Results and post-war analysis of the Battle of Borodino
In the Battle of Borodino, the two sides failed to determine the real outcome, but the Russian army consumed the French army and transferred in The conditions were created for the counterattack. Although the French army briefly captured Moscow, Napoleon's plan to invade Russia ultimately failed. ?
The results of the Battle of Borodino
Both sides suffered heavy casualties during the battle, but the Russian army still had reserves that could be put into battle at any time, and the logistics supplies were intact; and Napoleon's transportation The line was too long and it was difficult to keep its existing troops supplied. As a result, it was the French army, not the Russian army, that suffered a devastating blow a few weeks later.
On September 13, Kutuzov redeployed his troops on the outskirts of Moscow, intending to fight against the French army here, but was eventually persuaded to abandon this plan. So he led the Russian army through Moscow and continued to retreat.
On the afternoon of September 14, the first French army led by Murat entered the city of Moscow, and soon the city of Moscow turned into a sea of ??flames. The Battle of Borodino was one of the most important battles during the Napoleonic Wars. The battle not only had a profound impact on the entire "Russian War of 1812", but the total casualties on both sides in the one-day battle on September 7 were as high as more than 66,000 It also set a human record and created the battle with the largest number of casualties recorded in a single day in the history of war so far.
Post-war analysis of the Battle of Borodino
In the Battle of Borodino, there are three main important factors that can affect the outcome of the war: First, Davout’s proposal to attack the Russian army The plan to carry out a large-scale flank attack; secondly, the actions of the Russian cavalry on the French left flank; thirdly, Napoleon's decision to refuse to commit his Guards to the battle. There were also two factors of wider significance that affected the course of the entire campaign, namely the problem of supplies and the decision to leave Smolensk.
After the failure of his two well-arranged pincer offensives aimed at annihilating the Russian army, Napoleon decided to launch a comprehensive frontal attack on Smolensk. But at this time, the Russian 1st and 2nd Western Armies had met in Smolensk. The battle took place on August 16th and 17th. Due to the fierce attack of Raevsky's 7th Army in the rear and the slow movement of Junod, Barclay de Tolly launched a relatively smooth attack at Varutino, east of Smolensk. , the Russian army thus avoided a firefight with the French army on Moscow Avenue. Napoleon retreated to Smolensk to consider his next move.
At this point, he must have realized that the entire battle would lead to a disaster. He had irrevocably miscalculated Alexander and the Russians. Although he had tried to bring the Tsar to heel with a quick and decisive victory, he had so far failed to achieve this goal.
Even if he were victorious, the Russians would continue to fall back farther, regain strength, and continue to fight him. Napoleon now faced three choices. First, withdraw his troops and return home, but this is something Napoleon would never consider; second, hold on to the line of the Dvina and Dnieper rivers in the winter, so that he can wait until the spring of next year to reorganize the army to attack the Russian army; third, advance immediately to Forcing the Russian army to fight the French army.
Of the above three possibilities, the reason for spending the winter in Smolensk is the most convincing. After a long march, the French army has been reduced to about 155,000 people. Some of them fell ill, some deserted, some were sent to garrison military depots, supply points and bridges on communication lines, and some were fighting. There were casualties. It is true that Napoleon still had a numerical advantage, and new recruits were arriving in a steady stream, but most of these men were new recruits who needed time to train.
Due to the loss of a large number of horses, the power of his cavalry was greatly reduced, and the pack artillery also lacked supplementary horses. Food is becoming increasingly scarce and supplies are being depleted. In addition, although Napoleon won some small victories with the support of two reinforcements, the Russian army may have only retreated in the center, while it was still very active on the flanks of the French army. In addition, the Austrian and Prussian coalition forces under Napoleon's command were only half-hearted at best.
The reason why the French army was eager to continue advancing was to achieve a quick and decisive victory before winter came to land. This was simply a gamble, because Napoleon had no idea whether the Russian army would stop and fight the French army. The Russian army is likely to continue to retreat, thus worsening Napoleon's logistics. In addition, even if the Russian army really stopped and fought a decisive battle with the French army, the French army would suffer heavy losses and its combat effectiveness would be greatly reduced, making it difficult to achieve a decisive victory (in fact, the French army will only have a way out if it achieves a decisive victory). On the other hand, if Napoleon stopped advancing and gave Alexander six months of breathing space, the Tsar would use this opportunity to mobilize and train new troops and receive material assistance from Britain. People today would be wise and light-hearted to say that Napoleon made a complete mistake by continuing to advance. However, one might also say that if Napoleon had commanded as well as he did before in the Battle of Borodino, he would have probably achieved the decisive victory he expected, and in this way his decision would have been correct.
