▲ Data Map: Yan's "Kings of Past Dynasties" in the Tang Dynasty
There are two questions to answer here. First of all, are these myths true? The answer can be simple or false. What is the "intimate relationship"? The room is full of red light, the head has horns, and she is pregnant 13 months. The worst political swindler of this era can't make it up. But the answer can also be complicated. As Sun Guangde said, "the content of myth is probably fictitious, but the existence of myth is an absolute fact; These facts must have their reasons and functions. It can even be said that the "manufacturing reasons" of these political myths are more meaningful than the myths themselves. These myths have also become a part of history after their appearance, and they have also become the special political resources of the hero of the myth-the emperor. Then, I thought of the second question. Why did the emperor (regime) actively or passively participate in creating such a political myth? To put it simply, every dynasty, especially the founding emperor at the time of Dingge, especially needs political myths to create its own "legitimacy". Legitimacy is naturally a western political term. In the category of modern politics, it specifically means that rule requires the authorization and recognition of people's votes. But did "legitimacy" apply in China's imperial era? My answer is very affirmative. Here, we may need to clarify a long-standing misunderstanding about the source of power in China's imperial era. In the usual historical narrative, the emergence and maintenance of the new dynasty in the imperial era seems to depend entirely on military strength. There is nothing wrong with this. Without military power, the initial conditions for establishing a dynasty will be lost. However, this does not mean that a dynasty and the founding emperor can consolidate or even create political power only by relying on military strength. As Mr. Sun Yinggang said in the book "The Age of God", "It is unsustainable for a regime to maintain its rule by force, and it is necessary for any regime to establish legitimacy or legitimacy. This is not only the political reality of medieval China, but also the portrayal of any era. "... force hardly constitutes a source of legitimacy. A regime that relies solely on force is not only despised in China's traditional political view, but also regarded as a "rogue" or warlord by the people. More realistically, the new regime in the imperial era may have come to power through violence, but in order to maintain the ruling order, the new dynasty must not encourage a strong value of "the powerful are driven by it". "Strength-only theory" is more like the values of warlords. When the founding emperor and a dynasty have completed the transformation from "overthrower" to "ruler", it is bound to find a theoretical system with more legitimacy and stability function to persuade people to return to their hearts and warn those potential political competitors with the same strength to "release their horses to the south" and convince them that they represent "sacred power, historical trend and justice". For the imperial era of China, this theoretical system is "destiny". In China's traditional political view, "popular support" may also constitute the source of legitimacy, but in essence, "popular support" belongs to the destiny. In political practice, "popular support" is often easily influenced by the myth of "destiny" and a set of values behind it, thus completing the attachment to the newly established dynasty.
▲ Data Map: Emperor Gaozu Liu Bang Statue
In this sense, political myths are not only recorded in the official history as authoritative discourses, but also participate in the history itself. The fabrication of these myths has greatly influenced history. Without the help of myth legitimacy, the dynasty not only reduced the possibility of long-term governance, but also more likely missed the establishment of the government from the beginning because of congenital deficiency. Take Liu Bang as an example. In that chaotic troubled times, "Qin lost its deer, and the world chased it away", as a "cloth" who seriously lacked political background and family resources, he had to face a very serious challenge. In that era when the aristocratic family status was extremely emphasized, his political competitors were all the old nobles of the six countries, such as Xiang Yu, and even the descendants of the royal families of the six countries. How to convince everyone that Liu Bang is a curator? There are not many cards that Liu Bang can play. His only political choice seems to be to create a kind of political public opinion orientation of "destiny's will" by creating political myths. Liu bang once famously said, "It's not my destiny to take the world with a cloth and a three-foot sword"? Please note that in addition to the two key words "Buyi" and "Destiny", this sentence also has a very important word: "Three-foot Sword". What is a three-foot sword? This is Liu Bang's sword in another important political myth besides the birth myth. Behind the myth of beheading the white snake, Liu Bang was packaged as the "son of Chi Di" who beheaded the white emperor, who symbolized the Qin empire. Then, Liu Bang is the great man who is doomed to destroy the Qin Empire by himself. The myth of "Chi Di's son beheaded the white emperor" began in the early days of Liu Bangjian's army, which is obviously creating a public opinion foundation for the return of heroes all over the world. More interestingly, in the sentence "I take the world with three-foot sword, which is not destiny", "three-foot sword" actually appears as a synonym for "political myth", and the two words "cloth" and "destiny" are connected in series. An obvious metaphor is that as long as there is a political myth, even if it is a cloth, there will be a "fate."
▲ Data Map: Liu White Snake Statue