A few days ago, Yonghui released the financial report for the first half of 20021,which caused widespread onlookers-the absolute leader of this fresh supermarket actually suffered huge losses of 1 1 billion yuan, which is the first time in1years!
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Yonghui, 202 1 is really too difficult.
During the reporting period, the total revenue of Yonghui Supermarket was 46.827 billion yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 7.30%; The net profit of returning to the mother is even more bleak, with a loss of 65.438+0.083 billion yuan. In the same period last year, this figure was still a profit of 65.438+85.4 million yuan, down 654.38+0% year-on-year.
From the perspective of comprehensive gross profit margin, it decreased by 3.55% to 18.82% compared with the same period of 20 19, even lower than its gross profit level nine years ago. Both revenue and net profit declined, which was the first performance loss since Yonghui went public 1 1 year.
Photo: Yonghui Supermarket's revenue and net profit in the first half of the year
Yonghui said that the decline in net profit mainly comes from: the impact of the decline in income and gross profit margin; The fair value of financial assets held by the Company at the end of the reporting period decreased by 320 million yuan compared with the beginning of the year; The implementation of the new lease standard reduced the total profit and net profit of the reporting period by 250 million yuan and 206 million yuan respectively. However, even if the latter two items are added back for adjustment, Yonghui's main business still has a net loss of about 550 million yuan.
In the capital market, Yonghui has also been critically attacked. From 7.20 yuan at the beginning of the year to 3.77 yuan, the market value evaporated by over 50 billion yuan.
In addition, Yonghui is in constant trouble this year, and it can be called the supermarket enterprise with the most twists and turns.
At the beginning of the year, all the super-species stores in the country except Fuzhou were closed, and Yonghui MINI was also caught in the tide of closing stores. In July, the director of Yonghui resigned. In August, Yonghui was removed from the post of CEO Li Guo, and forced the former CTO Li to become the new CEO in the dispute.
Then, we can't help asking, what happened to a generation of giants? Why did they fall off the altar?
02
Was photographed on the beach by the "back wave"
The reason for the decline of Yonghui is, first of all, the alternation of old and new formats. Innovators who attacked others at the beginning are now photographed on the beach by the "back wave".
Yonghui was founded by two brothers, Zhang Xuansong and Zhang Xuanning. They were born in a rural family in Minhou County, Fujian Province. They move bricks and sell beer. Later, they entered the retail industry and opened a "Gule meager profit supermarket", which became an instant hit with the slogan of "parity every day" and earned a lot of money.
Before long, foreign supermarkets began to enter China, and "foreign brands" had a devastating impact on local traditional supermarkets. The two brothers were not spared, but they were not discouraged, but decided to "learn from foreigners to control foreigners."
They are keenly aware of a key difference between Chinese and foreign supermarkets-fresh food will be sold in foreign supermarkets, but only in the vegetable market in China.
The reason is that fresh food is difficult to store and perishable, so local supermarkets never sell it. But if we solve this problem technically, it will definitely be a very attractive cake.
Because the biggest feature of fresh food is high frequency+just need. This is equivalent to the drainage products of the supermarket. By buying fresh food to drive high-margin consumption of other products, the profits of supermarkets will increase rapidly.
Coinciding with the national policy, the two brothers actively undertook the task of "changing agriculture into supermarkets" and officially opened the first fresh supermarket-Yonghui Pingxi Fresh Supermarket in 2000. In a short time, the number of stores has exceeded 50.
In order to run through the preservation mode, Yonghui has gradually formed a set of methodology in several years of continuous exploration-
Docking suppliers in the upstream, relying on category advantages to have bargaining power and reduce supply chain costs. Self-built logistics distribution center in the middle reaches, distributing its own ingredients, incubating the brand of food supply chain in the lower reaches, carrying out primary processing on fresh food, and then sending the remaining products after processing to the to B end. Only in this way can we realize the double guarantee of product quality and enterprise profit.
But there is no invincible business model in the world. In the first decade of 2 1 century, Yonghui was an absolute innovation benchmark, but 20 years later, it was fatally hit by a more innovative benchmark-community group buying.
In 2020, giants entered the market with huge capital, and community group buying rose rapidly. The reason why this model can form a fatal blow to the traditional format is because of convenience. Under the pressure of work, young people nowadays are becoming more and more lazy. Even if they don't want to order takeout, they seldom go to the supermarket to buy meat and food.
In the mode of community group purchase, young people can pick up the goods at the door of the community after coming back from work, or they can choose to deliver them directly to their homes.
