Sun Tzu's Art of War, known as the "crown of the art of war", was published in the state of Wu in 5 12 BC, and it is recognized as the oldest military theoretical work in the world. The author's grandson, Woods Changqing, was born in Le 'an, Qi State (now Huimin County, Shandong Province) and was honored as the originator of military science.
Sun Tzu's ideal strategic pursuit is "to defeat the enemy without fighting"
Although the Art of War is a military book, its highest pursuit is not war, nor is it the pursuit of victory in war. It says, "It is good to win every battle, even if it is bad." So, what is its ideal strategic pursuit? It says that "a soldier who defeats others without fighting" is a "good man".
Looking through the Art of War, we can see that to a great extent, there are two words: one is "complete" and the other is "broken". "All" means winning without fighting, and "Breaking" means winning by fighting. "Total victory" is the best, followed by "breaking victory".
The way to achieve "total victory" is "going to the army to cut the conspiracy" and "going to the cross"; The way to achieve "defeat" is to "cut down the soldiers" and "attack the city"
"Cutting" means "defeating the enemy's strategic attempt", that is, exposing, destroying, aborting and going bankrupt the enemy's strategic attempt before it is put into practice. This is one of the most labor-saving, trouble-free and clear methods of struggle.
In the spring and autumn period when Sun Tzu lived, this method of "cutting" was indeed possible. The most typical example of this strategy is the story that Mozi and his grandson saved the Song Dynasty at the same time.
Chu invented and manufactured a ladder for siege as a public transport, which was intended to be used as a weapon for Chu troops to attack the State of Song. Chu Qiang Song Wei. Mozi is an advocate of "non-attack" and has always opposed unjust wars. Hearing that Chu was going to invade the Song Dynasty, he hurried to the State of Chu to dissuade the King of Chu from invading the Song Dynasty like Gong Gong, but the King of Chu and Gong Gong relied on the new siege equipment ladder and were unmoved by Mozi's lobbying. Mozi, like a loser, used clothes as a city in front of the king of Chu and sawdust as a weapon to attack and defend the city, and staged a "battle simulation" of Chu attacking and defending Song. As a result, "Mozi's defense was more than enough" ("Mozi's public defeat") forced the king of Chu to give up his plan to invade the Song Dynasty.
"Breaking off diplomatic relations" is to defeat the enemy's strategic attempt through diplomatic struggle. Although it won without a fight, it was less than "breaking off diplomatic relations" because diplomatic activities were more laborious and troublesome. During the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, diplomatic activities were very frequent, especially the integration of Lian Heng during the Warring States Period, which greatly affected national security.
The core of Sun Tzu's war-fighting thought is to win great victories at a small cost.
Sun Tzu's view of victory and defeat, apart from "total victory", is that "victory" and "all" are political solutions and "defeat" is a war solution. "All" is a bloodless war, and "breaking" is a bloody politics. Although Sun Tzu regards "total victory" as his ideal strategic pursuit, 70% to 80% of his thirteen articles are about the method of "breaking victory". Fighting is, after all, the main content of Sun Tzu's art of war.
It is Sun Tzu's pursuit of victory to fight big with small ones. Sun Tzu's most fundamental guiding ideology on the use of troops is to pursue the word "goodness". "Total victory" is the pursuit of "goodness of goodness", and "breaking victory" is the pursuit of "goodness of war", which is what he repeatedly emphasized.
The essence of Sun Tzu's thought of "being good at fighting" is still the continuation of his thought of "winning every battle" in the process of fighting. He said, "A good soldier can win without wisdom and courage." Why do excellent soldiers win battles without a reputation for wisdom or a record of bravery?
Because, in Sun Tzu's view, the real warrior won the battle, not a bloody battle or a desperate battle that killed 1,000 people and paid 800 yuan, but "winning is easy"-he hit an easy enemy and "the winner has lost"-he hit an enemy that was already losing.
