Theory is the prerequisite for practice

Practice is the standard for testing truth... I personally think that both are indispensable~

In academia, we We are used to being in awe of obscure doctrines, but we often forget that it is through extremely outstanding work that some originally complex ideological mysteries become clear, and some problems that have been repeatedly discussed in many obscure texts gain possible solutions. Popper is just such an outstanding thinker. A century ago, criticism of absolute truth and determinism was still a heresy in public intellectual circles, but Popper, with his unique style (and almost paranoid eloquent enthusiasm), promoted a turning point in the history of thought. This heresy has even become common knowledge today. But this is by no means an inconsequential common sense, but a significant common sense that rewrites people's views on science, history and social evolution. In this sense, Popper can deservedly join the ranks of first-rate thinkers.

Achievements as a philosopher

Popper's significance as a thinker may be relatively easy to clarify, but there is a lot of controversy about his contribution to philosophy. Although Popper himself tended to think of himself as a philosopher, his reputation in professional philosophy was rather dubious. Many despised his work, while others simply did not recognize his qualifications as a philosopher. The reasons for this situation are complex. My following analysis will focus on pointing out that it is difficult to evaluate Popper's philosophical achievements, which is related to the uniqueness of his research field and personal style.

Popper's academic career began with the critical study of induction problems, which is a typical field of epistemology. His theory of falsificationism comes from questioning the inductive method as the logical basis for the growth of knowledge, but this is not an original discovery. Hume raised the "problem of induction" as early as 200 years ago, and Russell also mentioned it again in a humorous way (a chicken that is fed as usual by its owner every day cannot "generate" that one day its neck will be broken by its owner) ). Wittgenstein (who was Popper's lifelong enemy) clearly restated this point in his uniquely styled Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus published in 1921: "The inductive process consists in this: that is, we take the The simplest law consistent with our experience (6.363). However, this process has no logical basis, but only a psychological basis (6.3631). "So, in terms of the discovery of the induction problem, Hume proposed it before and Russell later. Going back to Wittgenstein and others, Popper has nothing original about this. Popper had nothing original to say about this.

Popper's philosophical contribution lies in proposing a possible solution to the problem of induction. Contrary to the basic ideas of the Vienna Circle, Popper's falsificationism uses empirically tested "falsifiability" rather than "verifiability" as the demarcation criterion between scientific and non-scientific statements, and uses "question-conjecture-refutation" The "trial and error mechanism" of "observation-induction-confirmation" replaces the "empirical mechanism" of "observation-induction-confirmation" and provides a new explanation for the growth of scientific knowledge. Popper clearly proposed this idea as early as the early 1930s, and it was undoubtedly original. But how to evaluate this originality philosophically is debatable. Perhaps a comparison can be made with the work of the Vienna Circle.

The Vienna Circle, with Russell and Wittgenstein as its spiritual leaders, gathered many outstanding philosophers and mathematicians. They had read and discussed Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" word for word (not once, but twice!) for up to a year, and of course they had long been fully aware of the difficulty of induction. In other words, they faced the same problem as Popper. But the main members of the logical positivist school still insist on solving it in the empirical direction. Among them, R. Carnap’s path of using probabilistic interpretation to save the inductive method seemed quite promising at first, but later encountered many powerful refutations (including Popper’s), and no more promising progress could be seen. Giving up on the prospect, Carnap himself eventually turned to semantic research. The Vienna Circle finally disintegrated due to various reasons (especially Schlick's assassination).

In his intellectual autobiography "Infinite Quest", Popper claimed that it was he who "killed logical positivism". Although he did not mean it, he still wanted to bankrupt this important philosophical school at the time. Be responsible”. Although this may sound like boasting, the following conclusion can still be established: No one (including the members of the Vienna Group) has completed a possible solution to the problem of induction in scientific theory of knowledge that is enough to compete with Popper's falsificationism path. This is an important contribution in philosophy, although it may hardly be called a "first-rate achievement."

The paranoia and stubbornness in Popper’s personality tendencies may have affected philosophers’ evaluation of him to some extent. For example, he firmly claimed that he had completely solved Hume's problem that has troubled philosophers for 200 years, a problem that C. D. Broad called "the family scandal of philosophy." But this confident assertion is questioned by many philosophers and some scientists. In particular, Popper had difficulty explaining why people still rely on inductive methods in everyday experience (for Ayer, this is the key to Huemer's problem). Popper made a lot of self-defense for this, including making a distinction between the psychological process and the logical basis of scientific discovery. Many debates did lead to improvements in theory, but Popper might have gained more recognition if he had been more modest.

