Looking back at this period of history, the above viewpoints have jumped out of the shackles of traditional conclusions and are supported by a large number of data, which should be said to be reasonable. If Liu Deng's army doesn't go to Dabie Mountain, will it be a better strategic choice? Unfortunately, history cannot repeat itself, and future generations can only examine its process and results. So, why on earth did Mao Zedong make the strategic decision that Liu Deng's main force leapt thousands of miles into Dabie Mountain? Need to examine the specific historical conditions at that time.
After the full-scale civil war broke out in June, 1946, the war was basically fought in the liberated areas for one year. For the PLA, the situation at that time was that the enemy was strong and we were weak, so we had to carry out active interior-line operations. In this way, we can rely on the favorable conditions of the old base areas, have the support and cover of the people, have manpower to supplement the consumption of troops, get food supplies easily, and better arrange the wounded and sick. Moreover, the PLA is familiar with the terrain of the base area, which is convenient for luring the enemy into the ground and waiting for an opportunity to annihilate the enemy in the movement. After fighting like this for a year, * * * wiped out 97 and a half brigades of the Kuomintang army, including the reorganized 74th Division, one of its five main forces, which greatly consumed the strength of the Kuomintang army. At the same time, the PLA has been trained in continuous operations, seized a large number of enemy weapons and equipment, accumulated rich operational experience, greatly enhanced its strength, and completed the transformation from scattered guerrilla operations to concentrated main forces for large-scale corps operations. All these have prepared favorable conditions for the PLA to change from strategic defense to strategic attack.
However, long-term interior-line operations have also smashed the liberated areas and caused serious damage to the economy of the liberated areas. Chen Zaidao, commander of the 2nd column of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, later recalled: "A few months ago, the tug-of-war in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan region was fought again and again. In some places, people's cattle, pigs, sheep, chickens and ducks have almost been wiped out. How can we fight when there is no food in the field and no food in the army? At that time, most of the fiscal revenue of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan border region government was used for military expenditure. A soldier uses an average of 3,000 kilograms of millet a year, including food, clothes and equipment. The field army and the local army add up to more than 400 thousand people, and they won't last long. The sooner we attack, the sooner we can reduce the burden on the people in the liberated areas. War is an all-round military, political and economic war. No matter how strong the army is, it can't fight without food. "
As we all know, from ancient times to now, fighting is actually fighting for money and food. Without adequate economic support, it is impossible to carry on the war. The situation in the above-mentioned Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan liberated areas has been so serious that the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region with worse economic conditions has been destroyed into ruins. By 1947, due to the war and natural disasters, the originally scarce fields in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region could not be cultivated in time, the grain production was reduced by more than half, and the sideline industries such as textile and transportation were all stopped. By the spring drought of 1948, 400,000 people were hungry, nearly half of the remaining population in this area. The army's food comes from the public grain paid by the people. The people themselves have no land to grow and no food to eat. How can the army fight with a full stomach? Even in Shandong liberated areas with good economic conditions, the people have borne a great burden in order to support the army in combat. Grain alone took almost 35% of the total harvest, and in some areas it was even more, making people's lives almost unbearable. With the continuous advancement of the Kuomintang army, the area of Shandong liberated area has been increasingly compressed, and a large number of resources have been lost, making it difficult for the PLA to turn over. Su Yu, deputy commander of the East China Field Army, later lamented when talking about the situation at that time: "The water in Shandong is almost dry!"
In order to overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang, the People's Liberation Army will continue to grow and develop. However, the economy of the liberated areas was greatly damaged in the war, and the people's own survival was extremely difficult and they were unable to support the huge party, government and army personnel. In this grim situation, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had to issue instructions, requiring all liberated areas to establish a sound financial system, practice strict economy, streamline government organs and rear personnel, increase production and financial income, and reduce the burden on the masses, all for the victory of the war. Later, Mao Zedong summarized it as "the army advanced and the production increased by one inch. Strengthen discipline, the revolution is invincible "slogan, to the whole party and army propaganda.
