After the victory of China War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, its international status has been unprecedentedly improved and it has become one of the five permanent members of the United Nations. At that time, the total number of Kuomintang troops reached 4.7 million, which was three times that of the People's Liberation Army led by the * * * production party. In addition, the Kuomintang has both navy and air force, which is the blind spot of the PLA, and the heavy equipment of the army is far ahead. This thriving scene made Chiang Kai-shek proud, claiming that it would take only three months to disintegrate the PLA. In this context, Chiang Kai-shek issued a comprehensive operational instruction to the Kuomintang army, with the intention of crushing the PLA with sophisticated weapons, huge troops and sufficient materials, and with the intention of quickly disintegrating the PLA army.
The PLA takes mobile warfare as its main mode of operation, regardless of the gains and losses of one city and one place. Every battle concentrates several times the enemy's strength to annihilate the enemy's effective strength. Under the guidance of this policy, in the first eight months of the war, the soldiers and civilians in the liberated areas actively fought, but many Kuomintang troops were annihilated by the People's Liberation Army, and the gap between the two armies narrowed rapidly. It can be said that the plan of the Kuomintang army to attack the liberated areas in an all-round way ended in failure, and its morale was also sluggish. Therefore, the strategic policy was changed from the previous all-round attack to the key attack, with the intention of reversing the war situation by attacking key areas such as Shandong Liberated Area and Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.
In this context, the battle between the Kuomintang army and the People's Liberation Army is heating up rapidly, but the performance of the Kuomintang army is not good, so it can only constantly adjust its armaments and try to regain its superiority. Although this situation has not affected the overall situation, it has also caused some troubles to our army. Among them, the two battles experienced by the two field armies led by Su Yu and Lin Biao are typical, and it was in these two battles that they both met the enemy's situation and put forward a new battle plan temporarily, but Chairman Mao's handling of these two things is very different, and his attitude towards Lin Biao and Su Yu is also very different!
1In August, 948, the East China Field Army won the battle of Yanzhou and the battle of Yudong respectively, and the good news came, which further clarified the situation and greatly shortened the process of capturing the liberated areas in Shandong. At this time, 65,438+10,000 troops defended Jinan and put it on the agenda. On this issue, the Central Military Commission put forward "attacking economic difficulties" as the strategic guiding principle, requiring the East China Field Army to concentrate all its troops and adopt division of labor and cooperation to attack economic difficulties. Twenty to sixty days is the prime time of the campaign, during which Jinan should be captured and one of the reinforcements destroyed.
In accordance with the instructions of the Central Military Commission, the East China Field Army decided to divide the existing army into two parts, namely, attack and assistance. The "attack group" was commanded by, Xu and Tan Zhenlin, with six and a half columns, most special forces columns and local troops as the main force, with a total of 6,543,800 people. "Dayuan" regiment was commanded by Su Yu, acting commander and political commissar of Hua Ye, and its troops consisted of eight and a half columns, a special forces column and local troops, with a total of about 6,543,800 people. It was laid along the southern canal of Jinan, where it was planned to ambush the Kuomintang army reinforcements from Xuzhou and southwest Shandong. On September 9, the attack group blew the battle horn outside Jinan.
In August, the route of the East China Field Army was observed by Wang, the commander of the Kuomintang army defending Jinan. According to his own operational experience, he judged that the next operational goal of the East China Field Army must be Jinan. The situation is urgent. On the one hand, he actively prepared for attack and defense, on the other hand, he asked Chiang Kai-shek to transfer troops to Jinan. The Kuomintang Ministry of National Defense planned to send the 83rd Division to Jinan by air, but it was a pity that the 83rd Division was ordered by Xuzhou to go to Jinxiang and Yutai for reinforcements. Therefore, in June of 5438+05, Chiang Kai-shek had to temporarily change his troops to the 74th Division of the Kuomintang Army, because the 74th Division was still in Fengxian County, and the East China Field Army continued to violently attack Jinan Airport with heavy artillery. As a result, the Jinan Air Force could not resist and had to withdraw completely, and the air transport stopped. So far, the 74th Division has only transported to 7 companies in Jinan, with more than 2,000 people.