The same is true for the practical effectiveness of the "conjecture-refutation" mechanism. This is better explained by the refined falsificationism or "scientific research program methodology" that Lakatos later developed. Although this is more of a technical correction and supplement than a new philosophical approach, Popper He could not tolerate his students' critical inheritance, which eventually led to the breakdown of their friendship. Perhaps most difficult for professional philosophers to accept is Popper's attack on Wittgenstein. He arrogantly declared that Wittgenstein's later research and the philosophy of language developed from it were completely misguided. In any case, Popper's personality had dogmatic characteristics that were very contradictory to the spirit of openness and tolerance he advocated, so much so that some people joked that Popper was the "enemy of the open society."

Popper's blatant offense against Plato may be another reason why he fell out of favor with philosophers. His interpretation of Plato in the first volume of "The Open Society" has received many fierce criticisms, from the details of the Greek translation, to the understanding of specific text passages, to the overall grasp of Plato's intentions. Greek philosophy expert R. B. Levinson published a special monograph "In Defense of Plato", which made a comprehensive attack on Popper. Popper specifically added an appendix to the fourth edition to refute this. Of course, there are philosophers who support Popper's interpretation of Plato. Gilbert Ryle, a well-known professor of analytical philosophy at Oxford University, who himself has published a monograph on Plato, published a book review in Mind magazine and pointed out that Popper’s “research on Greek history and Greek thought is obviously profound and profound. Endowed with originality, the interpretation of Plato will no longer be cliché." Russell also said that Popper's "attack on Plato, although contrary to orthodoxy, seems to me to be completely valid." Appropriate judgment of such a controversy is impossible without in-depth specialized study of Plato and Greek philosophy. Moreover, Whitehead famously said, "The whole of Western philosophy is a footnote to Plato." The debate between different footnotes is also difficult to reach a clear conclusion. But one fact is almost certain: Popper's interpretation of Plato and Hegel will not be seriously discussed as an important point of view in the study of professional philosophy.

In general, Popper’s most enthusiastic admirers in the humanities academic community (such as Hayek and Berlin) are mostly “thinkers” rather than professional philosophers in the strict sense. Popper once pointed out in an interview that the task of philosophy is to reflect on our unconscious biases and clearly opposed philosophy "imitating the model of modern science" on issues of specialization. In the modern disciplinary system, Popper's professional identity is quite ambiguous and even embarrassing. This also creates certain difficulties in evaluating Popper's academic achievements.

His course on "Logic and Scientific Method" at the London School of Economics doesn't even have a professorship. This made it difficult for this "internationally renowned" senior lecturer to be promoted to professor. It was not until 1948 (three years after the publication of "The Open Society") that, at Hayek's initiative, the school agreed to set up a special "Professor of Logic and Scientific Method" seat for Popper, finally solving his "professional title problem" ".

Popper's research topics are mostly between professional philosophy and natural science, especially reflected in his less famous specialized research. For example, at the 1958 International Congress of Philosophy in Venice, Popper presented a paper analyzing how Leibnis's criticism of Descartes affected the development of physics from atomic theory to "Faraday-Maxwellian field theory" . The paper was praised in very small circles, but mostly unknown to most philosophers. His book The Self and Its Brain, co-authored with Acres, suffered a similar fate. Popper was more like a scholar of Leibniz's time, working in the zone between natural science and philosophy. In this sense, he does not have many contemporary peers, and it is difficult for him to gain recognition in the professional philosophical community.

Two popular misunderstandings about Popper

There are two popular misunderstandings about Popper's thought, and it seems necessary to clarify them. Because Popper made extensive and detailed explanations of the demarcation criteria between science and pseudoscience, some people think that he is an advocate of "scientific supremacy" or "scientism." This is a very elementary misunderstanding.

In Popper's view, the difference between science and non-science lies in empirical falsifiability, but he firmly denied that this is the demarcation criterion for distinguishing "meaningful" and "meaningless". On this issue, Popper had a sharp conflict with the logical positivists, who believed that only logical propositions and scientific (empirically testable) propositions are "meaningful". Popper insisted that the demarcation standard between science and non-science is by no means the demarcation standard of "meaning". On the contrary, he believed that although propositions such as religion, mythology and metaphysics are not scientific statements, they have their own rich meaning and value, and some can become the source of scientific conjecture. He even believed that many theories he called "pseudoscience", such as Freudian psychology, may themselves have profound insights, and their theories may be correct, but they are not falsifiable and cannot be Tested empirically.

In Popper's dictionary, "science" is not a synonym for "meaningful" or "valuable", let alone "correct" or "truth". Nor is scientific knowledge the only meaningful intellectual enterprise for mankind. He emphasized that scientific theories are only temporary hypotheses that have not yet been falsified, and he also denied the superstition that equates science with truth. Therefore, contrary to popular misunderstanding, Popper was actually one of the strongest critics of scientific supremacy and scientism.