More importantly, in order to win the all-out war, it has become an inevitable trend of the development of the war to switch from interior-line operations to exterior-line operations, attack the Kuomintang-controlled areas, acquire new resources, and destroy the war potential of the Kuomintang-controlled areas. Mao Zedong is called a great strategist, because he is always angry, planning first, superior, and strong in execution. As early as the beginning of the war, Mao Zedong was determined to launch an outside attack, expand the liberated areas and annihilate a large number of enemies, so as to force Chiang Kai-shek to stop the war. To this end, he personally formulated several strategic plans, requiring the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army and the Shandong Field Army to attack the eastern Henan and Xuzhou areas of the Central Plains; The Central China Field Army mainly attacked the Bangpu section of the Jinpu Railway and its east area; The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army and the Shanxi-Suiyuan Field Army cooperated and successively occupied Pinghan, Zheng Tai, Tongpu Railway, Baoding, Shimen (Shijiazhuang), Taiyuan, Datong and other cities. After the breakthrough, the main force of the Central Plains Military Region marched westward into the northwest of Hubei and the border region of Henan, Shaanxi and Hubei, dispersing and persisting in suppressing some enemies. At that time, due to the disparity in the strength of the national army, the above-mentioned exterior offensive either failed or failed. Mao Zedong had to gradually adjust its exterior-line operational policy to interior-line operational policy, first of all, based on interior-line body count, waiting for the opportunity to turn the tide.
After the first year of operations, the PLA's strength has been greatly enhanced, and the conditions for turning to outside operations have gradually matured. At the same time, it is difficult for the economy of the liberated areas to continue to support the war, which objectively requires us to consider turning to exterior lines. After the Kuomintang army entered 1947, it changed its all-round attack into the key attack, and first concentrated on attacking the liberated areas in northern Shaanxi and Shandong. The central plains defense lacked the main support and was in danger of emptiness. Therefore, Mao Zedong is determined to seize the favorable opportunity to fight with the main force and lead the war to the Kuomintang areas. On this basis, Liu Deng's Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army was ordered to cross the Yellow River to the south, running through the Central Plains, closely cooperating with Chen Yi and Su Yu's East China Field Army Pu Railway, and maneuvering to wipe out the enemy, crushing the key attack of the Kuomintang Army Gu Group on Shandong. At the same time, Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were ordered to go west to northern Shaanxi to directly cooperate with Peng's northwest field army and break the key attack of the Kuomintang army Hu Zongnan Group. At this time, in Mao Zedong's strategic planning, it is certain that Liu Deng's army will go south to fight the Central Plains, but it has not yet taken the leap into Dabie Mountain as its ultimate goal.
According to the central command, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping organized the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army to cross the river suddenly from southwest Shandong on June 30th 1947, which broke through the natural barrier of the Yellow River of the Kuomintang army. Subsequently, Liu Deng commanded the southwest Shandong campaign until the end of July, and achieved great victory. * * * annihilated more than 56,000 people in nine and a half brigades of the Kuomintang army, disrupted the deployment of key attacks of the Kuomintang army, and supported the battles in the battlefields of northern Shaanxi and Shandong. During this period, Mao Zedong ordered Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi columns not to go to northern Shaanxi, and prepared to cross the Yellow River south into western Henan to cooperate with mobile operations in the battlefields of northern Shaanxi and the Central Plains. At the same time, the East China Field Army in Chen Yi and Su Yu was also divided into three roads under the orders of the Central Committee, and some of them jumped to the periphery to look for opportunities to destroy the enemy and cooperate with Liu Dengjun. After this series of writing, the drama of the PLA from strategic defense to strategic attack directed by Mao Zedong began.
