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What is the enlightenment of Beiyang history?
Some young readers may not know that China once had an opportunity to try democratic constitutionalism in an all-round way. That opportunity was in 19 12, when the Qing government collapsed and made peace, and the Chinese tried their best to imitate the western democratic countries such as the United States to engage in constitutionalism.

But what about the result? It failed. Not only failed, but also ended in a protracted civil war, with corpses everywhere.

Why did China people's first democratic constitutional experiment end in failure? Whose responsibility is it? Is the warlord responsible? Is the revolutionary party responsible? And the so-called "people"? Are they responsible?

Do you need to reread the Seventeen-year History of Beiyang, that is, 19 12- 1928?

The failure of constitutionalism began with the murder of Song. In fact, it is not uncommon for politicians to be assassinated or bribed in democratic countries around the world. At that time, revolutionaries chose civil war, which was called "the second revolution". Orthodox historians have been praising the legitimacy of this violent struggle.

However, we might as well ask calmly: unconstitutional things happen from time to time. Do we have to fight civil war every time? If so, when will you call?

Under the constitutional framework, criminal cases and unconstitutional cases should be solved by judicial means. Even if it is necessary to resist by force, it should at least be organized after judicial relief is exhausted.

Due to the existence of judicial independence and freedom of the press, the democratic constitutional system has the function of "self-correction". Although this function is slow, it exists objectively. Therefore, it seems not only unnecessary but also inappropriate to seek democracy in the barrel of a gun.

The word "warlord melee" is the most criticized by Beiyang warlords. However, the inside story deliberately concealed by historical preaching is that warlords have been fighting repeatedly and basically have direct or indirect relations with the revolutionary party. For example, the direct Anhui War and the direct Feng War all have the shadow of revolutionaries.

Of course, on the other side, the northern warlords are not good men and women. For example, at the time of the "court battle", Duan's confidant Ni Sichong said something like this:

"Li told me that it is illegal to declare war on Germany directly without the approval of Congress. What fucking law! The prime minister is the leader of the responsible cabinet system, and what the prime minister said is the law! Is it legal for him to recall the post of Prime Minister without the Deputy Chief Cabinet Officer? "

This passage of Beiyang warlord Ni Sichong revealed two important messages:

1, Ni Sichong thinks: "Fa" is not a sacred thing;

2. Ni Sichong thinks: You can break the law, so I can also break the law.

In other words, in the eyes of Beiyang warlords, the so-called "law" is just a fig leaf. In essence, politics is cheating. In good times, I obey the law. When it's bad, I'm "fucking what"

From this, we have to say: to truly understand the seventeen-year history of Beiyang, we must stand in an objective and neutral position. We should neither be partial to the warlords nor to the Kuomintang. As long as we do this, it seems not difficult to draw the following conclusions:

It seems that the Northern Warlords and the Kuomintang jointly destroyed the first democratic constitutional experiment of China people.

those years

After Wuchang Uprising broke out, the Revolutionary Party made peace with Yuan Shikai. The revolutionary party declared that as long as Yuan Shikai persuaded the Qing court to abdicate, the revolutionary party was willing to publicly recommend Yuan Shikai as the "great president". But what Yuan Shikai got afterwards was only a "temporary president", not only adding the word "temporary", but also an empty position. Real power lies in the hands of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister of the Cabinet.

Hu, one of the leaders of the revolutionary party, wrote clearly in his autobiography: the revolution has not yet succeeded, and the revolutionary party cannot be transformed into a participating party, but needs to "continue the revolution."

Here is a striking example: even the important position of "Zhili Governor" who controls the Beijing-Tianjin area, the Kuomintang has to install "one of its own" Wang Zhixiang, and the Prime Minister Tang and Yuan Shikai have fallen out.

Yuan Shikai, who was born in a totalitarian system and received the education of "ruling the country and leveling the world" since childhood, was obviously unwilling to be a "rubber stamp". He obviously felt cheated. So, unconvinced, he decided to "get back" what he "deserved" with interest. Since then, Yuan Shikai's interference in the constitution-making of the National Assembly, the dissolution of the Kuomintang and the concoction of Yuan Ji's Contract Law are the inevitable results of this logical development.

This is not intended to rehabilitate Yuan Shikai. Yuan Shikai is obviously a man of the old times, and obviously has great defects and has done many bad things. However, the relationship between the revolutionary party and the Beiyang warlords is obviously not without reason. This complicated history has its own clear logic of self-development.

Many people regard the revolutionaries as "democratic pioneers", but in fact, it seems that the revolutionaries are the first to undermine the spirit of democracy and the rule of law: when the Provisional Senate was still in Nanjing, it voted to pass the bill with its capital in Beijing, and the party leader Huang Xing actually threatened the Senate:

"I must be re-elected within one day, otherwise I will lead the troops and tie up the members of the League."

The historical truth is that revolutionaries are not real "democrats". Many history lovers in China think that revolutionaries are "true democrats", but this is just a beautiful misunderstanding.

After the assassination of Song Dynasty, the Revolutionary Party decided to "look for constitutionalism from the barrel of a gun" without waiting for a judicial decision. The revolutionary party did it, right? It may be controversial. However, one thing is certain: from then on, the so-called "masters of the country" in China entered a vicious circle of "you take my life and I take your life". The Kuomintang overthrew the Beiyang government by force. Only twenty years later, the Kuomintang government was overthrown by others.

Is this what Buddhists call "secular newspapers"?

At the constitutional level, the interim constitution stipulates that the decrees promulgated by the president need to be seconded by the State Councilor. That is to say: every time the president gives an order, as long as the state councilor in the cabinet is not attached to you, then any of your orders will not take effect. The question is: So who is in charge, the President or the State Councilor?

Frankly speaking, it is hard to think that this system design is scientific. A turtle can't have two heads, otherwise, the two heads can only fight with each other. After Yuan Shikai's death, the great president Li and the prime minister Duan became enemies (known as the "official-court dispute" in history) precisely because of this provision in the Provisional Constitution.

The launch and failure of the "Second Revolution" had a great influence on Sun Yat-sen. Since then, Sun Yat-sen seems to have become more superstitious about guns and more advocating centralization. "reconciliation"

It seems that this is no longer an option he is considering. After its alliance with the Soviet Union, the Kuomintang became more radical. At this point, not only did the Kuomintang have no room for reconciliation with the Beiyang warlords, but its relations with British and Japanese imperialism also deteriorated rapidly.

In order to "discredit" the Beiyang government in public opinion, the Kuomintang launched a "popular slogan" denouncing "Beiyang warlords as traitors" and "overthrowing imperialism", and finally came to power. But the problem is: this radical nationalist slogan is easy to incite, but difficult to put out. Therefore, in the confrontation with imperialism, the Kuomintang was in turn kidnapped by powerful public opinion and it was difficult to ride a tiger. As a result, I embarked on a dead end of "both internal and external training".

Of course, these are still inconclusive, and we are not in a hurry to draw conclusions, just throwing bricks to attract jade. When you start talking, naturally someone will speak, so that people can have different opinions, and different opinions collide with each other, so that relatively reliable facts can surface.

History has always been a winner and a loser. Only the plaintiff is allowed to speak, not the defendant. Listening to only one side of the story, of course, is inevitably distorted. We might as well try to talk about the history of the Beiyang government period (19 12- 1928) with a neutral attitude and listen to both positive and negative opinions. Impartiality, perhaps, we will be closer to a fair history.