As an attacker, the East China Field Army didn't know that the generals of the Kuomintang army had seen their marching route, but the change of the national army was detected by Su Yu. On September 1 1, Su Yu made the following prediction based on various reliable information: The 83rd Division 1 Brigade of the Kuomintang Army will be secretly airlifted to Jinan to urgently reinforce the national army. Due to the increase of the garrison in Jinan, the balance between the enemy and ourselves has been broken, and the current operational plan needs to be adjusted. Su Yu immediately called the three commanders of the attack group, and also called the Central Military Commission, the East China Bureau and the Central Plains Bureau. The main idea of the telegram is to hope that the three commanders will order the Jinan Municipal Committee to find out the situation, arrange radio stations to transmit information, and re-study the operational plan for attacking Jinan under this circumstance. In addition, Su Yu himself expounded in his telegram several schemes he came up with under such circumstances, waiting for instructions from the Central Military Commission. These plans generally mean:
First, attack appropriately and plan for the future. According to the original plan, most of the troops of the two groups of the attack group will attack the airport, make a quick decision, and develop in depth at the same time, find out the enemy's situation, defense ability and fortification level, and then decide whether to continue the attack or transfer troops to help.
Second, build a plank road in the Ming Dynasty and sneak into Chencang. According to the existing situation, we should continue to make full preparations, attack the southeast suburb of Xuzhou with the Dayuan regiment of a corps, and then attack the Xubin, Xu Hai and Shanglan sections with the troops of Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu and Jianghuai and the first and eighth longitudinal units as cooperation, thus creating the illusion of attacking Xuzhou, attracting the enemy's attention to Xuzhou and attacking Jinan under the false cover of attacking Xuzhou.
Third, attack from left to right and maneuver. We still attack Jinan as planned, attract enemy reinforcements, divide Dayuan Group, and attack Xuzhou from the northwest and northeast of Xuzhou. The enemy who supported Jinan had no choice but to return to Xuzhou, and fought on this route, constantly destroying the troops returning to Xu. Depending on the situation, our army will provoke some military forces to stop aid, or attack Jinan while returning to Xuzhou.
In the telegram, Su Yu showed no preference for the three schemes he proposed. We can only guess from the arrangement order of these three plans, and he himself is more inclined to "stick to the original plan".
At around 20: 00 on September 20th, after receiving a telegram from Su Yu, Mao Zedong thought it was more appropriate to carry out the operation as planned. /kloc-in the early morning of 0/3, Mao Zedong replied to Su Yu on behalf of the Central Military Commission, and prosecuted three commanders of the attack group. On the whole, he thinks the second scheme is not suitable. Liu Zhi has three main corps, which are stationed in Shangqiu, Xin 'an and Bengbu, and can provide help at any time when needed. They can not only fight back, but also have enough troops to go north to help the economy. Our army is scattered in various ministries and can only be forced to recall, so it is difficult for soldiers to achieve the purpose of aiding foreign countries. One or three plans are based on the original plan, and the details can be temporarily changed according to the enemy's reinforcements. Even if the 83rd Division arrives in Jinan, there is still great hope to seize the airport and annihilate the enemy in the periphery of the economic city. It is better to attack Jinan as planned and prepare for reinforcements at the same time. As long as the enemy in the airport and its vicinity can wipe out about two brigades, it means that the enemy in Jinan has not increased. Unless we are completely unsure of capturing the airport and annihilating the two brigades outside Jinan, we can only give up the economic attack plan and make other plans. But you can also try to attack once or twice, even if the attack is ineffective, there is no big loss.
/kloc-on the morning of 0/3, Su Yu called the Central Military Commission:
Mao Zedong, the Central Military Commission, Su Yu and other leaders in Hua Ye have been exchanging telegrams to discuss improvement. While preparing for the specific deployment of "tackling difficulties and helping the poor", all the work of the Jinan campaign is also in full swing.
Coincidentally, because of the change and mobilization of opposing forces, we must also adjust our fighters. In addition to the East China Field Army constantly adjusting its deployment to the national army, so does the Northeast Field Army. On September 1948 and 12, several independent divisions near Jinzhou went to war first. At the same time, the columns around Siping and Changchun went south one after another, dividing and surrounding Jinzhou, Jinxi and Yixian, which opened the curtain of Liaoshen Campaign. After months of repeated consultations between the Central Military Commission and the leaders of the Northeast Field Army in round-trip telegrams, Lin Biao finally made up his mind to attack Jinzhou south and seal the Kuomintang troops in the northeast, thus completely annihilating them. On September 1948 and 10, Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan made attack plans according to the operational guidelines formulated by the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong and the deployment of the Northeast National Army.
