The massive steel battle of World War I pushed the contest of national power between major powers to an extreme. While Germany was painstakingly rearming its armaments in order to break away from the Treaty of Versailles, the idea of ??"total war" gradually took shape. The book "Total War" published by German Deputy Chief of General Staff Ludendorff in 1935 summarized the war economic theory that sprouted from the "World War I" and emphasized that war requires the transformation of the country in all aspects of political, economic and social life; It is necessary to mobilize the whole people's strength, including spiritual and economic, to participate in the war, and do not hesitate to use any means to destroy the enemy's troops and civilians. At the same time, in view of Germany's national conditions, it must expand its self-sufficiency in war resources, reserve strategic raw materials in advance, and ensure overseas sources. These ideas were undoubtedly important references for later Nazi war practices.
Hitler was not the orthodox successor to the undercurrent of German militarism after World War I, but he made his fortune during the economic crisis. In the "Twenty-Five Points Program" proposed as the Nazi Party's platform during the "Beer Hall Riots" in Munich in 1920, this little man focused on national revanchism and catering to the social reform requirements of the small and medium-sized bourgeoisie, and violently attacked capitalism, trusts, and big companies. Industrialists and large landowners advocated "the prohibition of unearned income, the prohibition and confiscation of all illegal gains made from war, the sharing of the profits of large industries, the nationalization of large department stores and leasing them to small businessmen." Subsequently, the Nazi Party continued to win over small and medium-sized enterprises, handicraftsmen, small and medium-sized farmers and the lower classes of society with policies such as state ordering, solving employment problems, and banning land speculation. Hitler's theory is, "National socialism protects private property. Individuals sacrifice for society, which is nationalism; society serves individuals, which is socialism. The combination of these two points is national socialism."
Hitler did not intend to compete with Britain and France for overseas colonies, but established an expansion sequence of "Central Europe-European Continent-Global". Therefore, the first thing that made him angry was the current situation in Europe. In Mein Kampf, he proposed: “The National Socialist movement must strive to eliminate the imbalance between our population and our country’s area, regarding the latter not only as a source of food, but also as the basis of power politics. "A territorial policy cannot be achieved in Cameroon, and today it can be achieved almost exclusively in Europe. The acquisition of territory in Europe is only possible at the expense of Russia... and the new empire must... use the German sword." The German plow obtains the land and obtains the daily bread for the German people. "We must turn our attention to the land in the east. This land exists for the people who have the power to possess it."
1933. On February 3, just five days after taking power, Hitler said in a speech to senior generals: "Germany's only survival may be immigration, but the living space of the German people is too small... Therefore, the first task is to build the Wehrmacht and rely on the Wehrmacht. ”
The prerequisite for rearmament is that the economy shifts to a war track. In July 1933, the Nazis ordered all industrial organizations to form syndicates to control the domestic market and prices. The "German Economic Association" established on the same day requires all private enterprises to join one of the six major groups of industry, commerce, energy, banking, insurance and handicrafts, and also divides the country into 18 economic provinces. In 1934, the Nazis stipulated that the Ministry of Economic Affairs had the power to establish, dissolve or merge all industrial organizations, and sent leaders to enterprises to implement the "leadership principle" in the economic sector.
In the process of military expansion, the German central finance could only afford two-thirds of military expenditures. To this end, the Nazis not only confiscated the property of "enemies of the state" (only depriving the Jewish capital of 6 billion to 8 billion marks) ), and also used all financial means: controlling Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and commercial banks, the government has the right to dispose of large-scale public capital such as pension funds and social insurance funds in all public capital storage centers in emergencies; cutting welfare Expenses; issues treasury bills, special bills of exchange, and tax stamps.
In the German government revenue from 1933 to September 1939, domestic taxes, customs duties, etc. accounted for 81.8 billion marks, "Metallurgical Research Institute" credit 10.5 billion marks, tax stamps 3.1 billion marks, plus Short-term credit is 6.9 billion marks, long-term credit is 16.7 billion marks, and *** is 119 billion marks, of which military expenditure accounts for 60 billion marks.