In the Battle of Southwest Shandong, Liu Deng led his troops to attack the 66th Division of the Kuomintang Army, which was holed up in Yangshan, and gnawed the hard bone that had been entrenched for a long time. On July 23, just as the two sides were fighting fiercely, they telegraphed: "Under the current circumstances, in order to ensure and expand the initiative that has already begun, the military deployment suggestions are as follows: If Liu and Deng judge that they are sure to attack and annihilate the enemies of Yangshan and Jining quickly, they will attack and annihilate them. Otherwise, immediately concentrate the whole army to rest 10 days or so. In addition to mopping up small groups of enemies and vigilantes passing by, we will not fight Longhai, east of the New Yellow River or level the Han Road. We will make up our minds to leave the rear, go straight out of Dabie Mountain in half a month's journey, occupy dozens of counties centered on Dabie Mountain, eliminate vigilante groups, mobilize the masses, establish base areas, attract the enemy to attack us and carry out mobile warfare. "
You know, before this, Mao Zedong had instructed Liu Deng many times, asking them to try to annihilate the enemy on the interior line north of Longhai Road, and with support, to develop on the exterior line. Now suddenly asked Liu Deng to leave the rear, south to fight the Dabie Mountains. This is not a small change in strategic deployment, but a big choice related to the future life and death of the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan field army. Originally, whether in Hebei, Shandong, Henan, southwestern Shandong, or out of Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu, it was easier to start on the spot, get support from the rear, and rely on the support of the old liberated areas and brothers. Although Dabie Mountain is an old revolutionary base, it has been occupied for many years and its mass base is not good. Food, ammunition, winter clothes, personnel supplies and the placement of the wounded are all problems. Whether the base area can be established is really unknown. And the battle of southwest Shandong is not over yet. Even after the end, the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan field army needs to rest after continuous operations. A large number of wounded, migrant workers and captured officers need to be sent to the north of the Yellow River, and a large number of liberation soldiers who have been added to the army also need education and reform, and it takes some time to digest and treat them. Why is the central government in such a hurry?
Shortly after the victory of the Southwest Shandong Campaign, Liu Deng telephoned the Central Committee. In addition to supporting the spirit of the instructions of the Central Committee's July 23rd telegram, he also stated his own difficulties, and suggested that the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army should first conduct mobile operations in the north and south of Longhai Road for two months, and strive to wipe out seven or eight brigades before going south to Dabie Mountain. The next day, Mao Zedong sent a top secret telegram to Liu Deng, in which a passage deeply shocked them: "The situation in northern Shaanxi is very difficult now (Chen Geng has told them face to face). If Chen, Xie, Liu and Deng can't mobilize Hu Jun to help northern Shaanxi open the situation within two months with their own effective actions, and northern Shaanxi can't support it, then two months later, Hu Jun's main force may be transferred eastward, and your difficulties will increase. " That is to say, if it weren't for the difficult situation in northern Shaanxi, Mao Zedong wouldn't be in such a hurry to let Liu Deng go out and mobilize the enemy quickly. However, Mao Zedong didn't give a death order, and still suggested that Liu Deng choose whether to continue to destroy the enemy inside or go directly out of the Dabie Mountains.
In this regard, 42 years later, Deng Xiaoping recalled: "After crossing the Yellow River, the troops wiped out the enemy's four divisions and nine and a half brigades at once and won the banner. This momentum is extraordinary. Crossing the Yellow River is actually a counterattack. However, how deep is the counterattack? Destroying nine and a half enemy brigades is just a gesture. More importantly, how can we take further action? We can continue to annihilate some enemies in Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong and Henan and attract and contain more enemies by sending a telegram to the Military Commission. The situation is very good. Chairman Mao sent a very secret telegram to Liu Deng, saying that it was "very difficult" in northern Shaanxi. Without saying anything at that time, I immediately replied, and after half a month, I took action, jumped behind the enemy and went straight out of Dabie Mountain. In fact, it took less than ten days to start action. "
Mao Zedong's telegram is not empty talk. Northern Shaanxi was originally a barren land, and it was repeatedly tossed by war. At that time, it was already thousands of miles away, the economy was completely bankrupt, and the population of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region was nearly half. Peng's Northwest Field Army can only get some black beans to satisfy their hunger and often fight on an empty stomach. Even Peng himself has been weak with diarrhea for several years. , Ren, and led the central government personnel to risk their lives in northern Shaanxi, dealing with Hu Zongnan department day and night. Mao Zedong took this sentence seriously in his telegram to Liu Deng. If we really can't mobilize the enemy as soon as possible to relieve the pressure in northern Shaanxi, then once northern Shaanxi fails, hundreds of thousands of troops from Hu Zongnan will be transferred eastward to join the battlefield in the Central Plains, and the situation in the war of liberation will be in jeopardy! At that time, the central government was still in northern Shaanxi. If northern Shaanxi failed, what would happen to the central government? This is a huge responsibility!