Since the Liaoning-Shenyang campaign started, a large number of troops of the Northeast Field Army went south, but the front command post of the Northeast Field Army was located in Shuangcheng, far from the front line, which obviously did not adapt to the situation at this time. On September 2 1 65438, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and Liu Yalou sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission saying, "We will move in the direction of Jinzhou when Jinzhou officially fights." On September 30th, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and other frontline command post personnel secretly returned to Harbin, and then went south through many places. At this time, Jinzhou airport has been blocked, and the air superiority of the Kuomintang army cannot be exerted. Reinforcements can only be transported by sea, but the PLA's maritime power is blank, and it is impossible to contain the national army without mastering the sea power. Therefore, Lin Biao worried that Fu's troops would come to Huludao from the sea. So 1 October1day, he and Luo Ronghuan and Liu Yalou called the Central Military Commission, roughly meaning:
Jinzhou is the enemy's focal point and weakness. When attacking Jinzhou, the enemy will definitely give full support. It is predicted that the reinforcements will be enemies of Shenyang, the sea and Shanhaiguan, and the enemies of Changchun will also take the opportunity to break through, turning this battle into a decisive battle between ourselves and the enemy, and we may be able to recover the whole Northeast in one fell swoop. And our army's Jinxi reinforcements and Shanhaiguan reinforcements against the enemy are not only small in number, but also weak in strength. It is suggested that the large forces of Yang Corps attack the enemies of Tangshan and Luanxian routes.
Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and Liu Yalou judged that the Kuomintang troops would desperately reinforce from Shenyang, Shanghai and Shanhaiguan, and their estimation of the final result of the development of the war situation was also very accurate. However, due to the tense war in Suiyuan, it is really difficult for them to ask Yang Corps to go to Tangshan and Luanxian. 10 On June 2, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram for the Central Military Commission, clarifying two points, roughly meaning:
1. Five enemy infantry divisions and four cavalry brigades are looking for Yang Chengwu in Suidong, intending to attack. Although Yang Department can't reach Suidong directly, it can completely coordinate Yang Chengwu's collection in Pingzhang. If it works, it can clamp down or annihilate many enemies who are now defending Pingzhang section, so that the other two divisions of Tongzhou Sixteenth Army can not advance eastward for the time being.
Second, encourage Lin Biao to destroy the enemy of northern aid that may appear in Yujin section by itself, and the most important thing is to shoot down Jinzhou quickly and strive to capture the city in about ten days.
65438+1 October1,Northeast Field Army conquered Yixian. Unfortunately, at the end of the battle, artillery commander Jolie stepped on a mine and died. The good news is that more than 65,438,000 defenders have been wiped out.
On the afternoon of October 2nd, 65438/KLOC-0, Lin Biao got the information that four shipping divisions of the Kuomintang went to Huludao. Lin Biao is a man who hesitates easily. After learning the information, he was very anxious. He thought and thought, if the Kuomintang really shipped four divisions to Huludao, what would happen if the troops attacking Jin were attacked by the enemies of Shenyang, Shanxi and Huludao? After much thought, he ordered a time-out.
Lin Biao's style of commanding operations is cautious and steady. Many times, this steady style of work makes the troops fight watertight and it is not easy to fall into the enemy's trap. But occasionally, this overly conservative style will make the battle lose its opportunity and even affect the bigger situation. It is his consistent style to always estimate the enemy stronger and the difficulties greater. He is afraid that he will make the same mistake again. He didn't play Siping before because he underestimated the enemy. The shadows of Zheng Jiatun and Siping kept coming and going in his mind. He hesitated again. Is it down or not?
Uncertain, 654381at 22 o'clock on October 2, Lin Biao took Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan. Liu Yalou drafted an urgent telegram and sent it to the Central Military Commission in the name of three people. This telegram was dictated by Lin Biao and recorded by Tan Yunhe, then secretary of Lin Biao. Of course, the draft was also handed over to Luo Ronghuan and Liu Yalou. Lin Biao thinks that when attacking Jinzhou, it takes too little time to completely solve the battle, because the enemy will concentrate on advancing to Jinzhou before the battle is over. It's hard to say how the two armies met. It is not easy to stop them. They are likely to encounter enemy troops on the defensive in Jinzhou. After all, the two places are too close. If Jinzhou can be captured soon, it is better to fight Jinzhou, because the troops running back and forth will delay time and make them too tired. The enemy of Changchun was besieged by our army for several months, during which more than 5,000 people were annihilated and surrendered to me18,000 people. There are only about 80 thousand defenders in Changchun, and their morale is very low. However, our army has been resting. At present, if we attack Changchun, we have a greater chance of success, but it will be delayed 15 to 20 days. Whether to attack Jinzhou or Changchun, Lin Biao has been undecided, so he asked the Central Military Commission for instructions.