During the war from September 1939 to May 1945, Germany's military expenditure totaled 622 billion marks, accounting for 92% of the national budget during the same period. All tax revenues accumulated to 182.7 billion marks. The national budget deficit averaged 34% per year. In the spring of 1945, the total national debt reached 379.3 billion marks. Although the government was deeply in debt, it was able to obtain all supplies through requisition, at the expense of a monetary system that was on the verge of collapse by the end of the war. But the Nazis did not rely on high tax rates because they could give the public an illusion of stability. In 1941, the income tax rate on an annual personal income of 10,000 marks was 13.7.
Another source of wealth for Germany is the "cannons not butter" policy. "Skilled workers entered the arsenal and unskilled workers built highways." The prosperity of military industry and related industries solved Germany's serious unemployment problem and increased the overall purchasing power of society, becoming one of the achievements advertised by the Third Reich. Of course, the Nazis’ primary goal was not to improve life. Food production was controlled by the state. The reason why Germans were willing to accept the simple peasant life advocated by the Nazis was largely due to the contrast with the Great Depression and the beauty of the powerful empire outlined by the Nazis. Future expectations.
From 1932 to 1938, Germany's pig iron production increased from 3.9 million tons to 18.6 million tons, and steel production increased from 5.6 million tons to 23.2 million tons. In early 1934, the German Defense Working Committee approved a plan to mobilize 240,000 factories to supply war orders. From 1933 to 1936, Germany built more than 300 new arsenals, including 55 aircraft factories, 40 automobile and tank factories, 70 chemical factories, 15 shipyards and 80 artillery factories. By the time of the invasion of Poland in 1939, German industrial output had surpassed that of the United Kingdom and was second only to the United States and the Soviet Union.
Learning from the severe shortage of food during World War I, which caused instability on the rear, Germany had achieved self-sufficiency in food by 1938 and had increased its grain reserves from 3.08 million tons the previous year to 9.13 million tons, which was enough. The country has been eating it for more than two years, and its oil reserves have increased from 130,000 tons to 470,000 tons, and potato reserves have reached 15.46 million tons.
However, military expansion and war preparations could not really solve the crisis. Instead, Germany's exports dropped in 1939 and its finances deteriorated. Its foreign exchange and gold reserves were only 5.6 billion marks, while the national debt was as high as more than 60 billion marks. Hitler said on November 5, 1937: "For Germany, economic difficulties have also become a driving force. The practice of stimulating the world economy through armaments production will never lay the foundation for economic arrangements in the long term. The basis...the only remedy that may be worthy of our dreams is to strive for a larger living space. "War is not only a temptation, but also a necessity.
When preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union began on July 31, 1940, the German army estimated that it would need 120 army divisions. On August 2, Chief of General Staff Keitel asked the Bureau of War Economics and Armament to develop armaments to equip 180 army divisions. plan. By February 1941, German arms production increased by nearly 60% within half a year, including an increase of 100% for ammunition, an increase of 25% for tanks, 31.8 million tons of steel production nationwide and in the occupied areas, 4.8 million tons of oil, 439 million tons of coal, and 4876 tons of coal in the entire Western Europe. Several factories were producing arms for Germany, and at one time Germany's industrial base exceeded that of the Soviet Union by more than 50%. In the same year, Germany obtained 8.12 million tons of fuel, which basically met the needs of the army. Together with the 8.8 million tons of oil reserves in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and other countries, it could sustain the war for seven months.
Before the outbreak of the Soviet-German War, Germany controlled 2.47 million square kilometers of land, three times its own territory, with a population of 270 million. Its European allies also had 800,000 square kilometers of territory and a population of 78 million. In terms of soldiers, although the Soviet Union has 31.5 million men aged 20 to 39 years old and only 15.5 million German men in the same age group, Germany can make use of the army of slave countries and the industrial labor force replaced by foreign workers and prisoners of war.
The Soviet Union’s preparations for war
The Soviet Union’s preparations for war can be traced back to the industrialization in 1926. As the only socialist country that took advantage of the chaos of the First World War to achieve successful revolution, the Soviet Union’s peaceful construction was heavily preparatory to war.
The first Five-Year Plan started in 1928 marked the full launch of Soviet industrialization. In 1931, 1/3 of the world's total exports of machinery and equipment were purchased by the Soviet Union, and the figure reached 50 the following year. The proportion of industry in the total output value has also increased to 70.7. The "Second Five-Year Plan" started in 1933 built 4,500 industrial enterprises, and the total industrial output value increased by 1.2 times, ranking first in Europe and second in the world. In the 13 years before the war, the Soviet Union’s cumulative defense expenditure was 170.1 billion rubles, which was only slightly lower than the total industrial investment of 185 billion rubles.
