The main and direct motivation for the Nixon administration to improve relations with China was to strengthen its bargaining position with the Soviet Union on issues such as the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms negotiations and the Vietnam War.

In 1975 and 1976, some U.S. analysts wrote that Moscow made compromises on strategic arms talks and European disarmament issues. The important reason was that the progress in Sino-U.S. relations in the past few years had strengthened the international of insecurity. Another opinion is that if U.S.-China relations develop too quickly, the Soviets will have serious doubts about the strategic intentions of the United States and believe that the United States has made up its mind to form an anti-Soviet alliance with China, so making concessions to the United States is in vain. Useless. Détente between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed promising during this period, and the Nixon and Ford administrations seemed inclined toward the latter view. This is reflected in their cautious attitude towards establishing strategic relations with China, and they believe that maintaining relations between the United States and the Soviet Union is more important than developing Sino-US relations. Until 1978, the Carter administration basically implemented the policy of “equal treatment” for China and the Soviet Union.

However, the US government has actually explored the possibility of establishing military relations with China in a secret and cautious manner. Plans in this area were basically formed in March 1974. Some important policy blueprints were completed from 1976 to 1978, including detailed plans on how to gradually develop military cooperation with China. However, an interagency study within the government opposes establishing a U.S.-China military relationship in the near future. The conclusion is that the Soviet Union and the United States engaged in détente to a large extent to reduce the possibility of China and the United States joining forces to resist the Soviet Union. If the Soviets were given the impression that Soviet-American détente did not prevent Sino-American unity, Moscow would reconsider its policy toward the United States. Therefore, the risks of U.S.-China military cooperation are too high. In June 1977, the contents of the report were intentionally disclosed by the U.S. government to the New York Times for publication.

Consideration of the balance of power Starting from Nixon and Kissinger, U.S. foreign policymakers have been more clearly aware of the relative weakening of U.S. power in the world and the inevitable trend of multipolarization of the world political landscape. They believed that according to the principle of balance of power in international relations, China and the Soviet Union should "support the weak and restrain the strong." In addition, after the Vietnam War, the U.S. military power in East Asia weakened, and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region were still unable to resist the Soviet threat alone. China controlled a quarter of the Soviet ground forces, which was of great significance to maintaining the strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region. major.

Image changes During the period when the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States and China were easing at the same time, the images of China and the Soviet Union in the United States improved, but China's image changed faster. From the past "the most dangerous enemy" Became a "quasi-ally". Among senior leaders, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai impressed American leaders with their leadership abilities and ideological depth, dwarfing those of Brezhnev and Kosygin. It is worth mentioning that the Nixon and Ford governments, which pursued a realist diplomatic line, did not propose that the easing of relations between the United States, China, and the United States and the Soviet Union must be based on changes in the domestic political systems and ideologies of China and the Soviet Union. The Carter administration's human rights diplomacy was mainly aimed at the Soviet Union.

A public opinion poll from 1974 to 1976 showed that the American public believed that China’s strength and international status would be significantly enhanced in the next ten years, while neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was a country that was becoming stronger.

In addition to safeguarding its national strategic interests, an important background condition for the change of the Nixon administration's China policy is the voice coming from outside the White House walls. This movement demanding changes in the old China policy is the United States' Another important incentive for policymakers to adjust their China policies. In the United States, the public's psychological orientation is an important constraint when formulating a certain government policy, whether it can be implemented smoothly, and whether it can succeed