Audit, public security and procuratorial departments cannot supervise the Commission for Discipline Inspection-when the supervisory organization itself is corrupt, there will be a vacuum in power supervision. The vacuum in the downstream of this system will soon spread to the upstream, making the supervision in the upstream of power useless, and the supervisor and the supervised form the same interest body. If a new supervisory organization is set up to supervise the original supervisory organization, then the new supervisory organization may also be corrupt and need to be added. In this way, the number of institutions that need to be added will be endless. Every time this chain is extended, the effectiveness of supervision will be weakened by one point, but the cost will increase by one point. In the end, it will evolve into a situation in which the effectiveness of supervision becomes a mere formality, power corruption runs rampant, and the cost of supervision extends to the whole society, causing various crises.
Therefore, in order to solve the regulatory problems of regulatory agencies, we cannot follow the idea of adding institutions within the system. At present, the central government's practice is to let the discipline inspection commission accept the leadership and checks and balances of the party committees at the same level. Therefore, although the central government is strengthening the vertical leadership of the Commission for Discipline Inspection, it has never agreed to implement vertical management of the Commission for Discipline Inspection. If the Commission for Discipline Inspection gets rid of the Party Committee at the same level and only obeys the leadership of the higher-level Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Commission for Discipline Inspection with the power of "double regulations" beyond the current legal procedures is likely to become the most unrestricted privileged department.
However, although this system of "Party Committee in charge of the Commission for Discipline Inspection" prevented the Commission for Discipline Inspection from becoming an absolute force, it also led to the weakening of the Commission for Discipline Inspection's supervision ability. If corruption is related to leading members of Party committees, it is difficult for the Commission for Discipline Inspection, as a subordinate institution, to play a supervisory role. Interest exchange is the choice that conforms to the immediate interests. The mutual checks and balances of power within the system often lead to mutual supervision, rather than the exchange of mutual interests that designers hope.
To get out of the strange circle of "balance of power within the system becomes collusion of interests", we can only seek a breakthrough from outside the system. The effective traffic management methods in some cities in China seem to provide a successful demonstration for this. The power of traffic management lies with the traffic police. In order to prevent the traffic police from abusing or misusing their power, a traffic inspector was set up to supervise the traffic police's law enforcement behavior. However, inspectors may abuse their power or be corrupt. It is obviously not desirable to add "inspectors' inspectors" in the original way, so some places supplement it with traffic stations and give supervision to drivers and citizens.
Therefore, it is not only the objects managed by power that supervise power, but also countless listeners and viewers of traffic stations. They are listening and watching and have not made a sound for the time being. This pressure of public participation is the ultimate driving force for the effectiveness of supervision.
This mode of traffic station can introduce universal supervision of public power. If the supervision of power can be carried out openly and transparently, not just in a small circle; If the people have channels for public expression and reflection, then power and its supervision institutions will be under the supervision of countless pairs of eyes. This kind of public participation supervision is far more effective than the supervision within the system of "a few people supervise a few people", because here, supervisors cannot be bought. It will not be corrupt, so there is no need to extend the supervision chain. Such a regulatory agency is really built on rocks, not on the beach.
More importantly, this kind of interaction with public participation will only put pressure on the abuse and improper use of power by officials, and will not hinder the normal exercise of power from top to bottom. Compared with the western model of campaign and freedom of speech, the bottom-up model and strength of the traffic station model are more suitable for China's national conditions, and can be seamlessly connected with the existing system, without worrying about shaking the existing system while balancing power.
There is a famous saying: "the power of matter can only be destroyed by the power of matter." Applying this to the issue of power is: "Power can only be controlled by power". Power cannot be controlled by people without power; A big country cannot be controlled by a small country; Only power can control power, more precisely, only power greater than or exceeding a certain power can control this certain power.
In recent years, all walks of life have vigorously advocated the restriction and supervision of power, including mass supervision and public opinion supervision. How to abandon the effectiveness of public opinion supervision; Practically speaking, the effectiveness of mass supervision is minimal. It is not that the masses do not want to supervise and do not exercise their supervisory responsibilities, but that the masses have "power" with their bare hands, and the supervised simply ignore this supervision. Therefore, the real supervision can only be the supervision of superiors and the supervision of the Commission for Discipline Inspection.