If the army wants to win the battle, it depends on the wise monarch, talented generals, brave soldiers, well-equipped people, adequate security and smooth communication. Sun Tzu has incisive exposition in different degrees. Here, I just want to explain the three pillars of Sun Tzu's tactical thought.
From the perspective of operational command, Sun Tzu's Art of War is also a creative art of war, from which we can find that Sun Tzu's imagination is very special, his thinking is extraordinary, and he is good at turning ordinary into magic. He initiated a series of conceptual categories in military science, among which "potential", "reality" and "strangeness" formed the three pillars of Sun Tzu's tactical thought.
We know that "potential" is about the accumulation of military power, "strangeness" is about the use of military power, and "reality" is about the goal of military power selection. These three are complementary and interrelated.
An army consists of army morale, strength and weapons, which is the "situation"; Command this army correctly and flexibly to change its tactics, which is "strange meaning"; According to the enemy's situation and our situation, we skillfully choose the best operational direction of this army, which is true and false.
In fact, throughout the ages, Chinese and western strategic executives, whether China's grandson or clausewitz in the west, all know strategy and power, and the difference is only in their different understanding and application of power.
Sun Tzu compared water to "potential" and "the disease that excites water. As for the stone drifter, the potential is also". This water potential is impact, not explosive force. Explosive power is like firepower, fierce and fierce, and the outcome is obvious. Impact is like water power, leaving the enemy no chance to breathe, no time to fight back, and no room to change tactics.
In terms of the right to use, Sun Tzu attached great importance to the odd and the right, attached importance to the way of fighting, and advocated that "ingenuity can accomplish things" and replaced brute force with ingenuity. The reason why Sun Tzu discussed the different tactics of "ten encirclement and five attacks" is to pay attention to the choice of tactics, strive for the best policy, prepare for the middle policy and avoid the worst policy. The best policy is to master the law of motion of things, and the best policy is to solve problems easily. I am skilled and get twice the result with half the effort. Hit the snake seven inches, not the whole body. This is Sun Tzu's thinking. This kind of thinking is reflected in the use of military power, which is very similar to the principle of Taiji Chuan, and it is still soft and wise and scheming.
Sun Tzu once said, "Win by power, win by surprise". Literally, it is to take soldiers as enemies and win with raiders. In fact, there is another meaning, that is, using formal methods to layout and using strange methods to defeat the enemy. It is a general rule to arrange troops and formations in the usual way. However, the secret of operation lies in a heart. If there is no such thing, fighting will become robot confrontation. It is precisely because of this article that the human factor is the decisive factor in winning or losing the war.
From the operational point of view, of the three "feelings", "strangeness" and "reality", it is the most dynamic and competitive. Because the problem of "reality" is to finally realize "taking the enemy by surprise", the enemy's surprise is empty, and the enemy's surprise is empty. Unprepared refers to the enemy's joints.
These principles were successfully embodied in the Guiling War between Qi, Wei and Sun Bin.
Pang Juan led Wei Jun from the capital girder (now Kaifeng) to attack Handan, the capital of Zhao, and Zhao asked Qi for help. According to the usual train of thought, the Qi army that saved Zhao just used Wei Jun's strategy of attacking the city and shuddering, and joined hands with Zhao to attack Wei Jun inside and outside Handan at the gate. However, Sun Bin denied this conventional thinking, thinking that this method is just like fighting, and he himself participated in beating people, which is a stupid way. He advocated attacking and defending the empty beam, forcing Pang Juan to withdraw from Handan and return to save himself. Then he took the opportunity to ambush Wei Jun on his way home and caught him off guard. The progress of the campaign, as Sun Bin expected, won.