Second, because it is cheap, under the subsidy of burning money by capital giants, you can buy more than a dozen eggs for 99 cents. The strength of this subsidy can be seen from the financial reports of the giants.
According to haitong international's forecast, the GMV related to buying more vegetables will reach 14 1 billion yuan in 20021year, and the related losses will reach 30-40 billion yuan. In addition, CMB International predicts a loss of 7.8 billion yuan at 2Q2 1.
From Yonghui's financial report, we can also clearly see the influence of community group buying on Yonghui. The financial report shows that the fresh and processed gross profit margin of Yonghui Supermarket in the first half of this year was 65,438+00.27%, down 4.69% year-on-year, and the revenue decreased 65,438+065,438+0.74% year-on-year. In contrast, the gross profit margin of food products business in the first half of this year was 65,438+05.68%, down by 3.54% year-on-year and revenue by 3.02%.
In the future, can Yonghui fight against the encirclement and suppression of Internet capital giants and keep its own base camp? This is not only related to the leading position of the industry, but also directly related to life and death.
03
Create a difficult transformation of cooling at a time.
However, over the years, Yonghui has always understood the truth of "if you don't advance, you will fall back" and constantly innovate business models. But it is often created once and cooled once.
With the rise of the Internet and the full impact of e-commerce on traditional hypermarkets, Yonghui followed the strategic pace of Ali's "new retail" and launched "super species" after Ali Box Ma Xiansheng.
Super species is a brand-new retail format, which belongs to the fusion of supermarket catering. There are eight categories: salmon workshop, Bolong workshop, wheat workshop and living kitchen. Consumers can buy fresh products, let the clerk process them on the spot and eat them in the store.
This refreshing "new species" really attracted a large wave of consumers in the early stage of development. On the first day of opening, the revenue was nearly 200,000, and it expanded to 26 in one year.
However, the seemingly unparalleled "unicorn" is actually a "poisonous horn beast" that only sees the input and cannot see the output. Yonghui Yunchuang, which includes the super-species plate, has been in a state of loss since 20 15 was formally established, with a cumulative loss of 2.646 billion yuan in four years.
From 20 19, the super species began to adjust greatly, until April 20021,the super species completely closed down and declared failure.
So why did this "new retail benchmark" get up early and catch a late episode?
The most critical problem is unclear strategy.
Superspecies didn't think about what they were going to do at first, which was related to the different ideas of the founders. Zhang Xuanning is optimistic about the new online retail business, which is Yonghui Yunchuang founded by himself, while Zhang Xuansong is optimistic about the traditional offline supermarket chain, which is Yonghui Yunchao.
Especially with the intensification of the loss of super species, the conflict between the two brothers is getting bigger and bigger, and then it is upgraded to the development direction and personnel conflict of Yonghui. Zhang Xuansong even publicly admitted that he had differences with Zhang Xuanning.
The conflict between the Zhang brothers in turn affected the development of Yonghui. The disharmony of management makes super species in a state of extreme division. They want to do both catering and retail, both online and offline. In the end, nothing was done.
From the online point of view, Yonghui did not understand that "online" is not simply to provide an online purchase channel, but also to make preparations for supply chain and distribution.
Due to the insufficient reservation of online order space, it is often necessary to transfer goods from other places when delivering goods to this part of users, which is bound to greatly slow down the delivery speed and affect the user experience.
From the offline, Yonghui's super species has a typical problem of contemporary entrepreneurship-looking at the face is very valuable, and looking at the lining is extremely burning money.
In Yonghui, consumers can process products on the spot after purchase, and they can also eat in the store. However, it takes up quite a lot of space to make meals, which inevitably means that the floor efficiency is low.
Especially compared with one-third of box horses allocated to catering, the proportion of Yonghui directly reached one-half, so it is easy to understand that the cost is high and it is difficult to make money.
Moreover, super species is playing the concept of boutique supermarket, aiming at middle and high-end consumers. So the location is mostly located near office buildings and high-end shopping malls. The typical feature of these places is "an inch of land and an inch of gold".
Take Fuzhou store as an example, the super species is located in the high-priced area, and the rent is about 10 yuan/square meter, while the rent of ordinary supermarkets is 1 and 2 yuan/square meter.
So it is not difficult to understand the characteristics of the superspecies "gold-sucking black hole".
A similar problem happened to another innovative exploration, Yonghui mini, which was short-lived after the crazy expansion.
At the end of 20 18, Yonghui Supermarket put forward the idea of miniaturization of hypermarkets and sinking of small formats, and launched Yonghui Mini Store. At the shareholders' exchange meeting in 20 19, Zhang Xuansong even set the goal of opening 1000 mini stores throughout the year.
