balance of RMB real estate loans was 53.22 trillion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 6%, which was 1.9 percentage points lower than the growth rate at the end of last year. In the first quarter, it increased by 779 billion yuan, accounting for 9.3% of the increase in various loans in the same period, 9.8 percentage points lower than the previous year's level.
Tremble! Soaring 57%, 202 1 first quarter, 2 trillion "mortgage" came.
Viagra is neither a bull nor a bear in the real estate market, but a policy faction. The real estate market looks at policies in the short term, policies in the medium term and policies in the long term.
What is the policy? Of course, the core is still credit. Without funds, real estate cannot rise, so historically, the rise of the real estate market is closely related to the degree of credit easing. Especially in the past year or so, the rise of the real estate market has a very high correlation with the business loans entering the building.
Then, to analyze and judge the market in the first quarter of 20021and the future market trend, we must look at the first quarter credit data released by the central bank:
On April 12, the financial data and social financing data released by the central bank in the first quarter showed that even under the influence of the high base affected by the epidemic last year, the scale of new bank credit in the first quarter of this year was still considerable.
In the first quarter of this year, RMB loans increased by 7.67 trillion yuan. Even on the basis of a high base in the same period last year, the year-on-year increase was still 574 1 100 million yuan.
"The rapid growth of personal debt is closely related to China's economic development stage, the age structure of residents, consumption upgrading, urbanization development and other factors. Overall, the growth rate of personal loans will maintain rapid growth. Ruan said that from the structural point of view, the new personal loans are "one liter and one drop", which means that the growth rate of personal business loans has rebounded, while the growth rate of personal housing loans has declined.
At the end of March, the balance of individual housing loans increased by 14.5% year-on-year, which was 0.2 and 1.4 percentage points lower than that of last month and the same period of last year respectively. Personal business loans increased by 24.6% year-on-year, which was 1 1.5 percentage points higher than the same period of last year.
Some hot cities in the property market have intensified their efforts to investigate and deal with the illegal inflow of personal business loans into the property market. Even so, the data of new credit in March showed that the medium and long-term new credit of residents mainly with personal housing mortgage loans was obviously off-season. In the month, residents' medium and long-term new loans reached 623.9 billion yuan, an increase of 2 126 billion from the previous month. Under the background of rising base, it still increased by 654.38+05065438+billion, which was still hot with the sales of commercial housing in that month.
1: for the first time in history, the medium-and long-term loans of households in a single quarter are 2 trillion yuan!
In the first quarter of 2002/kloc-0, RMB loans increased by 7.67 trillion yuan, an increase of 574 1 100 million yuan. By sector, household loans increased by 2.56 trillion yuan, of which short-term loans increased by 582.9 billion yuan, and medium-and long-term loans increased by 1.98 trillion yuan;
The financial statistics report for the first quarter of 2020 shows that RMB loans increased by 7 1 trillion yuan in the first quarter, an increase of 1.29 trillion yuan year-on-year. By sector, household loans increased by 1.2 1 trillion yuan, of which short-term loans decreased by 50.9 billion yuan and medium-and long-term loans increased by 1.26 trillion yuan.
Looking at the data of the same period before, in the first quarter of 20 19, loans from the household sector increased by 1.8 1 trillion yuan, of which short-term loans increased by 429.2 billion yuan and medium-and long-term loans increased by 1.38 trillion yuan; In the first quarter of 20 18, loans from households increased by 1.75 trillion yuan, of which short-term loans increased by 466.9 billion yuan and medium-and long-term loans increased by 1.29 trillion yuan;
As we all know, the core of medium and long-term family loans is mortgage. In previous years, the highest household loan was about 5 trillion, and it was as high as 2 trillion in the first quarter of 2002/kloc-0. If this data is added up, it is 7-8 trillion.
2. Operating loans hit a record high.
According to the data of the central bank, the amount of operating loans is still amazing, so the property market in hot cities is still active.
Before 20 19, it is unlikely to use commercial loans to buy a house because it is unprofitable. Generally speaking, operating loans will be paid off in 1-3 years, and the interest rate is much higher than that of mortgage loans. In this case, most people will not use commercial loans to buy a house. The gain is outweighed by the loss.
But by 2020, because of special policies, the operating loan cycle is getting longer and longer, and the interest rate is much lower than that of mortgage loans, so buyers and banks have the idea of moving into the building with operating loans.
The core reason why operating loans flow into the property market is the spread with mortgage loans, which has a lot to do with banks being both athletes and referees in the process of lending. From the bank's point of view, the risk of operating loans is relatively higher than that of mortgage loans, but the interest rate of operating loans is lower than that of mortgage loans under the policy requirements, so the implementation of banks is distorted, which encourages operating loans to enter the property market in disguise.