Sun Bin's method of "encircling Wei to save Zhao" is to flexibly apply the principle of "attacking him unprepared", which Sun Bin vividly called "criticizing the enemy's throat". "Criticizing the enemy's throat" means attacking the enemy's throat, which is both crucial and weak. Mao Zedong spoke highly of the battle of Qi and Wei directed by Sun Bin, and once wrote such a comment: "Attacking Wei to save Zhao, because of defeat, is a hero through the ages."
"Death" is the main line of Sun Tzu's thought of running the army.
If "all" and "breaking" are a main thread that runs through Sun Tzu's combat thought, then "literature" and "martial arts" are a main thread that runs through Sun Tzu's thought of running the army. "Use words to control it, use strength to control it" is another huge thinking framework put forward by Sun Tzu. Civil and military integrity, including kindness and prestige, clear belief in reward and punishment, loving soldiers and being good at prisoners, strict requirements and many other legal meanings.
The main body of commanding operations is the general, and the main body of managing troops is also the general. Sun Tzu's Art of War discusses in detail the position, function and requirements of generals in running the army. Therefore, in this sense, Sun Tzu's Art of War is also a book to study general talents or control.
At the end of the Spring and Autumn Period, generals, as new things, just sprouted. Sun Tzu keenly saw this and spoke highly of it. He made a series of incisive expositions on the position and function of generals, selection and appointment, moral cultivation and so on, which has important guiding significance.
Sun Tzu believes that an excellent general should have the political character of "further not seeking fame, retreating without avoiding crimes, only protecting the people and benefiting the Lord", have the standards of "wisdom, faith, benevolence, courage and strictness", practice the moral cultivation of "staying still and ruling the country with righteousness" and cherish the feelings of loving soldiers. Sun Tzu's demand for generals and others is not only a wise saying in the Spring and Autumn Period when the form of war changed greatly, but also a scientific truth for later generations to run the army.
Simple military dialectics is the soul of Sun Tzu's Art of War.
Sun Tzu's great achievements in military art are inseparable from his simple military dialectics. When studying war, Sun Tzu paid great attention to analyzing all kinds of contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and their contradictory movements, so as to "know ourselves and ourselves", proceed from reality, explore the objective laws of war, and thus formulate correct operational principles and methods.
Sun Tzu's Art of War is commendable in that it not only sees the objective conditions for winning the war, but also sees the important role of human factors in winning or losing the war. The "shape" in Sun Tzu's Art of War discusses the moving matter, and the "potential" discusses the movement of matter. In Sun Tzu's view, everything in the war is moving rather than static. "Degree, quantity, number, balance, victory", "five things", "seven plans", "ten encirclement and five attacks" and "hunger relief" are all material forces of war, which show the strength of attack and defense and are the objective basis for determining the victory of war. Sun Tzu saw that they are not immutable, but can actively promote their transformation through people's subjective efforts. He said: "Chaos is born of governance, timidity is born of courage, and weakness is born of strength." "If the enemy can escape, he will be desperate; if he is full, he will be hungry; if he is safe, he will move." In short, as long as we know ourselves and ourselves, the tactics are correct, and the victory is in our hands, the weak army can also defeat the strong army, and win more with fewer. For example, he said that if the enemy is ten times as many as me, the way to defeat the enemy is "to be human and I am invisible, then I specialize in dividing the enemy." I specialize in one, the enemy is divided into ten, and if I attack one with ten, I will be outnumbered. One who can attack a widow with many people, a negotiator. "That is to say, through tactical deception and force feint, we can concentrate our forces and induce the enemy to disperse their forces. In this way, although on the whole, that is, strategically, I strike ten with one blow, but on the part, tactically, I strike ten with one blow, strike fewer with more, attack the weak with the strong, and control the superior with the superior. Only in this way can we win every battle, then reach the rest, divide and rule, and finally win the overall victory.
Luring the enemy by mistake means winning more with less, hitting the enemy's key points, avoiding reality and attacking the virtual, and winning more with less. "Nine Places" wrote: "How to treat the future when the enemy is consolidated?" Sun Tzu said, "Listen to what he loves first." It means that the enemy is aggressive and the army is under pressure. How to deal with it? Sun Tzu believes that as long as he takes the lead in attacking its key parts, he can turn passivity into initiative.
