was recorded privately, the recording process did not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of others, nor did it violate the interests of the public and social ethics, and its evidence collection method did not violate the prohibitive provisions of the law. The judgment of the second instance held that the acquisition of the recorded materials was formed by Zhao Mouguo's private recording in the process of talking with Zhang Mouhua. The recording process did not infringe on the legitimate rights and interests of others, nor did it violate the interests of the public and social morality. The way of obtaining evidence did not violate the prohibition provisions of the law. Therefore, the evidence should be considered as legal evidence. The conversation in the recording included that Zhang Mouhua did not deny the fact that on December 1, 212, Zhao Mouguo was forced to press his handprint on the letter of guarantee by violence, and the contents reflected in the recorded evidence and the inquiry record of the public security organ mentioned above can mutually prove each other. Zhang Mouhua objected to the recorded evidence, but there was no evidence to the contrary. The letter of guarantee on which Zhang Mouhua claims his rights only has fingerprints, without the guarantor's signature or seal, which is not in line with the usual trading habits. The letter of guarantee itself has great flaws and doubts. Several pieces of evidence provided by Zhao's country corroborate each other, which can form a chain of evidence and achieve a high probability of proof. On this basis, the judgment of the second instance found that the fact that the handprint of Zhao's country on the letter of guarantee held by Zhang Mouhua on July 17, 212 was pressed by others under the condition of violence was well founded. The reason why Zhang Mouhua applied for retrial and thought that the fact that Zhao was forced to stamp on the letter of guarantee by violence could not be established was inconsistent with the facts, and our court did not support it. On whether the judgment procedure of second instance is illegal. Zhao provided recording evidence in the first and second trials, but not the original recording carrier, but the copied CD. In the first trial, Zhang Mouhua believed that the recording was recorded without knowing it and could not be used as evidence, and did not deny the existence of the recording fact. After cross-examination and confirmation of the contents of the recorded evidence, the judgment of the second instance held that there was no obvious doubt that the basic contents could be heard clearly from the recording effect. Although it was privately recorded, the recording process did not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of others, nor did it violate the interests of the public and social ethics, and its evidence collection method did not violate the prohibition provisions of the law. Zhang Mouhua's reason for applying for retrial that the second-instance judgment procedure is illegal cannot be established. III. the Supreme People's Court (215) Min Shen Zi No.3541
If the content of the recorded materials provided by one party can be regarded as a conversation between the two parties, it shall be regarded as proof of the basic facts it claims, and the other party shall provide evidence to prove it, otherwise it shall bear the adverse consequences. Lin Mouxiong and Lin Moujuan applied for retrial, claiming that Chen Mou Hui, as the party providing evidence, should have the legal obligation to prove that the recorded materials belong to total recall between Lin Mouxiong and Chen Mou Hui. The first-instance judgment shifted the burden of proof to Lin Mouxiong, and on this ground, it was determined that the recorded content was true and legal, and it was used as the basis for determining the important facts of this case, which violated the legal provisions and was not corrected by the court of second instance. After examination, the retrial court held that since the parties did not sign a written contract on the rights and obligations of the partnership, the key to determining the disputed facts was whether the recorded materials and written materials provided by Chen Mou Hui were adopted. Judging from the contents of the recorded materials provided by Chen Mou Hui, the two parties called each other "in-laws" and repeatedly mentioned the "seven-bid, ten-bid and fifteen-bid" project, which is consistent with the name of the partnership project in this case. The specific content is that the two parties discussed how to settle the partnership project, and the recorded materials should be considered as a conversation between Chen Mou Hui and Lin Mouxiong. Chen Mou Hui has proved the basic facts he advocated. Lin Mouxiong refuted the facts and should provide evidence to prove them. However, he did not provide evidence to refute them, and refused to identify the recorded evidence. He should bear the adverse consequences. There is nothing wrong with the second-instance judgment adopting the evidence. Therefore, the retrial reason that Lin Mouxiong advocated that the evidence was inadmissible could not be established. 4. the Supreme People's Court (216) No.36 recording material contains no statement or recognition of the facts to be certified, and there is no other content related to the disputed facts in this case, so the recorded evidence will not be accepted. On the admissibility of recorded evidence. Tsinghua Company, the retrial applicant, claimed that the original judgment rejected the recorded evidence, failed to find out the facts of the case through polygraph, and failed to collect the evidence that Tsinghua Company could not collect for objective reasons, which was illegal. Li, the respondent of the retrial, argued that the reconciliation involved in the recorded evidence was aimed at Liu Mosen's loan and had nothing to do with Li's loan. After investigation, the recorded materials compiled by Tsinghua Company did not contain Li's statement or approval on the nature, formation process and formation time of the loan of 5 million yuan in this case, and there was no other content related to the disputed facts in this case, so the court of first instance did not adopt the recorded evidence, which was not improper. V. the Supreme People's Court (214) Min Shen Zi No.641 provides only recorded evidence, but cannot provide other evidence to confirm each other, and the recorded evidence fails to directly prove the facts to be proved, and the other party denies it, so the probative force of the evidence is not enough to overturn the probative force of relevant written evidence. In the retrial application, Wang