Another misunderstanding of Popper's political stance deserves more serious discussion. Hayek is generally regarded as a "right-leaning" liberal thinker. His half-century-long close relationship with Popper is well known. He even mentioned in his letter to Popper that " Our philosophy”. Berlin, another liberal thinker, also praised Popper. In the preface to the 1963 edition of his "Life of Marx", Berlin called Popper's "The Open Society" "a rare creative and powerful work" and believed that among all living authors, Popper had the greatest influence on Marxism. Philosophical and historical doctrines made "the most careful and fascinating criticisms." And Popper himself did call himself a liberal. These factors would make people naturally infer that he would hold a "right-wing stance" politically. Although this view is not groundless, it is still seriously biased. In fact, Popper was quite far removed from his fellow liberals in terms of political stance.

First of all, it is necessary to point out that although Popper was biased against Marxism, he did not carry out an ideological attack. The book "Developing Society" is an analytical criticism of the theory and practice of Marxism from the perspective of critical rationalism.

Popper had a deep respect for Marx himself and believed that Marx was a genius philosopher. He was also keenly aware that Marx was justified in distinguishing his theory from "utopian socialism" and that his theory It was indeed scientific at the time because it made a large number of predictions that could be tested by empirical facts. But in Popper's view, many of these important predictions have been falsified by history. But his main target of criticism is what he calls "vulgar Marxists". No matter how many facts that contradict the theory appear in social practice, they still insist on the dogma of the theory and defend it relentlessly. This kind of dogmatic self-justification goes against one of the basic qualities of science, which is that theories must bravely face the test of practice. This vulgar Marxism therefore no longer has a scientific character. At the same time, Popper also pointed out that Marxism is a kind of historical determinism, which will lead to overall and long-term planning arrangements for social practice. Although Popper did not touch on the shortcomings of the Soviet model of socialism at the time, the concept of "progressive social engineering" he advocated, advocating a social evolution model that corrects errors through constant trials, is not without inspiration for today's socialist practice. meaningful.

Popper was a communist in his youth. Although he later gave up this belief, he still believed in socialism for many years and still has a strong belief in Marx's views on human equality and freedom. deeply identify with moral ideals. He wrote in "Infinite Quest": "If it were possible for socialism to be combined with individual freedom, then I would still be a socialist. For there is nothing like living a plain, simple and free life in an egalitarian society. Life is better." He later realized that freedom was more important than equality, because striving for equality might endanger freedom, but there would be no equality among unfree people. In this sense, Popper did emphasize the priority of freedom over equality. But this does not infer that he holds a right-wing political stance. On the contrary, his views on many important issues seem to have a more "left-wing" political bent.

In the second volume of "Open Society", Popper clearly opposed extreme liberalism, especially economic laissez-faire liberalism; he fiercely criticized market fundamentalism, believing that this would allow the rich to exploit the poor without limit , the result will be that the poor will lose their freedom. Therefore, he strongly supports the state's economic interventionism: "We must establish a system to protect the economically weak from the strong and consolidate this through state power... This means that the principle of state non-intervention must be abandoned and the principle of unfettered economic institutions, if we want freedom to be preserved, then I must demand that the state replace unfettered economic liberal policies with planned economic intervention, and we must demand that economic interventionism replaces capitalism.” This quotation itself is extremely clear. If Popper is a liberal, then a liberal who demands the replacement of economic capitalism can at least be called a "liberal left" here.

Conclusion

A profound and clear thinker, a scholar hovering between science and philosophy, an anti-capitalist liberal, and a paranoid style who strives to promote A prudent and open eloquent, an intellectual who is both famous and widely misunderstood among the populace, this is the remarkable and unique Karl Popper. After a lifetime of endless exploration, he finally took Socrates' motto "I know nothing" as the epitaph of his thoughts. He warned people in the most powerful way about the limitations of knowledge and the dangers of rational conceit. For the disasters and horrors experienced by mankind in the 20th century, Popper was a doctor who diagnosed the plague of ideas. If his warnings have become common knowledge today, it is precisely because of his outstanding achievements that he has been forgotten. If one day a similar plague spreads again, people will think of him again and remember his diagnosis.

Notes:

1 [Austrian] Wittgenstein, translated by Guo Ying, "Tractatus Logic and Philosophy" (The Commercial Press, August 1985), page 93.

2 Karl Popper, translated by Qiu Renzong and Duan Juan, "Infinite Exploration—Ideological Autobiography" (Fujian People's Publishing House, February 1987), pp. 33-34.

3Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume 2: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath (London: Routledge, 5th Edition, 1973 reprint), p. 125.