To study the philosophical implication of Sun Tzu's Art of War, we should not only explore its simple military dialectics, but also explore the characteristics of its way of thinking. This feature is also an important sign that China's traditional military science is different from western military science.
We know that the theoretical basis of western military science is logical thinking, and the characteristics of western military terms are the decomposition and synthesis of conceptual elements. Compared with China's traditional military science, western military thought has the characteristics of focusing on micro-thinking, emphasizing specific operations and lacking long-term and macro-strategic awareness, which is its obvious defect. The theoretical basis of China's traditional military science is empiricism and informal logical thinking mode with dialectics as the main body. Although this way of thinking has its weaknesses, compared with formal logic, it pays attention to the integrity and dynamic grasp of things, and pays attention to the universal connection, dynamic transformation and circular development of things. Compared with formal logic, it is more suitable to reflect and control empirical knowledge and realistic contradictory movement from the perspective of subject, and has a far-sighted overall consciousness and far-sighted consciousness. This is the soul of China's traditional military science represented by the Art of War, the strength of China's traditional military science, and the rich cultural heritage left by China's traditional military science, which must be inherited and carried forward.
two
After Sun Tzu's Art of War came out, it received rave reviews. With the maturity of China's feudal society and China's feudal culture, in the Northern Song Dynasty, seven military books headed by Sun Tzu's Art of War were established as the classics of China's military science, further consolidating the lofty position of Sun Tzu's Art of War in the history of military art until the Ming and Qing Dynasties.
Modern Transformation of China's Traditional Military Science Represented by Sun Tzu's Art of War
Sun Tzu's Art of War was really tested and challenged after the history of China entered modern times. In Li Hongzhang's words, modern China was confronted with "changes that have never happened in a thousand years" and "enemies that have never happened in a thousand years". Facing the impact of modern military technology and modern war style, China's traditional military science system, including Sun Tzu's Art of War, has seriously collided with western military science. After the Opium War, Lin Zexu, Wei Yuan and others deeply realized the reality that "skills are not as good as people" and put forward the strategic proposition of "learning from foreigners and improving skills". The repeated defeats in the modern anti-aggression war reveal a concise logic that people are less skilled than others, and the further logic is that China people must accept the modern military science system. The time value of traditional military science has also begun to be doubted. Chen Longchang, a military scientist, hit the nail on the head and pointed out: "China talked about being careless with soldiers, but thirteen articles of Sun Tzu's Art of War and Qi Xin's book are still popular today, calling them practical. However, Sun Tzu's theory is too subtle to be understood unless he is wise. Shu Qi came from the pre-Ming Dynasty. Although I tried to recommend it, few people adopted it, so I just need to practice its meaning. In addition, the so-called compromise is rarely required, and it will be important to defend the past and the present. " Xu also came to the conclusion: "Half of the ancient art of war is empty talk and impractical. Although Qi's "Ji Xiao Shu Xin" does not tell much about the facts, the language is vague and it is difficult to take the law. "
In this context, China's traditional military science system began a modern transformation, and a large number of western military theoretical works were introduced. Teaching materials such as Science of Tactics, military strategist, laws of war, military science and weapons science, which reflect modern western military theory and military art thought, have basically replaced the position of the "Seven Books".
Successful transformation needs "westernization", not "westernization". Successful "westernization" should be based on one's own reality and the other's critical inheritance of one's own military science, otherwise it will be a rootless tree and passive water. As Mr. Lu Xun said: "Externally, it does not lag behind the world trend of thought, but internally, it still loses its inherent blood." With today's retro, there is no new Sect. " It is against this background that some military scientists have realized the great potential value of China's traditional military science.