The Soviet industrial layout also fully considered strategic depth. The "First Five-Year Plan" established new industrial bases in Ukraine, the Caucasus, Belarus and Kazakhstan, the "Second Five-Year Plan" will invest half of heavy industry investment in the east, and the "Third Five-Year Plan" will focus on the Volga River Basin, the Urals and Siberia. as the focus.
In his speech in 1927, Stalin asserted: "The issue of a new imperialist war is the basic issue of the present time. This is almost beyond doubt." The Soviet Union will face "a long-term, cruel war." competition in which the entire economic and political foundations of both warring parties will be tested." In 1933, he also stated that the enemy "can take advantage of our technological and economic weaknesses to attack us at any time." One month before the war, Stalin made it clear in his speech at the graduation ceremony of the Red Army command trainees: "Germany will be the enemy."
The Soviet army's war preparations, especially the scale of the planned mechanized equipment, were unprecedented in human history. It is unprecedented in the world and has reached the point of being divorced from reality. After the Soviet military personnel expanded from 855,000 in 1933 to 1.943 million in early 1939, it increased to more than 5 million in June 1941. The Army planned to increase from 98 divisions to 303. In March 1941, the Soviet General Staff formulated a plan to shift industry to wartime production, but equipment production lagged seriously behind. The adaptation required the tank force to be expanded to 61 tank divisions and 31 motorized infantry divisions. Each division should be equipped with 375 and 275 tanks respectively, totaling more than 31,400 tanks. Before the war, Japan only received more than 7,000 tanks, of which There are only 26 new tanks. The adaptation required the establishment of 25 aviation divisions and 106 aviation regiments within one year, half of which were equipped with new aircraft. However, by the summer of 1941, the production capacity of the Soviet aviation industry was about 50% higher than that of Germany, and the total output, especially the output of new aircraft models, was far behind. Unable to keep up with demand, by the time the Germans invaded, only 19 regiments had been refitted. The five airborne corps established at the beginning of the year are seriously lacking in technical weapons, and the new air defense system has not yet been fully established. As a result, one month after the war broke out, the Soviet army's original organization plan was forced to significantly reduce. The aviation division was reduced from 4 to 6 regiments to two regiments, the aircraft of each regiment was reduced from 61 to 22 to 32, and the infantry organization was reduced by 25. Artillery was reduced by 52, automobiles were reduced by 64, and the groping mechanized army was all cancelled.
In March 1940, the Soviet-Finnish War, which they barely won, exposed the weakness and chaos of the Soviet army after the Great Purge. A large number of officers promoted after the "anti-revolutionary campaign" lacked training and combat experience, resulting in a decline in the training level of many units. The youngest soldiers in the German combat units were recruited in the autumn of 1940, and those who were recruited in the spring of 1941 were sent to the reserve corps. However, Soviet soldiers were recruited to the front line as soon as they joined the army. Before the war, more than two-thirds of the soldiers in the border military region served in the first year, and half of them only joined the army that year.
In the words of a British historian: The Soviet army on the eve of the war was a powerful but unassembled machine. This is why Hitler was eager to take action and Stalin tried his best to avoid war in 1941.
The strength of both sides after the Soviet-German war
“Kick open the worn-out door and the whole house will collapse.”
——Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union Prediction
Precisely because total war requires the mobilization of the whole people, Ludendorff, who was well aware of Germany's national strength, particularly emphasized the importance of a quick decisive war in "Total War": "It must be committed without scruples from the beginning. 'The last soldier'. Ignore the many known and possible threats and follow the course of the war.
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Hitler was also well aware of the strength of the Soviet Union. Two months before the war, the Luftwaffe delegation visited several Soviet aviation bearing, alloy and engine factories. In their report to Goering, they admitted The Soviet aircraft manufacturing industry was the largest and most advanced in Europe.