Why didn't Deng understand the message? They repeatedly weighed the changes in the national war situation and the situation in southwest Shandong. At that time, the East China Field Army was suddenly defeated in July, and the inner and outer line corps suffered heavy losses. At that time, they could only protect themselves and were unable to mobilize the enemy. And Chen Geng, Xie Fuzhi column is still in Shanxi, insufficient strength. Only Liu Deng and his men can accomplish the strategic actions that can attract and mobilize the Kuomintang troops on the battlefield in the Central Plains. In this critical situation, despite many difficulties, Liu Deng resolutely shouldered this heavy burden. On July 30, they called the Central Committee, "Determined to leave after half a month's rest to meet the needs of the overall situation. According to the current situation, we have 19 brigades face to face, and at least 10 brigades will follow me. Therefore, it is not appropriate for me to stay in Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu, but to go straight to the Dabie Mountains. It is only appropriate to form a corner with the Xie Chen Group, practice wide maneuvering, and prepare for a war without a rear. " Liu Deng will go directly out of Dabie Mountain instead of Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu. Although there are thousands of people, I'm leaving!
Because after entering August, there was heavy rain in southwestern Shandong, and the water level of the Yellow River soared. Planes of the Kuomintang army fly to the vicinity of the levee every day to bomb and bomb, and the Yellow River levee is in danger of bursting. At this time, the Kuomintang troops also gathered around, trying to force Liu Deng's army to fight a deadly battle south of the Yellow River. The situation is critical, Liu Deng decided not to continue fighting with the enemy, not to rest for half a month, but to travel south as soon as possible. On August 7th, Liu Deng led four main columns of Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army to the Dabie Mountains in three ways.
In order to cooperate with Liu and Deng's southward advance and adjust the deployment, Chen Yi and Su Yu were ordered to command seven columns of the main force of the East China Field Army to form the Western Corps, to cover Liu Deng's army's leap into the Dabie Mountains in southwest Shandong, and then to advance to the Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu regions, so as to maneuver and annihilate the enemy on the exterior lines, and gradually turn the southwest Shandong, Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu regions into favorable battlefields and support the rear of Liu Deng. The other three columns of the East China Field Army formed the East Corps, under the command of Xu and Tan Zhenlin, which was responsible for defending the liberated areas in Jiaodong and containing the Kuomintang troops in the Shandong battlefield. After Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi columns strengthened their strength to form a thank-you group, under the command of Liu Deng, they crossed the Yellow River in the south, advanced into western Henan, let go of development and made mobile operations. The east can cooperate with Liu Deng and Chen Su, and the west can cooperate with the battlefield in northern Shaanxi. In this way, after the first-level planning, except for the troops of the North China Military Region, the rest of the People's Liberation Army in the Guanzhong battlefield has formed five strategic groups: Peng's Northwest Field Army held the Hu Zongnan Group in northern Shaanxi, Xu and Tan Zhenlin's Hua Ye East Corps held the Fan Group in Shandong, and the three armies, Chen Su and, broke through the central government and marched into the Central Plains, threatening the Kuomintang army's Yangtze River defense line and Nanjing and Wuhan. In this way, the national strategic counterattack layout has been completed, and the People's Liberation Army should completely attack the exterior lines.
