1944 In the Battle of Central Henan (also known as the Battle of the Central Plains) from April to June, the first war zone (Commander Jiang and Deputy Commander Tang) suffered an unprecedented fiasco because of the strategic judgment of the highest decision-making level in Chongqing (specifically, Chiang Kai-shek). On the way back, the national army was indeed robbed and disarmed by the "local people's armed forces" (I have never seen the plot of "taking the Japanese army", and its statement comes from the novel "Wen Gu 1942" by writer Liu Zhenyun).
There are several historical materials to prove this point:
First, Tang's "review"
After the Battle of Central Henan, Tang submitted a Review of the Battle of the Central Plains in the First Theater. There are two paragraphs:
"In the battle, the unexpected special phenomenon is that the people in the mountainous areas of western Henan intercept the army everywhere, regardless of guns and ammunition, and take it at will, although anti-aircraft guns and radio stations also intercept it. Even the siege of our army and the shooting of our officers and men have been heard from time to time. Especially the troops from all over the country, Bao, Jia, and the township head all escaped, and at the same time, they robbed warehouses and grain, forming empty houses and open spaces, which made our officers and men unable to eat for several days. On the one hand, it is because an absolute few unscrupulous soldiers are undisciplined, disturbing Yan, lacking administrative foundation and unable to cooperate with the military. This is the main reason. As a result, when the troops moved in, the loss of being intercepted by the people was almost heavier than the loss of fighting, which was very sad.
"And the enemy in the lower administrative cadres, towns, police stations, have hidden traitors, confuse people, obstruct the national army, and by hook or by crook. After the enemy broke through Longmen, he fled to Datun and held a meeting of the pseudo-Garbo leaders. At that time, people held flags to welcome him. At that time, the local team of Yiyang county was ordered to destroy the Xinluotong highway in Luoyi section. Luoyang people are not angry with the Japanese army, but resist with live ammunition. At night, they will repair the damaged places. The above is just an example. If politics is like this, what hope is there for the principle of military-civilian cooperation? "
In his review, Tang attributed the looting and disarming of the national army to "no foundation in administration and no cooperation in military affairs", which was specifically aimed at the then chairman and security commander of Yuzhou.
In another telegram sent directly to Chiang Kai-shek, Tang also made a subtle statement:
"The battle of the Central Plains failed to achieve the task, with a negative monarch and a negative party. The center is afraid and ashamed. There are many reasons for losing opportunities, but the main reason is lack of professionalism and improper handling. Now all the troops in the Ministry are working hard to prepare their troops, which will be restored soon. Although the current situation is extremely difficult, the cadres are United and have high morale, and are ready to continue to kill the enemy. However, the environment here is complex and full of contradictions. Party and government issues seem to be more complicated than the army. The adjustment seems appropriate, so that we can concentrate on saving the decline. " ("Don Bourne Showed Reflection on the Defeat of the Central Plains War and Tried to Consolidate the Army", the digital collection number of Taiwan Province Provincial National History Museum is 002-080102-00075-01,1944/06/06. )
The so-called "Party and government issues seem to be more complicated than military issues" is obviously aimed at Yuzhou President Li Peiji, without naming names.
Don is so targeted. On the one hand, this is related to the discord between Tang and Tang. On the other hand, the basic people of Li Pei really cannot do without the fact that the national army was disarmed.
It is the local armed forces left by Fang Ting, a local strongman in western Henan, who is keen on attacking the retreating national army and collecting its weapons. These local armed forces have long been independent of western Henan. Although during the Anti-Japanese War, most of them nominally obeyed the national government, but they still maintained a high degree of independence. When recalling this battle, Ma, commander of the 29th Army of Tang Dynasty, explicitly accused these local armed forces of being the principal criminals who fought against the national army and robbed guns:
"At that time, the armed forces left by Bie Tingfang, the Yellow Emperor in western Henan Province, in the name of" local autonomy "and" mutual help ",reconciled the local people and cracked down on the merchants. Since the collapse of Tang Jun, military discipline has been rampant and the people hated it, so it was used by landlords and gentry. (At that time, Bi Tingfang was dead, and the sons of Liu Jieqing and Bi Tingfang continued to dominate the party under his banner. All the ministries in Tang Jun have become frightened birds, and the chaotic troops are confused about the situation. As soon as they heard the gunshots, they thought that the Japanese invaders had caught up or blocked the way, and even under a scream, they would disarm and flee for life. " (Selected Works of Literature and History, Vol. 10, No.32, P 187). The words in brackets in the text belong to the original)
Therefore, it must be clear that it is not "the people of Henan handed over the national weapons", but "the local armed forces in western Henan handed over the national weapons."
Li Peiji, then chairman and security commander of Hubei, Henan and Anhui, had close ties with these local armed forces.