The recent crackdown has been very strong, which has cracked down on some acts of using new houses and newly registered enterprises to obtain commercial loans in the short term. The strength of this policy will definitely curb the overheating of the market, return operating loans to the essence, help enterprises operate, and to some extent curb the irrational and unhealthy development of the entire property market.
But as long as the spread exists, any policy can only cure the symptoms, not the root cause!
In the case of operating loan interest rate of 3-4 and mortgage loan interest rate of 5-6, the spread is as high as 2 points, and the operating loan cycle and mortgage loan can basically be 20 years.
The same loan is 3 million yuan, and the interest of mortgage loan for house purchase is 820 thousand less than that of commercial loan!
In addition, the biggest impact of the proliferation of operating loans is the discrimination against the just-needed, most of which are suitable for investment in housing, and are basically concentrated in improved luxury homes, so this round of property market boom obviously started from the middle and high-end market. From the second quarter of 2020, from Shenzhen, Shanghai and Hangzhou, mid-to-high-end properties suddenly became popular.
Commercial loans to buy a house have spread from first-tier cities such as Shenzhen and Shanghai to second-tier cities.
From the perspective of operating loans, the current banking supervision websites are basically second-and third-tier cities, which shows that this scale is very large.
The fundamental reason for operating loans to enter the building is two-point spread. For commercial banks that are both referees and athletes, the interest rate of high-risk operating loans is low, and the interest rate of low-risk mortgage loans is high, so it is natural to move. If the spread between operating loans and mortgage loans is not leveled, then operating loans will not be managed.
To sum up briefly, most of China people's personal loans are for buying houses. According to central bank data, personal loans increased by 2.6 trillion yuan in the first quarter, an increase of 1.4 trillion yuan year-on-year. This data supports the real estate market in the storm-like regulation, why can it keep the volume and price rising together.
Will the house prices that many buyers care about fall? In fact, the core is to look at credit. As long as the personal loan data released by the central bank rises year-on-year, house prices will not fall.
The core of real estate regulation and control is to adjust the bank, and the bank's money can't be managed. Any regulation can only be spring breeze, including housing prices in first-and second-tier cities such as Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. Generally speaking, in an environment with abundant credit, rising is still the mainstream.
The central bank issued a "loan restriction order"! Since 202 1, 48 trillion mortgage loans have faced "high-voltage lines"
According to CCTV news reports, on the afternoon of February 3 1, the People's Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued the Notice on Establishing the Management System of Real Estate Loan Concentration in Banking Financial Institutions, which will set the management requirements of real estate loan concentration in different stages according to the asset size and institution type of banking financial institutions, and the notice will be implemented from 10/.
The so-called centralized management system of real estate loans mainly refers to Chinese banks, whose real estate loan balance ratio and individual housing loan balance ratio should meet the management requirements stipulated by the People's Bank of China and China Banking Regulatory Commission, that is, they should not be higher than the upper limit stipulated by the regulatory authorities.
Note that the new regulations are divided into two parts: the proportion of real estate loans and the proportion of personal housing loans.
The credit flow in both areas cannot exceed the prescribed limit, which is the two "high-voltage lines" that the property market will face.
So, where is the "upper limit" of real estate loans?
Specifically, it is divided into five major files, and each file has two upper limits, namely, the upper limit of real estate loan and the upper limit of personal mortgage. First list the contents of the new regulations, and then analyze the impact on the property market after the introduction of the regulations.
The six major state-owned banks (China Construction of Workers and Peasants, Postal Service and Transportation) and China Development Bank are the first gear, and the upper limits of the two gears are 40% and 32.5% respectively, which is the highest among the five gears.
China Merchants Bank, Agricultural Development Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, CITIC, Xingye and other medium-sized banks followed, with two upper limits of 27.5% and 20% respectively.
The third file is Chinese-funded small banks and non-county agricultural cooperative institutions, mainly including city commercial banks, private banks, large and medium-sized cities and urban agricultural cooperative institutions. The upper limits of the two files are 22.5% and 17.5% respectively.
The fourth file is county-level rural cooperative institutions, and the upper limits of the two files are 17.5% and 12.5% respectively.
The last file is the village bank, and the two upper limits are 12.5% and 7.5% respectively.
Obviously, the conditions of large joint-stock banks we often deal with are the most relaxed, while those of city commercial banks or small banks in counties and towns are the most stringent.
Such detailed, strict and meticulous regulations on the proportion of real estate loans were promulgated on the last day of 2020 and implemented immediately on the first day of 202/kloc-0, without giving the market a buffer period, which has never happened before.