There was less than a year left between the time they decided to invade the Soviet Union and the spring of 1941. Hitler and the German high command overestimated their bets. Betting on a quick decisive battle, they believed that the war of aggression against the Soviet Union would only take five months. It was not necessary or impossible to completely change the equipment and mobilize. It only needed to continue to implement the "Four-Year Plan" and "broad armaments" (that is, the military industry had a wide coverage. , but not on a large scale) policy, mainly through the full operation of existing military and industrial forces to meet needs
Hitler’s bigger bet is: “If the war (against the Soviet Union) is successful, it may force Britain to make peace. situation", and at the same time "the elimination of Russia will greatly increase Japan's power in the Far East", and the entire world will "hold its breath" because of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The war broke out on June 22, 1941, and the Soviet Union In September of that year, 1.5 million square kilometers of territory were lost, and about 75 million people fell behind enemy lines. Within a year, the Soviet army lost 8.04 million combat personnel, including 2.5 million dead, 4.34 million captured, and 1.2 million disabled. Half a year after the war started, the total industrial output dropped to 48% of the pre-war level, and the production of key weapons materials such as ferrous/nonferrous metal plates and bearings came to a standstill. By 1942, the output of coal, pig iron, and steel had dropped from 166 million tons in 1940 to 166 million tons in 1940. 15 million tons and 18 million tons dropped to 75 million tons, 5 million tons and 4.8 million tons.
However, the Soviet rear mobilization mechanism quickly came into operation two hours after the war broke out. The order "On the State of War" stipulated measures such as citizen labor obligations, requisition of transportation, and rationing of daily necessities. On the 26th, an order "On the Working Time System for Employees in Wartime" was issued. On June 30, the Soviet Union established a National Defense Commission. , as the highest wartime authority, in July, the comprehensive People's Commissariat of Defense Industry was reorganized into four specialized People's Commissariat of Aviation, Shipbuilding, Ordnance and Ammunition, and specialized tanks were separated from the People's Commissariat of Medium Machinery Manufacturing The People's Commissariat of Manufacturing, in November, restructured the People's Commissariat of General Machinery Manufacturing into the People's Commissariat of Rocket Equipment, which is specifically responsible for the production of rocket launchers and mortars. The original Economic Committee was reorganized into four committees: National Defense, Metallurgy, Fuel and Machinery Manufacturing. Professional Economic Committee.
The eastward relocation of industry was an important measure for Soviet wartime mobilization. The evacuation committee established on June 24 had arranged the relocation of 11 aviation plants from June 29 to 1941. In the second half of the year, equipment and a large amount of materials of 2,593 industrial enterprises were relocated from the west. In May 1942, the transfer of enterprises in Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic Sea coast was basically completed. In the second phase, enterprises in southern regions such as Stalingrad and the North Caucasus were evacuated. . During the entire process of moving eastward, the railways transported 1.5 million trains of industrial equipment and more than 10 million employees. Among them, the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was built after the Russo-Japanese War and was improved during industrialization, played an important role. Many enterprises that have relocated start operations at their new locations in less than two months on average, and some even partially start operations midway or in the open air.
In the national economic mobilization plan in the third quarter of 1941, the Soviet Union rapidly increased the production of coal, oil and metals, adjusted the distribution of raw materials, electricity and equipment for the military industry. By the second half of 1941, tank production ratio In the first half of the year, there was an increase of 1.8 times, with 60 more aircraft and three times more artillery. The 1942 War Economic Plan adopted in August called for mobilizing all material resources in the Volga River Basin, Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia to increase arms production. From 1941 to 1945, the Ural region alone produced 440,000 artillery pieces, 136,000 aircraft, 100,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery.
The waxing and waning of strength
“We once estimated that the enemy has about 200 divisions, but now we have identified 360 divisions... If we eliminate a dozen divisions, the Russians will Will invest a dozen more.
Time...is in their favour, they are moving closer to their resources, while we are moving further and further away from ours. ”
——The diary of German Army Chief of Staff Halder in August 1941
Six months after the Soviet-German war broke out, the German army was blocked under the city of Moscow, with nearly 750,000 casualties. people, 2,750 of the 4,000 tanks were lost, and by the end of March 1942, the casualties increased to more than 1 million, accounting for 1/3 of the total strength of the Eastern Front, including the loss of at least 15,000 officers, and a large number of non-combat attrition of 400,000. The "reserve army" was exhausted in August 1941, but the front line still needed 132,000 people. Before the spring of 1942, the German army did not hesitate to mobilize workers, rear personnel and western front troops to supplement the eastern front with more than 40 divisions. However, By July of that year, there were still only 2.847 million troops. At the beginning of the summer offensive, only 8 divisions were fully ready for the offensive, and the main offensive force was only half of its strength. The number of troops reached 266 divisions and 6.2 million people, which was still lower than the Soviet army's 6.591 million people. Moreover, the Soviet army had never been under the pressure of fighting on two fronts. In November 1942, only 47 of the 390 divisions were deployed in the Far East, compared with Germany's 264. However, 71 of the divisions must be stationed in Western Europe, Southern Europe and North Africa.