According to Bie Bingkun's "Memories of Bie Grandpa", his father Bie Guanghan (Bie's son) was held hostage by local armed forces in the name of "local autonomy", and was later suppressed by Herry Liu and other Yu army leaders. To fight this repression, don't just choose to move closer to other political forces in the province, including Li Peiji:
"Don't Guanghan use a lot of methods, woo Wang Youqiao, Luo Zhen, Zhu Jiuying, successively served as the sixth district (Nanyang) commissioner of Yuzhou, so that they played a certain role as an umbrella? At the same time, Bie Guanghan also wooed Li, director of the Civil Affairs Department of Henan Province and president of Henan Agricultural and Industrial Bank. " "Li Peiji once gave my grandfather a Ford black car."
In this way, it is not difficult to understand why Tang pointed the finger at Chiang Kai-shek in reviewing documents and telegrams.
1944 On May 20th, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in "Scheduled Work Route for this Week":
"Three, henan aftermath, more provincial chairman. Fifth, the resignation was revised to the first theater chief. "
It can be seen that Chiang Kai-shek also agrees with the existence of the problem of "military and political disharmony" in Henan. 1in July, 944, Li Peiji was removed from the post of chairman and security commander of Henan province.
It is related to the contradiction between Chiang Kai-shek and Tang Dynasty that Chen Cheng replaced Chiang as the commander of the first theater. 1May 6, 944, Jiang wrote in his diary:
"At this time, the most difficult person is the crude incompetence of senior generals, especially the old generals. They don't know their incompetence, but they think they are qualified. Unless they are given an important position, they are unwilling. I can't think that people should be appointed according to their qualifications and relationships. Today, Jiang lost in the first war zone. "
1May 7, 944, Jiang wrote in his diary:
"At six o'clock in the morning, I made three phone calls with Ming Tong and asked him about the Dengfeng troops. He is still at a loss. Why doesn't his senior department usually prepare radio communication equipment with the military department? He was pushed back to Tang's order, but he didn't convey it. Such a poor general really makes people want to cry. "
The sentence "under the command of Tang, we can't communicate" shows that Jiang (commander) and Tang (deputy commander) are incompatible in the first war zone.
Second, Chen Cheng's investigation in the first war zone
After the defeat in central Henan, Chen Cheng was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to investigate in the first war zone.
Chen Cheng wrote in his memoirs:
"From July 22nd to August 4th, I was in Xiping and Xi 'an, and convened teachers, generals and logistics personnel above the director of the political department of the division, and held two review meetings respectively. I got many frank confessions about the failure of the western Henan campaign, such as:
……
7. The military discipline is extremely lax: Henan folks have long had the slogan "It is better to burn and kill the enemy than to station the national army".
Although it is inevitable to exaggerate, the deterioration of military discipline is also an undeniable fact. Tang Can, deputy head of the team, is not leading by example, and his personality is too strong, and his behavior is better than his behavior, so he is often cheated and afraid to get angry. Yichuan, Songxian and Dengfeng were looted by the 85th Army. The 13th Army is in Mi County and Yucheng, the 8th Division is in Lushi, and the 40th Army is in Mudonggou. The special service team of the Chief Executive's Office cooperated with the Chief Executive's Office, leaving no chickens or dogs everywhere. The army and civilians are like enemies. It is natural that the army could not get help from the people during the war. However, all localities are local bullies, such as chief Jiabao or captain of self-defense in villages and towns, who have seized the opportunity to rob, kill and disarm sporadic troops. (Memoirs of Chen Cheng: War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, Oriental Publishing House, 2009, P94. )
Malik Wu Li and others, Chen Cheng also decided that it was not ordinary people who robbed the national army guns, but "the local ruffians and hooligans of chief Garbo or township self-defense players".
However, due to the confrontation between the military and the government, there was indeed an atmosphere of panic in the first war zone at that time-Tang blamed the provincial capital on the grounds that the guns of the national army were robbed, and the provincial capital deliberately rendered the army to retaliate against the people. For example, a report by the Provisional Senate of Henan Province accused Tang of "blaming others and thinking that he had killed" (in fact, Tang didn't mean it). 1June 2, 944, Chen Cheng wrote in a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek that there were six urgent things to do in the first war zone. The fourth is:
"People are afraid of military retaliation, causing panic. It is appropriate for the provincial government, the provincial party department and the provincial Senate to send personnel to deal with it in conjunction with senior officers of the first war zone chief officer department or deputy chief officer department. Recover the lost folk guns and pay the price as appropriate, so as not to arouse the rebellion or be used by traitors. " It is urgent for Henan Province to deal with the aftermath of telegrams. Please check six things ","Letters between Mr. Chen Cheng and Mr. Jiang ",P575).
