The reasons for the serious setback of "shock therapy" in the Russian Communist Party are quite complicated, the main ones are the following aspects.

First, the difficulties in transforming the operation and management mechanism were underestimated. The original economic operating mechanism of the Russian Communist Party has a history of more than 70 years. It is quite standardized in terms of organizational structure, staffing, operation methods, etc.; from leading cadres, staff to ordinary working people, they have become accustomed to and accepted it. The operation and management mechanism that has been formed; for a long time, the "planned national economy" has been widely publicized as the basic feature and superiority of socialism, which has left a deep imprint on people's ideology, etc. All of these have made reforms more difficult. The failure of Khrushchev's reforms, especially Gorbachev's reforms, is directly or indirectly related to the above situations. However, Yeltsin neither carefully studied the situation in Russia nor deeply summarized the experience and lessons of reforms in various periods. Instead, he adopted a reckless policy of cutting through the knot with a sharp knife, trying to turn Russia from the original plan-based economic system to a market-based one in a very short period of time. The track of economic operation; transform the original "shortage market" into a modern market relationship based on supply and demand. Haste makes waste, and acting hastily will inevitably lead to failure. Russian Vice President Rutskoi once publicly criticized that "the government's principled error is" to "rush to the market through shock therapy" without research and analysis.

Second, there are many branches of government and the laws are not unified. In a big country like Russia, in order for reforms to succeed, there must be a strong political center and capable leaders at all levels, but Russia lacks such prerequisites. The year 1992 was a year of fierce political struggle in Russia, centered on the battle between the president and the parliament, which worked under "serious opposition".

Yeltsin believed that "one of the most serious obstacles to economic reform is" the "profound contradiction" between the legislative and executive agencies. As a result, first, there are multiple branches of government. The president criticized that there are often "three to four decisions" on the same issue; the speaker complained that many orders, decisions, and instructions are "conflicting with each other," making it difficult for local staff to To figure out "this mess", people are at a loss; secondly, the laws cannot be implemented. So far, there are basically two teams from the central to the local governments doing their own thing, "wasting time and energy on arguing with each other", Yeltsin It is believed that only half of the regions have established a "normal cooperative relationship" between the two teams. In this chaotic situation, any reform plan and policy cannot be implemented, which leads to the "inward explosion" of the entire economy.

Third, expectations for Western aid are too high. Western economic powers, led by the United States, used economic aid as bait to accelerate the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and then tried to bring the "Commonwealth of Independent States" countries into the Western economic orbit as soon as possible. In order to obtain tens of billions of dollars in aid from the West, Gorbachev once knelt down and begged in front of Western powers, and Yeltsin was also deceived by Western aid. First of all, this is strategically wrong. A big country like Russia with a population of nearly 150 million can only rely on its own efforts to develop its economy and carry out reforms. Reliance on foreign aid can only lead to mistakes. Secondly, Yeltsin confused the political behavior of Western powers with their economic behavior. For ulterior purposes, Western powers can support a certain faction politically, including the promise of economic assistance, but when it comes to implementing economic assistance, it is another matter. In this regard, state power can only play a certain role in promoting it to varying degrees, because as a rule, such huge economic aid plans are mostly implemented by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. As economic organizations, they are not only It must reflect the political intentions of major countries, and more importantly, it must consider economic interests. It is necessary to consider both the economic benefits of the loan and the repayment ability of the recipient country. Yavlinsky, who formulated the "500-Day Plan" under the instruction of the United States, revealed the secret in one sentence: Western economic aid is "mainly spiritual aid, not financial aid." The "Seven Western Countries" had promised to give Russia US$24 billion in aid, which was only a drop in the bucket for the Russian economy that was riddled with holes. Even this meager amount of aid, after a year of fighting and pleading, was not enough. Half, in response, the Russian Speaker publicly criticized that the government once regarded Western aid as a "motivator for reform", but now it has "suffered a clear failure."