Description of the problem:

Do you think they have rebellious ideas and are worried about mutiny again?

or, for moral conscience?

Analysis:

After all, it is * * * suffering? Why kill? When the vast majority of phase method, thought that these people split personality, cruel personality? You can only share the pain but not the wealth.

think deeply? These people who have made great achievements can always come back to the last peak in the face of the most complicated and difficult things. During this period, all means are used, true and false, and everything is acting. The adviser thinks that he is loyal, while the master thinks that the means of such ecstasy are changing. He has no words from the monk of Tang Dynasty, so how can he wait to destroy /

The adviser can count all the organs, but he can't count human nature? Everything I do is for the sake of the owner, so the owner can only be grateful and share

"Birds are exhausted, good bows are hidden". In the history of thousands of years, this farce has been staged repeatedly. The whole history is caught in a strange circle. No matter how hard you struggle, you can't get out of the cycle after all, just as the Monkey King can't jump out of the palm of the Tathagata. Since this kind of thing happened in every dynasty and generation, logically and intuitively, it should not be a personal quality problem of an emperor, but a structural problem. With the development of economics, people can analyze some historical phenomena with the method of economic rationality. The relationship between heroes and emperors can be explained reasonably with the theory of information economics, although it will not be the only explanation.

in the principal-agent theory of information economics, there are many types of agents because of information asymmetry. The agents know what type they belong to, but the principals don't. In order to show his type, the agent chooses a certain signal, and the client judges the type of agent according to the observed signal and signs a contract with the agent. This is the so-called signaling model. For example, the relationship between employers and employees in enterprises: employees know their abilities, but employers don't; In order to show their abilities, employees choose the level of education. Employers pay their employees according to their education level. In addition, there is a signal screening model, which is the same as that in signaling model, except that the principal comes first, and a series of contracts are put forward for managers to choose, and the agent chooses the most suitable contract according to his own type. Either way, the agent is motivated to expose his type.

With the help of economic theory, we can regard the relationship between the emperor and the hero as a principal-agent relationship. As the owner of the empire, the emperor controls the property rights of the empire, but he can't directly govern the country. He must entrust one or several agents to help him manage the country. Under such a principal-agent relationship, the emperor gave high-ranking officials and generous salaries to the heroes, and asked them to work hard and serve the emperor. However, the emperor's main concern is to ask the heroes not to rebel. Whether the heroes work hard or not belongs to the incentive theory, which will not be discussed here for the time being. We will focus on whether to rebel or not.

for any emperor, it is very important to ensure that the country will last for generations. Therefore, it is logical for the emperors to rack their brains to solve the problem whether the heroes make rebellion or not. The key to solving the problem of whether the heroes will rebel is to identify who will rebel, but this is a pattern of asymmetric information: ministers themselves know whether they will rebel, but the emperor does not know who is a traitor and who is a loyal minister. Song Taizong has a famous saying to the effect that a country has either external troubles or internal troubles. External troubles are tangible, while internal troubles are imperceptible. A treacherous confession reveals the helplessness of the emperors: he must have some way to identify who is a traitor and who is a loyal minister. According to the theory of information economics, the heroes must send a signal or the emperor must use a signal to determine a separation condition, so that loyal and treacherous officials can be separated without confusion.

In economics, due to the different costs and benefits of each kind of people, it is also possible to formulate separation conditions according to a signal, so that different types of people can automatically show their true colors according to the cost-benefit comparison, but for things like rebellion, the benefits of being an emperor are so high that any cost is dwarfed. As long as there is some risk preference, it is possible to rebel successfully, and it is difficult to guarantee that some people will not be evil. In the face of the emperor's throne with almost unlimited income, it is impossible to determine a separation condition according to the cost-benefit situation, and the emperors can only judge directly according to a certain signal (this paper does not consider the situation that the loyal minister will change into a traitor because of the change of time and situation). Then what signal can make the emperor identify the traitor?

The first thing people think of is to strengthen the punishment of threats, such as exterminating the Nine Clans, in the year, and so on, so that people who have risk-averse behaviors will choose not to rebel. But when the emperor's income is so high, risk lovers will always try it when they have the chance. The heroes, especially the founding heroes, themselves mean that they are risk lovers. Otherwise, who will "carry their heads and do the revolution"? Therefore, the threat of punishment after the event will not have much shocking significance for the heroes who take risks as their profession.

what about kinship? From Lv Hou to Li Shimin, from Dourgen to Yongzheng, the kinship and kinship constraints of relatives are only a small cost for competing for the throne. Those who achieve great things will never take it to heart, and it is an eternal saying to share me. Can we identify treacherous court officials according to the signal of obedience to the emperor? There is no doubt that people who really want to rebel will still be respectful to the emperor. An Lushan's absolute obedience to Tang Minghuang's stomach is fresh in my memory, and this signal has no meaning. Can you think in reverse, thinking that those who dare to argue with the emperor are loyal ministers and those who dare not argue are treacherous officials? Unfortunately, in the history, the powerful ministers dared to argue with the emperor, but it was still difficult to tell the difference between loyalty and treachery. All these things, we can't find a reasonable signal for the emperors to separate loyalty and traitors from the heroes, and of course it is impossible to find the conditions for separation.