Of course, in the past, the central bank also required the proportion of housing-related loans, but most of them stipulated a vague proportion, or restricted the flow of credit through surprise inspections.
For example, in document Yinfa 12 1 in 2003, document No.46 issued by the Banking Regulatory Commission in 2004 and document No.25 issued by the Banking Regulatory Commission in 2009, the building must meet the requirements of "complete four certificates, 30% of its own funds, and the developer has the second-class qualification or above" before lending to the bank, which is the so-called "432" requirement.
For example, at the end of 20 15, the central bank launched MPA assessment, adding mortgage scale and the ratio of mortgage to development loan. If any bank fails the examination, mother will not give money.
The central bank and the China Banking Regulatory Commission believe that these measures are far from enough, and we will continue to raise the price of banks, so that real estate can not get what it wants. In our memory, there is really no such thing as issuing official documents, grading and setting a ceiling, which makes the whole market feel a sense of oppression.
Why should the central bank and the China Banking Regulatory Commission "enlarge" real estate loans?
The answer is simple: the proportion of real estate loans is getting higher and higher, and the phenomenon of "too big to fail" has appeared, which has bound the entire financial system.
According to the data of the central bank, at the end of the third quarter of 2020, the balance of RMB real estate loans was 48.83 trillion yuan, up by 12.8% year-on-year, 0.3 percentage points lower than that at the end of the previous quarter, and declined for 26 consecutive months. In the first three quarters, it increased by 4.42 trillion yuan, accounting for 27.2% of the increase of various loans in the same period, and 6.8 percentage points lower than that at the same period of last year.
President Yi Gang sent a paper some time ago, which mentioned that real estate and financial assets have a dual relationship.
On the one hand, real estate is an important asset of residents and enterprises, and residents and enterprises pose liabilities to banks through real estate financing. The financial assets of banks partly correspond to the real estate in the hands of residents and enterprises.
On the other hand, the rapid expansion of credit secured by real estate will lead to the concentration of financial risks to banks and localities, and it is easy to form a self-strengthening mechanism.
Prynne wrote an article explaining it at that time. Let me give you an example: A is a buyer, B is a bank, C is a city, and D is a housing enterprise.
City C sells the land to the real estate enterprise D, and City C obtains financial revenue.
Housing enterprise d mortgages the land to bank b to build a house.
Buyer A takes income and cash as down payment, mortgages it to Bank B, and converts it into real estate, which is the most important asset composition of the family.
Because of the mortgage, the asset side of Bank B is constantly expanding, and the residential property actually corresponds to the bank's assets.
It has gone up, and everyone is happy. C's fiscal revenue will be more and more, A's assets will be more and more high-quality, and it can be mortgaged again to obtain more financing. Bank B's assets are also healthy, so it is difficult to have bad debts. The scale of D continues to expand, and land acquisition will intensify. There are hundreds of billions of housing enterprises everywhere, and it is a scene of jubilation.
But in essence, property buyers A, housing enterprises B and cities C all passed on the risks and leverage to banks B. Once there is a liquidity crisis in the property market, the prices of cities that nobody cares about collapse, the market value of real estate shrinks and the value of collateral plummets. The asset side of the bank will inevitably deteriorate, and bad debts and centralized redemption will appear in batches.
According to statistics, in 20 19, the ratio of house price to income in Hong Kong was as high as 49.42 times, ranking first in the world, while that in Chinese mainland was 29.09 times, ranking second in the world.
In contrast, it is only 3.5 times in the United States and 1 1 times in Japan, which reflects that the burden of buying houses in China is already obviously heavier, and it is impossible for house prices to go up any more.
You know, both the United States and Japan have experienced a "hard landing" of real estate. After the introduction of "land price tax", Japan's economy collapsed and experienced "lost 20 years". The subprime mortgage crisis in the United States eventually needs the whole world to pay the bill.
Real estate regulation is urgent.
Let's talk about the impact of the new regulations on the real estate industry.
In the short term (1-2 years), the impact is really small.
Guo Sheng Securities collated relevant data. Judging from the total proportion of real estate loans, in the first tranche, China Construction Bank and Bank of China accounted for 4 1.72% and 50.0 1%, which required pressure drop of 1.7% and 10%.
The second tranche of China Merchants Bank, China CITIC Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and Industrial Bank were all overfulfilled, with pressure drops of 6.8%, 0.6%, 1.2% and 7.8% respectively.
In the third stage, Hangzhou Bank, Chengdu Bank, Bank of Zhengzhou Bank, Qingdao Bank and Qingnong Bank need to reduce the pressure by 2.7%, 13.3%, 10.5%, 9.3% and 7.7%.