Mouqun once again used the recorded evidence he provided in the first and second trials as evidence to support his retrial claim, saying that the new evidence he held was mutually confirmed with the recorded evidence and other evidence, which was enough to prove that Lu Mou's borrowing behavior was his operation of Guangyu Company, Guangyu Company should bear the liability for repayment of the applicant's debts, and Lu Mou and Wang Moulan should bear joint and several liabilities for Guangyu Company's debts. After examination, the retrial court held that according to Article 71 of the Civil Procedure Law (now Article 74 of the Civil Procedure Law revised in 221): "The people's court should distinguish the authenticity of audio-visual materials and examine whether they can be used as the basis for ascertaining the facts in combination with other evidence in this case." Therefore, in the case that Wang Mouqun only provided recorded evidence and could not provide other evidence to confirm each other, and the recorded evidence failed to directly prove the facts that Wang Mouqun wanted to prove, and Guangyu Company denied it, the probative force of the evidence was not enough to overthrow the probative force of the written evidence provided by Guangyu Company. Even if the new evidence provided by Wang Mouqun proves that the personal property of the shareholders of Guangyu Company and hotchpot of Guangyu Company, its legal consequence can only be that the shareholders are jointly and severally liable for the debts of the company, rather than that the company is jointly and severally liable for the debts of the shareholders. Therefore, Wang Mouqun's new evidence cannot support his claim. VI. the Supreme People's Court (215) Min Shen Zi No.1825 has no evidence to prove that the recorded content is false, and there is no evidence to prove that the recorded evidence was obtained in a serious illegal way. At the same time, the recorded evidence has been cross-examined in the trial and should be considered legal. On the legality of recorded evidence. Keman Company applied for retrial, claiming that the recording of Tian Mohai and others in the negotiation and investment process provided by Yulong Company was made at an unknown time, which was obtained illegally and infringed upon the legitimate rights and interests of others, and should not be accepted without cross-examination at the trial of first instance. After examination, the retrial court held that the recorded evidence in the case confirmed the fact that Magnesium Company invested in Keman Company with the assets of Yulong Company, and there was no evidence to prove that the recorded content was false, and there was no evidence to prove that the evidence was obtained in a serious illegal way. At the same time, the evidence was cross-examined in the trial of the first instance, and Keman Company issued a cross-examination opinion in court. Keman Company claims that the reason why the recorded evidence has not been cross-examined is inconsistent with the facts in the case, and the evidence should be adopted according to law. VII. the Supreme People's Court (217) No.437 Supreme People's Court denied the authenticity of the recorded evidence, but did not apply for identification, nor did it cite evidence to the contrary to overturn it. The court found that the facts of the case were not improper in combination with other evidence. Jiyu Storage Company applied for retrial, claiming that the recorded evidence presented by China Railway Logistics Company has exceeded the time limit for proof, and the authenticity of the recorded evidence should be proved by China Railway Logistics Company. The court of first instance found that Jiyu Storage Company should bear the adverse consequences and mistakes. After examination, the retrial court held that the second paragraph of Article 65 of the Civil Procedure Law stipulates: "If a party provides evidence within the time limit, the people's court shall order it to explain the reasons; If you refuse to explain the reasons or the reasons are untenable, the people's court may refuse to accept the evidence according to different circumstances, or accept the evidence but admonish and impose a fine. " (Now it is the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Civil Procedure Law revised in 221) Although the recorded evidence presented by China Railway Logistics Company in the first instance was submitted beyond the time limit for adducing evidence, it had a great impact on the handling of this case, and the court of first instance adopted the evidence in compliance with the above provisions. International Reputation Warehouse Company refused to recognize the authenticity of the recorded evidence, but did not apply for identification, nor did it cite evidence to the contrary to overturn it. The court of first instance combined with travel itinerary and other evidence to find that the fact and time that China Railway Logistics Company had advocated taking delivery of the goods were not improper. VIII. The recorded content of the Supreme People's Court (213) Minti Zi No.23 is clear and coherent, and there is no obvious trace of alteration or technical treatment. If the parties did not deny the authenticity of the recorded evidence during cross-examination and did not apply for judicial expertise, they should consider the recorded evidence to be authentic. During the litigation in this case, Li Moutang submitted a total recall between him and Bai Mouxiang. The recording content was clear and coherent, and there was no obvious trace of alteration or technical treatment. Although Bai Mouxiang claimed that the evidence content of the recording was doubtful and could not be used as a basis for judging the actual conversation content of the two people, he recognized that the recording was his own voice during the cross-examination in the first instance. During the original trial, he did not deny the fact that there was a conversation and the authenticity of the recording, nor did he apply for judicial expertise, so our court confirmed the authenticity of the recording. The court of first instance applied Item 3, Paragraph 1, Article 69 of the Provisions on Evidence in Civil Procedure (now Item 4, Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Provisions on Evidence in Civil Procedure, which was revised in 219) to stipulate that "the following evidence cannot be used as the basis for determining the facts of the case alone: (3) Audio-visual materials with doubts" will not be accepted, and the court will correct it. Nine, the Supreme People's Court (217) Supreme People's Republic of China No.313 has no other certificates.