In the key Central Plains region, Mao Zedong has high hopes for the three-way army advancing in the shape of finished products. Especially Liu Deng's army, which shoulders the most arduous task. With regard to the strategic action of Liu Deng's troops to leap into the Dabie Mountains, Mao Zedong made a prediction in his telegram to Liu Deng on August 6: "When I go south, I must guard the Hanshui River Basin in Hefei, Anqing, eastern Hubei, Hankou and Pinghan, as well as Nanyang, Tongguan and Luoyang, and I need dozens of brigades to guard these places. The enemy's mobile forces in Shandong, western Shandong and northern Shaanxi have 45 brigades (29 brigades in Shandong, 8 brigades in western Shandong and 8 brigades in northern Shaanxi), and the garrison has 96 brigades (including those who have been annihilated). In order to take out dozens of brigades to defend the Yangtze River, Hanshui River and Pinghan River, we can not only greatly reduce the garrison forces on the Longhai Line and its northern area, but also change some mobile forces into garrison forces. In this way, the overall situation may change. Only when our southern corps can't destroy a large number of enemies, so it can't stand on its own feet and is forced to retreat can it temporarily mobilize the enemy, and it can't change the overall situation, and it will cost a lot of casualties and downsizing. This kind of price, no matter what role it plays, must be prepared to pay, but if it can change the overall situation, it is even more worthwhile to pay such a price. "
Mao Zedong made it very clear. The reason why Liu Deng's troops were asked to leap thousands of miles into Dabie Mountain was not only a strategic counterattack on the outside line that had already been brewed, but also forced by the battlefield crisis in northern Shaanxi and eastern Shandong. As long as the Kuomintang troops on the battlefields in northern Shaanxi and Shandong can be mobilized to help them, and the pressure on the two liberated areas can be alleviated, even if the enemy is only temporarily mobilized, it is urgently needed. It is worthwhile to pay a certain price for this. Mao Zedong made a huge strategic gamble from the overall height. He is betting that the People's Liberation Army will eventually be able to play outside lines and gain a foothold in the Central Plains, forcing the Kuomintang army to change from a key offensive to a key defensive, thus reversing the war situation, fundamentally changing from a strategic defense to a strategic offensive until a decisive battle with the Kuomintang army.
After the above investigation, we can know that under the historical conditions at that time, the strategic action of leaping thousands of miles into Dabie Mountain has its certain inevitability. Now that Liu Deng's troops have crossed the Yellow River and started to play outside lines, there is no reason to leave halfway. A few days after the battle of southwest Shandong, it faced the crisis of last stand. At this time, the safest thing is to go to Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu first, but Hua Ye has just been hit hard and its fighting capacity has been greatly reduced, so it is in urgent need of rest. There is little chance that the two armies will join forces to annihilate the enemy in large numbers, and Liu Deng's troops may still be besieged and blocked by Kuomintang troops when they go south. That is to say, simply opening up the strategic space, crossing Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu and heading straight for Dabie Mountain will still pose a great threat to the hinterland of the Kuomintang regime even if it is besieged and intercepted by the Kuomintang army, and it is possible to mobilize some of the enemy's main forces to help, thus alleviating the pressure on the battlefields in northern Shaanxi and Shandong and giving the brothers a chance to launch favorable fighters to annihilate the enemy. However, the Kuomintang troops are empty in the Dabie Mountains, so it is easy for Liu Deng troops to strike first and quickly establish base areas. Once it was established in Dabie Mountain, the situation of fighting on exterior lines was formed, and the pressure on the enemy's abdomen increased, so it was impossible not to return, which was conducive to gradually tide over the difficulties in the liberated areas of Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong and Henan. Later history proved that after Xie Chen Group pushed south, Hu Zongnan had to deploy two integrated armies to defend Xi 'an and reinforce western Henan, thus reducing the pressure on the battlefield in northern Shaanxi. Liu Dengjun attracted 33 strategic mobile units of the Kuomintang army, dispersed their deployment in the Central Plains, and reduced the pressure on the battlefield in Shandong. In this way, the key offensive deployment of the Kuomintang army was completely disrupted, and it was necessary to deploy troops urgently. While maintaining the offensive, it defended the east and blocked the west. Chen Yi and Su Yu seized the fighter plane and led the West Corps of the East China Field Army to suddenly cross the Longhai Railway and enter the enemy's empty Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu areas. They quickly launched mobile operations, successively wiped out more than 70,000 people, and opened up large new areas, making the trend of exterior-line operations irreversible. The key offensives of the Kuomintang army in northern Shaanxi and Shandong have not achieved decisive results for a long time, but the main forces of the People's Liberation Army have successively turned to exterior lines, quickly controlled large areas, and formed a new strategic offensive in the Central Plains, threatening the hinterland of the Kuomintang regime along the Yangtze River. The Kuomintang army had to shrink its forces and turn from defensive to offensive, which gave the PLA a large number of fighters to wipe out the enemy in the Central Plains, and the Shandong battlefield was able to launch a counterattack to recover lost ground. Since then, the initiative of the war has been transferred to China People's Liberation Army, and Mao Zedong's strategic gambling has finally succeeded.