Jiang Baili, a famous military scientist, began to interpret the Art of War from the perspective of modern military science, which opened a "new interpretation wind" of traditional military science research. After entering the Republic of China, the value of traditional military science represented by Sun Tzu's Art of War was further recognized by Chinese people. Military scientists in the Republic of China believe that the characteristics of China's traditional military science mainly include the following aspects: China's traditional military science is "application-oriented, pointing out some principles or methods to show the extreme of its application"; Western military science "mainly explores the theory of military science and even military technology, and its application is suitable for the understanding of general theories." China's traditional military science is "grasping the fact ontology immediately with intuition" and "seeking the beauty of application without formal reasoning"; Western military science "draws coherent conclusions through logical reasoning." China's traditional military science is influenced by Confucianism, and its theoretical scope is not only about strategy and tactics, but also includes important "national politics" such as politics, economy and diplomacy, which "clearly marks the scale of peacetime and wartime". this is
China's art of war is immortal. Compared with western military works, China's military works "have the value of governing the country and calming the world". China's nation is peace-loving, and China's military science "reveals the idea of peace everywhere". This is quite different from "military science of great powers based on aggression", which is also the main reason why China's traditional military science shines brilliantly. China's traditional military science takes "defeating the enemy without fighting, and the good is also good" as the highest principle, which is the military science of Wang Dao; Western military science regards the annihilation of "directly annihilating the enemy" as the highest principle of using troops, which is hegemonic military science. China's traditional military science pays attention to "attacking soldiers first, then cutting soldiers, and then attacking the city"; It is not perfect for western military science to stay at the level of "attacking the city with soldiers"
These understandings have basically grasped the characteristics and values of China's traditional military science. It has become the knowledge of military scientists to critically inherit the excellent heritage of China's traditional military science, critically absorb the essence of western modern military theory, and establish a modern military science system with China characteristics in the exchange and integration of Chinese and western military science.
However, the military strategist of the Republic of China's idea of establishing an independent study system for recruits in China, to a great extent, only stays at the theoretical level. In terms of class attributes, most military scientists in the Republic of China were bourgeois thinkers. The congenital deficiency of the bourgeoisie in China makes it impossible for them to get rid of their heavy dependence on the West in politics, economy, culture, military affairs and military theory. This also determines that bourgeois military scientists cannot establish this new and independent military science system. The task of establishing the recruit system has historically fallen on the proletariat. Mao Zedong's military thought is a scientific system with China characteristics. It is not only the product of the combination of Marxist-Leninist military theory and the concrete reality of China revolution, but also the product of the proletarian militarist, represented by Mao Zedong, critically inheriting and developing China's traditional military culture. The essence of China's traditional military culture has been comprehensively inherited and developed in this new system.
The idea of "total victory" in Sun Tzu's art of war was rediscovered in the 20th century.
After entering the 20th century, two unprecedented world wars in human history, especially after the appearance of nuclear weapons, exposed the defects of western military thought. Taking the western people's reflection on the military theory since clausewitz as an opportunity, the value of China's traditional military science once again appears. The First World War made liddell hart, a British military scientist, have a strong sense of disillusionment with the western military theory since the Napoleonic Wars. He is convinced that "the main reason for the useless mass slaughter in the war is that the war director is stubborn in the wrong military doctrine, that is, clausewitz's explanation of the Napoleonic Wars". Shortly after the end of World War I, liddell hart published an article calling for a "re-examination" of the "widely popular view on the purpose of war" inherited from clausewitz. It was in the liquidation of modern western military theory that liddell hart discovered the important enlightening significance of Sun Tzu's Art of War in strategic thinking and strategic values, and thus put forward the "indirect route strategy".