Napoleon continued to advance. Maybe he also had doubts, because when the French army arrived at Vyazma on August 28, it happened to rain heavily. On the 30th the emperor announced: "If it continues to rain tomorrow, we will withdraw to Smolensk." By the 31st, the weather cleared, and the French army advanced another 15 miles along the road to destruction.
It is said that in the early morning of that day in Borodino, when Napoleon faced the rising sun breaking through the fog, he could not help but turn around and exclaimed to his staff: "This is the sun of Austerlitz." If He returned to Smolensk on August 31, perhaps in better condition, and he might have said: "Thanks to the heavy rains in Vyazma." In any case, before embarking on the uncertain 280 miles to Moscow Before a long journey, it is very wise to conduct a stage of reorganization in that city.
From the time he crossed the Neman River to his final retreat from Moscow, Napoleon, apart from the dazzling glory of his past achievements, had clearly shown an unusual sense of weariness. His years of galloping on the battlefield with superhuman courage were passing quietly, his firm confidence and accurate judgment were also lost, and his power was declining. All this reflected his failure to win the battle of Borodino with distinction.
It is generally believed that it was for these reasons that Napoleon refused to consider Davout's proposal to combine his and Poniatowski's troops and to send another 40,000 troops from Suggestions for the rear to attack the Russian left flank. However, this may not be entirely his fault.
Davout's suggestion was made on the afternoon of September 6 (the day before the battle started). His intention was to use the night march to carry out this large-scale roundabout operation.
After Napoleon received this request, two problems immediately appeared in his mind: first, once the Russian army learned of this encirclement operation, they would definitely continue to retreat, which Napoleon had always been worried about; Second, marching at night in the jungle-covered countryside is not only difficult to discern the direction, but also causes unnecessary fatigue to personnel and horses, which will inevitably weaken the combat effectiveness of the troops when attacking. There is also a third factor to consider (although this is very unlikely), namely that long-distance flanking the enemy march will take up time and draw out a large number of troops. If there is a mistake in timing and the Russian army attacks the French army while Davoisang is on the way, the most serious situation will occur.
Davout's idea is very similar to what Napoleon often did when faced with difficulties. However, Napoleon may (although not necessarily) be reluctant to let Davout remind him what to do, because at the time he and Davout were The relationship is not very harmonious. It is more likely that Napoleon was right about time and movement at the time, and that Davout's proposed action was too ambitious.
In any case, it is possible to achieve a decisive victory by attacking Bagration's weak left wing from the right wing. Poniatowski's 5th Army was not strong enough to launch such an attack, and his actions showed this;
However, after receiving reinforcements, it is possible that he would take a less powerful approach than Dara's Wu's night march deep behind enemy lines was so earth-shattering, but his safer move was to outflank the Russian left flank.
Kutuzov's personal impact on the battle was minimal. But if all arms are used and a more decisive commander is sent to direct the battle, then his cavalry attack on the French left wing is likely to have a major impact on the entire battle. It turns out that this is an excellent example of both success and lessons. The Russian cavalry greatly disrupted the French army's battle plan. If the Russian infantry fights together, the results will be even greater.
When the battles on the central battlefield, both sides of the Semyonovka River and around the Bagration Bastion were at a critical juncture, Ney was also undergoing a fierce counterattack by the 2nd Western Army and quickly requested help. . Napoleon hesitated for a moment, then ordered General Krapared, who commanded the Imperial Guard's Vistula Polish Army, to go for reinforcements. But almost at the same time, he changed his mind and sent the 2nd Division of General Friant's 1st Army. This was the first time the emperor refused to use reserves.
The second (and more important) time came not long after. Friant's troops, with Brigadier Dufour's light cavalry regiment as the vanguard, dealt a heavy blow to the Russian army, and finally opened a wide gap in the Russian army's most critical defense line.