Generally speaking, from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War to the early Showa, the "independence of commander-in-chief power" basically did not become a political and military confrontation. On the contrary, during the Taisho period and the early Showa period, Japan's politics and military maintained a coordinated and priority relationship, which basically reflected the principle that military obeyed politics. After World War I, the Japanese military realized that the future war must be an "all-out war" through the investigation of the European war. To mobilize the whole people and use all the forces of the country to participate in the war, it will be inseparable from the support and guarantee of the government and political parties. The military is aware of the necessity of maintaining a coordinated relationship with the government. Strategy (narrow military strategy) should serve political strategy, but it has become a strategic threat to political strategy, and political strategy is forced to serve strategy. Clausewitz put forward the principle that "war is an extension of politics" in On War.