Liddell hart was the first person to reflect on modern western military theory, but not the last. After World War II, the West, led by the United States, was successively defeated in the Korean War and the Vietnam War, and the problems of western military theory were further exposed. In particular, the failure of the Vietnam War touched westerners greatly. In the Vietnam War, Americans fought in strict accordance with Western military theories. However, in this war that lasted 1 1 year, the United States won almost every battle, but lost the whole war. This not only confuses the battlefield commanders of the US military, but also forces the top decision-makers of the war to reflect on what is wrong with this seemingly winning war anyway. In this context, more and more westerners turn their attention to The Art of War, hoping to get inspiration from the ancient wisdom of the East. As a result, many people come to the conclusion that the failure of the western world is precisely because it violates the lessons of Sun Tzu's Art of War. In a soldier's report, the commander of the American invading army, Westem Moran, recalled the Vietnam War and quoted Sun Tzu's famous saying that "entering Vietnam was the biggest mistake made by our country". Former President Nixon also said in "Real War": "As Sun Tzu, a military strategist in China, said 2,500 years ago,' Those who spend a long time on the military are beneficial to the country and have nothing. Therefore, winning for a long time is not expensive. "The failure of the United States in Vietnam is exactly what Sun Tzu said. Collins, another famous American strategic thinker, also pointed out in his book Grand Strategy: "Sun Tzu said,' Go to the army to fight'. ..... The United States ignored Sun Tzu's wise advice and foolishly went to war. We overestimated our ability and underestimated the enemy's ability. We were keen on using armed forces, which soon produced a decisive goal: military victory on the battlefield. "
At the end of 1970s, when the western strategic system faced a serious "collapse crisis", Americans thought of Sun Tzu again, and were inspired by Sun Tzu's "total victory" strategy to formulate the so-called "Sun Tzu's nuclear strategy". The US military's operational command theory also learned a lot from Sun Tzu's Art of War, so that Australian military writer Mohan Marley II predicted when looking forward to the development of military theory in the 2nd1century: "Just as the wars in the 9th century were influenced by Yomini and the wars in the 20th century were influenced by clausewitz, the wars in the 2nd1century may also be influenced by Sun Tzu's Art of War.
Unlike modern China people who were forced to accept western military theories, modern westerners, represented by liddell hart, took the initiative to introduce China's traditional military science. If for modern China, the spread of western learning to the east resulted in the disintegration of a traditional military science system, then it was not the case for modern westerners. Modern western military theory is already a mature system. The spread of China's traditional military science to the west did not have a comprehensive impact on the western military theoretical system. On the contrary, it is more manifested in the revision of the western military theoretical system represented by clausewitz. Because of this, the absorption of China's traditional military science by western military theory was not carried out at a low level at the beginning, but borrowed from the thinking mode contained in China's traditional military science.
The humanistic spirit of Sun Tzu's Art of War is worthy of great publicity in contemporary international relations.
The greatness of China's traditional military science lies not only in its revelation and creation of immortal general operational principles, but also in its holding high the banner of just and prudent war and opposing militaristic tactics. Sun Tzu's Art of War pointed out at the beginning that war is a national event and must be treated with caution. Since then, it has repeatedly stressed that it should always be alert to the threat of enemy countries. "Don't rely on it, just wait; You can't attack it without relying on it. "He warned monarchs and generals to treat war as' unless it is profitable, you have to use it, unless it is dangerous, you don't fight', and the soldiers are dangerous." The Lord can't be angry, and he can't fight because of anger. "
The Chinese nation is a peace-loving nation. Like the Confucian culture in China, the basic spirit of China's militarist culture is harmonious culture, which has always advocated being good to neighbors and actively defending. The exposition in Yanzi Chunqiu is representative: "Don't invade the land of a big country, don't consume the people of a small country, and the princes all want their respect;" Don't rob people with armor, don't bully people with strength, so the world should be strong. "In the view of war, military strategists believe that' knowing soldiers is not good for fighting since ancient times', Confucianism advocates that benevolence and the world are at peace, Mohism advocates' non-attack', and Taoism pursues the establishment of an ideal society with nothing to lose'".