Lin Biao wants to leave Jinzhou for Changchun at this time, but changing this decision is not what he wants to change. This is a major event and must be approved by the Central Military Commission. Therefore, before the approval of the central government, we still have to obey the deployment of Jinzhou, and the combat troops must act in accordance with this decision. So after Lin Biao sent this telegram, he still didn't change his original plan. At this point, the train in Lin Biao stopped at the west of Zhengjiatun. If he attacks Jinzhou, the train will follow the original track. If you call Changchun, he will have to reverse the car and drive back. After several twists and turns in Lin Biao, the train finally continued to the west and headed for Jinzhou.
On the morning of October 3rd, 65438/KLOC-0, Luo Ronghuan still thought that Jinzhou should be fought, and planned to suggest to Lin Biao to fight Jinzhou as planned with Liu Yalou. Lin Biao listened to their opinions, and then they reached an agreement: attack Jinzhou as planned. Subsequently, Lin Biao asked the secretary to tell the confidential office to stop sending this telegram to the Central Committee. But it was already late, and the telegram was sent at 4 am.
Luo Ronghuan suggested immediately sending a telegram to the CMC according to the last letter, indicating that the resolution of Jinzhou was still being played. Lin Biao agreed, so the three men discussed and drafted the telegram. The telegram clearly shows that the three men adhered to the original plan and felt that it was still too time-consuming to annihilate the enemy and return to Changchun after some adequate preparations. In addition, the military layout of our army is expounded in detail. In addition, the cable also mentioned the following assumptions and predictions:
Finally, with these concerns, I telegraphed to the Central Military Commission for instructions on what to do.
The joint telegram of Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and Liu Yalou was sent at 9: 00 a.m. on the 3rd and received by the Central Military Commission Radio Station at 20: 00 on the 3rd. Mao Zedong saw this telegram on 4th 1: 30. In fact, Mao Zedong was very angry after receiving the telegram from Lin Biao. He hesitated to attack Changchun from another direction. He was worried that Lin Biao would act without authorization, and the plan to close the Kuomintang army in the northeast might fail, so he sent two telegrams on the 3rd, severely criticizing Lin Biao's false assumption of fighting Changchun. On the 3rd, the telegram of 17 was divided into two sections. Mao Zedong said in the first paragraph:
In the second paragraph of the telegram, Mao Zedong criticized the command team of the Northeast Field Army like this:
Mao Zedong is still worried that Lin Biao will change his mind after signing the above telegram. Lin Biao at this time in thousands of miles away, it is impossible to lift up your face. The only way to influence him is to send a telegram. So, at 3 19, Mao Zedong called Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, Liu Yalou and Dongbeiju again:
After receiving these two critical telegrams, at 9 o'clock on the 4th, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and Liu Yalou jointly called the Central Military Commission and reported to Dongbeiju, emphasizing the original plan of advocating or attacking Jinzhou.
Five hours after Mao Zedong sent the above-mentioned second urgent telegram, he received a telegram from Lin Luoliu, reaffirming his determination to attack Jinzhou. He just breathed a sigh of relief and sent a telegram at 6 am on the 4th, saying:
At the beginning of the Jinan campaign, Lin Biao, commander-in-chief of the Northeast Field Army, and Su Yu, commander-in-chief of the East China Field Army, both faced the situation that the specific military deployment of the enemy had changed before the war, and the situation was somewhat similar. They reported this situation to the Central Military Commission and got different responses from the Central Military Commission. For the Northeast Field Army in Lin Biao, the Central Military Commission sent several telegrams in succession, demanding in very strict language that Lin Biao stick to the original plan of attacking Jinzhou, go back to attack Changchun without hesitation, and move the command post to the pre-war as soon as possible, so as to make a quick decision and change later. For Su Yu's East China Field Army, it is more moderate. For the three schemes put forward by Su Yu in his telegram to Chen Qing, it is pointed out that it is not feasible to attack the southern suburbs of xuzhou east with one regiment, so the original scheme can be maintained.
The reason for this difference is that from attacking Jinzhou to attacking Changchun, it is a huge change to the original plan, which can be described as a world of difference, while Su Yu's plan is only a fine-tuning of the original plan, and there is not much change. This is why Mao Zedong has different attitudes towards Lin Biao and Su Yu.