Third, Chiang Kai-shek's reprimand.
On July 2 1, 1944, Chiang Kai-shek held a training meeting in Huangshan, specifically reviewing the battles in central Henan (Central Plains) and Changsha.
Chiang Kai-shek denounced the corruption of military discipline in the first war zone at the meeting, and thought it was a shame that the national army was disarmed by the people:
"Speaking of this time the battle of the central plains? Some American and Soviet officers retired with our army. In their view, our army was surrounded and attacked along the way, disarm! This situation is similar to that of the Belarusian army in the Russian Empire. Of course, such an army can only fail! All the chariots and horses of our army do not carry weapons and ammunition, but only smuggled goods. In times of crisis, the goods were either taken away by the people, or they were too late to be transported away, abandoned on the roadside, and then transported to their families. Later, the people were tired and finally failed to quit, so they were killed by the people! The military discipline corruption of the army can be said to be extreme! When retreating, officers and men of many units harassed everywhere, even raped and plundered, which made people miserable! Such an army still exists in China today. How to be a man? Especially tell me how to treat people personally; My commander-in-chief was humiliated like this, which is a shame for everyone. " (Chiang Kai-shek's "Instructions to the standout meeting-be brave after knowing shame")
Obviously, Jiang has no intention of distinguishing whether the participants in disarmament are "local armed forces" or "ordinary people". After all, this distinction has not changed the nature of things.
A little supplement
Speaking of the battle in central Henan just now, I would like to introduce a little more about Chiang Kai-shek's personal reflection on this battle.
1. Chiang Kai-shek admitted in his diary that the fiasco in the first war zone was mainly due to his "strategic judgment error".
On May 1944 and 13, Jiang wrote in "Record of Reflection Last Week":
"This week, the military, diplomatic theory and party affairs are in adversity. The military deployment is all based on verbal orders and personal arbitrary mistakes, which leads to a bad situation in Luoyang. This is an unprecedented strange thing in my life, so I feel embarrassed and almost uncomfortable. This is the incompetence of the commander of the war zone. He has completely broken his promise. Therefore, because evil turned to anger and intervened in the war ahead everywhere, this result was obtained. In the future, the war ahead should be handled by the military command department without direct participation, let alone giving verbal orders by telephone. This is the biggest lesson we should never forget. "
On May 3 1 day, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in "Introspection Record of this month":
"On May 7th, the enemy chariot was tricked by the feint movement, but even the two armies of Xilongmen and Hulao Pass reinforced Luoyang, which turned the situation in Henan into victory. This is the only regret in life and the biggest mistake, so I will write a book to clarify my sins and stupidity. After learning this lesson, military disposal will not be complacent, which may be the way to turn disaster into joy. "
To the outside world, Chiang Kai-shek also admitted that he was responsible for this fiasco.
1944, 16 In September, Chiang Kai-shek delivered a speech at the third congress in Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, briefly describing the whole process of the top decision-maker (that is, Chiang himself) making strategic judgment mistakes:
"At the beginning of the Henan War, we got the information that the enemy only deployed several infantry divisions from the battlefields in North China and Central China, and did not find that he was a mechanized division or an armored division. With the strength of our first war zone, it is enough to fight. So at that time, we just deployed and prepared according to the tactics of the enemy's past coordinated operations. Unexpectedly, when the enemy arrived in Zhengzhou, he found that he still had a large number of mechanized troops to participate in the battle. At that time, our layout was to take Xuchang and Luoyang as the two strongholds of the Henan campaign. Xuchang's fortifications are quite strong, and according to the methods and intensity of the enemy's usual attacks, it has been safe for a long time. However, after the enemy's attack failed for several days, he attacked the city with chariots. Our troops did not have this training and all kinds of fortifications in advance, nor did they pay attention to it. So in less than two days, Xuchang was breached by him, and Lv Gong's mentor was also killed in Xuchang City. By this time, we should not only defend the enemy's infantry air force, but also defend the enemy's mechanized troops from the war in Henan. Therefore, we must change our strategy. In addition to sticking to Luoyang and containing the enemy, all the troops near the east plain will retreat to Songshan Mountain and make other arrangements before fighting the enemy. Because there is no hope of victory if infantry is used to resist the enemy's mechanized troops in the plain. According to this plan, the high command ordered the Luoyang garrison to stick to it for two weeks. It is expected that in two weeks, our troops retreating to Songshan will be concentrated and redeployed to Luoyang to reinforce the counterattack. ..... Unexpectedly, as soon as our troops retreated to the east of Linru, the enemy did not attack Luoyang first, but tracked and chased my retreating troops with chariots. Of course, the speed of mechanized troops and infantry can't be compared. Our retreating troops were attacked by the enemy before they could concentrate, and then he besieged Luoyang with all his strength. "