Due to years of consumption, armaments policy seeking quick success, poor organization and management, and constraints on labor and raw materials, Germany's war economy has not reached the expected level. Ammunition production has been significantly reduced, artillery and anti-tank weapons are insufficiently produced, infantry firepower has been weakened, the air force lacks long-range weapons for strategic bombing, and the naval equipment gap is even greater. First, the Soviet Union is facing huge pressure on food supply. Difficulty, followed by the lack of labor. For this reason, the Supreme Soviet implemented a rationing system and passed the "Decree on Mobilizing Urban Residents with Labor Capacity to Participate in Production and Construction during Wartime" and established the Labor Registration and Distribution Committee. By the summer of 1942, the Soviet Union The war transition of the national economy was completed. 1,200 factories that moved eastward and 850 new factories were put into production. The proportion of industrial output in the eastern region increased from 28.4 in 1940 to 70. The output of military industry in the east alone reached the pre-war national level. The main military industry Product output exceeded that of Germany. In 1944, the Soviet Union's annual output reached 40,300 aircraft, 28,983 tanks, and 122,500 artillery pieces, all several times that of Germany.
The Twilight of the Third Reich
1942. At the beginning of the year, Hitler had to admit that the Blitzkrieg failed to defeat the Soviet Union. At the same time, the German occupied area began to shrink, the strategic resources available had reached the limit, the "war to support war" was weak, and there was a serious shortage of heavy industrial raw materials and human resources. Without the implementation of general mobilization of the national economy, the "war economy" really began.
In February 1942, Speer was appointed as the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions (reorganized into the Ministry of Armaments and War Production in September 1943). Minister, while concentrating power, Speer also encouraged the autonomy of private enterprises, agency and joint ventures. These measures helped overcome the various struggles for power and arbitrariness in German military industry management, and enabled large-scale production. The system was standardized, and everyone, whether it was a large Krupp arsenal or a small family factory with only a dozen or so people in Silesia, could collaborate. This was of particular significance to maintaining production even as Allied bombing continued to intensify. On the other hand, Germany stepped up its plunder, obtaining 2.008 billion marks in supplies from the slave countries in 1942, and transporting 4.23 billion marks in supplies from the occupied countries in Western Europe in 1943.
It should be said that the German arms industry showed amazing adaptability and survivability during this period. It maintained growth in 1944, and weapons production reached its peak in July, expanding 5.3 times compared with 1939. The number of aircraft factories in this year increased from 80 in 1943 to 550. The aircraft production in the first half of the year increased by 19.4%. The annual aircraft production was 39,870, including 30,511 fighter jets, which were 3.4 times and 6.6 times respectively in 1941. Tank production increased 33.9, reaching 27,000 vehicles, and artillery increased by 50.3, reaching 87,000.
However, the result was that the goose was killed and the war economy developed abnormally. In 1943, 4/5 of German products were military supplies. Agricultural and animal husbandry production continued to decline. Industrial production briefly peaked in 1943 and then began to decline. , important basic industries such as steel, coal and electricity came to a standstill. By the first half of 1944, except for electricity, steel and aluminum, the output of most heavy industrial products in Germany declined, strategic material reserves became less and less, and transportation difficulties were fundamentally The foundation of military production was shaken.