It can be seen that because the central bank has repeatedly applied to reduce the proportion of real estate loans in recent years, the proportion exceeded by banks is not much. For example, in the first gear, ICBC, Agricultural Bank of China, Postal Savings and Bank of Communications are all under the "ceiling" and the quota has not been used up.
Even if the proportion of housing-related loans of CCB and BOC exceeds the limit, the next step is to control the growth rate of loans, because the total amount of credit has been increasing.
If the denominator increases, the numerator will not move, even if it exceeds the loan ceiling of 10%, it can still reach the standard.
What's more, banks still have a transition period.
If the proportion of housing-related loans exceeds 2%, the transition period is two years, and the proportion exceeds 4%. The transition period of business adjustment is as long as four years, and most banks can land smoothly.
However, in the long term (5- 10 years), it is extremely unfavorable to buyers and the real estate industry.
There is only one key word: long-term mechanism.
In the past, it controlled the status quo and controlled the banking stocks. After a gust of wind, it did not affect the "real fragrance" status of real estate as high-quality collateral. Banks, housing enterprises and property buyers are all happy.
The current regulation controls hard indicators, expectations and credit increments, and wants to put all valuable credit resources into real estate as before, but there is no way.
The "three red lines" of housing enterprises are aimed at the loan demand of real estate.
The bank's "two high-voltage lines" aim at the loan supply of the financial system.
While restraining "demand" and controlling "supply", it took a long time to gradually "iron out" the side effects caused by the rapid expansion of the real estate industry and ease the financial system's dependence on the property market.
Jiang Tianyang has a famous saying: there are three conditions for doing great things: first silver, second silver and third silver.
No matter how high the developer's means of capital integration is, and how strong the ability of buyers to break through the restrictions on purchases, loans and sales is, without the continuous "silver" support of banks, the foundation for credit expansion will be gone, and it is futile to say anything.
Therefore, the central bank chose 202 1 to issue a "loan restriction order" from the beginning, which is an attitude "declaration": real estate "de-financialization", and we are serious.
2020 is the most difficult 1 year for real estate in the last five years, and it may be the best 1 year in the future.
On June 5,438+10, the national individual housing loan increased by 1000 billion yuan. What do these figures mean?
This shows that people's desire to buy a house has reached its peak. In addition, the state gave a green light to the loan to buy a house, and people made full use of this favorable condition. Recently, the mortgage policy has been adjusted to promote the stable development of the real estate market. Housing financing is returning to normal, and residents' willingness to buy houses is also increasing marginally.
Extended data:
First, the state's regulation of the real estate market
1, at the personal level: after early regulation, residents' understanding of the real estate market gradually returned to rationality, and houses gradually returned from investment products to residential needs in some people's consciousness, and people's expectations of the real estate market also changed. For the real estate market, expectations are very important. In fact, a great supporting factor of irrational development in the early stage is the expectation of rising house prices, but this expectation is out of date. But on the other hand, in order to ensure the healthy development of the real estate market, it is not to let people form overly pessimistic expectations for the real estate market. After all, excessively pessimistic expectations run counter to the healthy development of the real estate market.
2. Policy level: "Living without speculation" is the basic orientation of China real estate market development at present and in the future. The irrational development of the real estate market will lead to many economic and social problems, with less advantages and more disadvantages, so I won't go into details here, so the central government is determined to let the real estate market return to the normal development track. However, it should also be clear that letting the real estate market return to the rational development track does not mean blindly suppressing the real estate market, but maintaining its healthy development. There is no doubt that the real estate market is an important part of the economy, and its reasonable development will have a positive effect on the economy and help meet people's housing needs. The cross-cycle adjustment of macro policies will also take into account the stable development of the real estate market.
3. Financial level:
First, we should guard against the risks of the real estate market, including the excessive growth of housing prices and the debt problems of real estate developers, and transmit them to the financial sector;
Second, ensure the credit demand of rigid housing groups, and support first-time buyers in terms of loan down payment ratio and interest rate. For example, the data shows that more than 90% of bank personal housing loans are the first home loan; Third, the credit changes related to the real estate market are part of the overall credit situation of the economy, and the tightness within a certain range is normal. Moreover, real estate is an important part of the real economy, and reasonable credit support is normal, but credit policy will not support the irrational development of the real estate market;
Fourth, financial institutions have their own pace and grasp in real estate credit while meeting regulatory requirements. The low growth rate of personal housing loan in the early stage left a lot of room for the subsequent credit situation;
5. Moderately increasing personal housing loans (including other related loans in the real estate market) while ensuring rigid demand is conducive to alleviating the debt problem of some real estate developers and restraining the negative effects of the real estate market from spreading to other market entities.