However, since 2020, Yonghui mini has fallen into the tide of closing stores. After closing 302 stores in the second half of last year, 86 mini stores were closed in the first quarter of this year. So far, there are only 70 mini-shops left.
The reason why the mini shop lost was that Yonghui's tactics were unclear. Although at the strategic level, the cooperative operation mode of mini-stores and hypermarkets can complement each other, it seems quite right.
However, at the practical level, Yonghui blindly copied the operation logic, process and management methods of big stores, reduced the store area, but squeezed into the community with the same commodity structure and promotion methods, and blindly opened stores.
Moreover, because Yonghui is too impatient and radical, it is naturally more and more profitable.
As the old saying goes, you can't eat hot tofu if you are impatient.
04
Can the last straw save lives?
After playing various modes such as fresh food+catering, fresh community convenience stores, community fresh supermarkets, and supermarkets reaching home (all pits have been trampled), Yonghui pinned its hopes on the warehousing mode.
In May this year 1, the first warehouse member store in China opened in Fuzhou. After that, Yonghui warehouse stores successively settled in Shanghai, Sichuan, Beijing, Henan and other places. Up to now, there are 35 warehouse stores in China that have undergone store changes.
In this regard, some employees gave the evaluation of "driving backwards". According to an old employee, from red label shops to green label shops, to fine products and super species, we thought it was an increasingly high-end evolution. Unexpectedly, after the failure of the super species, the newly launched warehouse store went back to the old road of the red label store, as if something had gone wrong, like driving backwards.
So why did Yonghui return to its original point?
According to the official explanation of Zhang Xuansong, chairman of Yonghui Supermarket, the retail market has entered the stage of stock competition. Yonghui will return to the user-centered origin of Minsheng Supermarket, strengthen its scientific and technological capabilities and supply chain capabilities through innovative business models, provide consumers with cost-effective products and quality services, and let mainstream family customers return to Yonghui's stores to increase inventory.
But there is another folk saying-
A business report shows that Yonghui warehouse supermarket is not the product of Yonghui's long-planned plan, but because of an accident.
Previously, the sales of Fuzhou Olympic Sports Sunshine Store were poor, with a business area of 10,000 square meters and daily sales of only tens of thousands of yuan. Later, the dead horse became a living horse doctor and was transformed into a storage supermarket. Unexpectedly, the sales volume increased by nearly 10 times after the opening!
This attracted the attention of Yonghui executives and became a key project, which quickly spread throughout the country.
So, can Yonghui Cang be its lifeline?
From the current point of view, its ability to make money has yet to be penetrated.
On the one hand, judging from the gross profit level, the comprehensive gross profit rate of Yonghui warehouse supermarket is set at around 10%, which is lower than the gross profit level of ordinary supermarkets 15%-20%.
So, how does Yonghui need to "expand sales" to make up for such meager profits?
On the other hand, from the perspective of income channels, other leading warehousing member stores dare to give profits to consumers because membership fees account for a large proportion of profits.
For example, Costco 2065 438+09' s global membership fee income reached $3.35 billion, which is several times the net profit of Yonghui. Another example is the Sam member store. In 20 19, the annual income of 26 stores reached 570 million, which was close to 1/3 of Yonghui Supermarket's net profit in 2020.
However, Yonghui Warehouse Supermarket directly gave up this fee and regarded the non-member fee as a big publicity stunt. So how will Yonghui make real money in the future?
I was deeply impressed by the words of a senior investor-"Business models that don't make money are actually hooligans."
05
label
Forever, a long time, a long time; The meaning of glory, light and brilliance. The word Yonghui pinned the founder's expectation for the eternal glory of this cause.
But how can there be invincible myths in the world? As Ma said, giants may fall down if they don't keep up with the situation in time. When the giant falls, his body temperature may still be warm.
The rise of Yonghui in those days was a dividend in keeping with the development of the times. But now the environment has changed.
In the first quarter of 2002 10, among the three listed companies 1 0, such as Shang Chao Gaoxin Retail, BBK and Hualian Supermarket, the revenue of over10 companies declined, and the net profit of 8 companies was less than1100 million yuan. In addition to Yonghui, opinions from Wal-Mart, CR Vanguard, Carrefour and Renrenle also came out frequently.
It's hard to go against the current if you want to run ahead on the track that is drifting away. And the bigger the giant, the greater the risk and the smaller the room for trial and error.
We can only sincerely wish-Yonghui, come on!