In April 1944, the Soviet army broke through the pre-war borders. In June, the Allied forces landed in Western Europe. Germany, which was attacked on both fronts, fell further into trouble, and the war soon entered the German mainland. The balance of war economic strength between the two sides tilted rapidly. In 1944, the ratio of arms output between the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain and Germany reached 9:2. Taking the Air Force as an example, in the second half of 1943, Germany produced 11,395 combat aircraft and repaired 5,144 aircraft. In the first half of 1944, they were 15,299 and 5,491 aircraft respectively. However, losses on the battlefield caused the actual aircraft inventory to drop from 19,932 to 15,233. The entire Air Force can only work hard for local air defense. The Allies' escalating strategic bombings ranked submarine factories, aircraft factories, ball bearing factories, oil refineries, synthetic rubber factories and automobile factories as the six most important targets in order. Speer later admitted: "It took countless hours to rescue the damage caused by the air raids. "One hundred thousand soldiers." Goebbels wrote after a relatively peaceful night: "It is absolutely ridiculous. Just ten noisy bombers are enough to drive 15 to 18 million Germans out of their beds." In the past, the average German could get about 3,000 calories from food quotas per person per day, but this dropped to 2,500 and 2,200 calories in 1942 and 1944 respectively. By March 1945, on the eve of the Battle of Berlin, Germany's average monthly steel output was only 15% of 1944, coal was 16%, and monthly tank output also dropped from 705 to 333 units. At this point, Germany could no longer talk about wartime economic problems.
Revelation from the Soviet-German War
Throughout the Soviet-German War, the Soviets did not have any particularly clever strategies, tactics or risky actions. The decisive factor was that they were as huge as a polar bear. Manpower and material resources, as well as super strong will and patience. In the first few months of the war, the Germans captured 3.6 million Soviet troops. This was a big surprise, and they thought that the Soviet reserve force was running out. The exhausted Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center, Bobok, who was exhausted outside Moscow, said: "Who is going to put in the last effort at this time?" Whoever has one battalion can win!" Unexpectedly, the Soviet Army Headquarters mobilized the reserves of nine more army groups. Shortly after the war started, Hitler was also deeply shocked by the strength of the Soviet army. He once said to Guderian: "If I had known that the number of Soviet tanks listed in your book (referring to "Tanks, Forward!") was true, maybe We would not have started this war!” During the Nuremberg trial, Nazi Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop listed the “unexpected power of the Red Army” as one of the three major factors in Germany’s defeat.
Germany could not withstand not only equitable consumption of combat forces, but also unequal consumption. The Soviet army lost more than 300,000 people on the Eastern Front more than once in battles, but it could still mobilize more troops. strength, but the German army was unable to attack across the board in the battle of Moscow, and fell into passivity in the battle of Stalingrad. If the estimate of the Soviet Union's mobilization potential was limited by the absolute secrecy of the Soviet Union's military construction, then Hitler and the German generals believed that the Soviet Union's popular sentiment would soon collapse. This can only be said to be racist arrogance and a lack of understanding of the Soviet Union's national conditions.
When talking about the cost of industrialization, Stalin once said: "If Germany is a country that has established a proletarian dictatorship, then the industrialization of the Soviet Union can certainly start with light industry." With the strict Cheka work law Dzerzhinsky, who is famous in economic management, also famously said: "Can the Russia of workers and peasants be anything else? It can only be made of metal." Therefore, the heavy lessons and great victories of the Soviet-German war have become specimens, "Empire "Theory of the Inevitability of Socialist War" became the truth, and industrialization, agricultural collectivization and "military productivity layout" became the red bible.
The two different technical philosophies embodied by the Soviet Union and Germany in weapons and equipment also had an important impact on wartime production.
Soviet designers have always adhered to the simplest truth - weapons must be simple and reliable, easy to mass produce, train and maintain in order to meet the needs of war. Weapons production must pay attention to the highest total combat effectiveness produced by unit input, rather than simply pursuing performance. This is the reason for the numerical advantage of Soviet tanks and aircraft. Of course, Germany has also invested in numerical wrestling over armor thickness and artillery power. In order to compete with the T-34 medium tank and KB-1 heavy tank, it has developed increasingly heavier "Leopard", "Tiger" and "King Tiger" tanks. Heavy tanks. However, the reality that the national power is inferior to that of the Soviet Union has always driven the idea of ??quality over quantity throughout the development of German armaments. There have even been designs that were too "advanced" to be realized, such as the 188-ton "Rat" super-heavy tank. The Nazis' racism drove away a large number of scientists, but the new weapons that Germany developed at the end of World War II or were about to come out still astound future generations. The prototypes of jet aircraft, guided bombs, anti-aircraft missiles, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles were all Originating from Germany, there are also a large number of incredible plans, which have something to do with that crazy party leader. Although these weapons are generally not used against the Soviet army, in contrast, the Soviet army basically did not pursue relatively novel weapons during the war