China's traditional military science emphasizes that war must obey the social and moral laws, not just for self-interest. The use of military violence must be bound by human morality and cannot be unlimited. Military science should not lead to human self-destruction. On the contrary, military science must have profound humanistic feelings. Only in this way can military science point out the correct direction for human military behavior and become a rational science beneficial to human progress. Today, in the era of globalization, this humanitarianism and pacifism spirit in China's traditional military science is especially worth developing in modern international life.
Open up a new situation in the study of Sun Tzu's art of war
I once pointed out in the article Facing New Challenges and Creating a New Situation: Facing the new military revolution, the study of Sun Tzu's art of war should not be divorced from the world trend, but should have new ideas and theoretical ideas, new research perspectives and new research methods. In a word, the study of Sun Tzu's art of war must undergo a great change.
The first is to study the transfer of fulcrum.
Since 1 1 century, Sun Tzu's Art of War has been regarded as a classic in the Northern Song Dynasty, ranking as the first of martial arts classics. For thousands of years, a large number of works have appeared to collate its versions, annotate its chapters and sentences, test its techniques and explore its system. For a long time, this research tradition of interpreting classics has been the fulcrum of the study of Sun Tzu's Art of War. Although this research tradition should be inherited, the interpretation of Sun Tzu's Art of War has basically ended today. The transfer of research work to a new fulcrum is an unavoidable historical topic. In order to seek a new fulcrum, we must excavate the noumenon spirit of Sun Tzu's Art of War and explore its deep cultural significance. For example, discuss the strategic strategy and geo-strategic issues of the multi-polarization struggle in today's world, and discuss the problem of building a harmonious world through the ideas of "cutting off conspiracy" and "cutting off diplomatic relations". Only in this way can the study of Sun Tzu's art of war be more consciously close to the solution and application of real social problems.
Secondly, the extension of the research field.
To develop the study of Sun Tzu's Art of War, we need to leave the tradition and get out of it. Adhering to tradition requires us to comprehensively study the Art of War in China's traditional military culture. Specifically, it is necessary to link Sun Tzu's Art of War with China's classical art of war culture, such as the ancient art of war and Confucianism, Mohism and Taoism, so as to make it clear that "the former grandchildren will not be left behind; After the grandson, we can't leave the grandson behind, but extract the essence from it and carry it forward.
Getting out of tradition requires us to explore the research and application of Sun Tzu's Art of War in military and non-military fields with a brand-new perspective and modern knowledge and means. Research is to solve theoretical problems, and application is to solve practical problems. The two are complementary. If the theoretical problems are not solved, the practical application will be fragmented.
The third is the change of research methods.
To make a breakthrough in the study of Sun Tzu's Art of War, we should not only change the research methods such as computer retrieval and network communication, but also make a breakthrough in philosophy, with innovation as its core. To solve this problem well, we must put the study of Sun Tzu's Art of War in the context of the comparison between Chinese and western military cultures. Only when Sun Tzu's Art of War is compared, integrated and competitive with the so-called strong culture in the West can its modern value be truly highlighted.
The fourth is the improvement of academic level.
The vitality of the study of Sun Tzu's Art of War is determined by its academic status, and the key to measure its academic status is academic level.
As we all know, in the face of a series of new problems raised by the new military revolution, it is impossible and unnecessary to deal with the study of the Art of War. Sun Tzu's art of war is by no means a panacea for all diseases. We can seek useful enlightenment from it, but it can't provide us with ready-made answers. The research and application methods of simply quoting classics are superficial and undesirable. To improve the academic level, we must start with the system of Sun Tzu's Art of War, especially the category system of Sun Tzu's Art of War, and combine a series of new war topics put forward by the new military revolution to explore the theoretical essence of Sun Tzu's Art of War from a macro perspective, so as to achieve the goal of "making the past serve the present". The title picture is the silk book Sun Tzu's Art of War.