On March 2, 2065438, at about 7: 00/day1day, the reinforced cage of No.2 beam of the traffic center apron and taxiway project of Shuangliu International Airport collapsed along the direction of the cross bridge, causing four workers to die and 13 people to be injured, resulting in direct economic losses of more than 8 million yuan. ?
According to the investigation report, in the steel binding operation of Project 2# beam, the temporary support measures were removed manually in advance without binding the waist bars and stirrups at the construction site, which led to insufficient overall stability of the steel skeleton of the beam, and the construction interference of the steel skeleton operators, which led to the longitudinal instability and collapse of the steel skeleton of the beam. ?
The contents of the report are as follows (excerpt):
1. Accident, emergency rescue and aftermath.
(1) The accident happened. On March 4th, 20 19, the project department of the sixth engineering co., ltd. of China Railway Second Bureau (hereinafter referred to as the sixth engineering bureau of China Railway Second Bureau) arranged for Sichuan Zhongqixing Construction Engineering Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Zhongqixing Construction Company) to organize workers to start the erection of steel support measures for No.2 crossbeam, and completed the erection task of steel support measures on June 5th, 2065438, and organized personnel to conduct acceptance. From March 15, the labor service company arranged 13 new labor force and its original 10 workers to engage in the steel binding task of No.2 beam. By March of February1year, before the accident, the upper and lower main bars of the beam had been bound, the stirrups were basically bound, and the distribution bars on both sides were not installed.
On March 2 1 day 13, the laborers in the project department started work, and the on-site workers proposed to Wang Moxue, the on-site manager of the labor service company, that the steel support measures seriously affected the construction progress and suggested dismantling it. Considering that the reinforcing cage has been basically formed, Wang Moxue agreed that the workers would partially dismantle the steel support measures in the middle part. After obtaining the consent of Wang Moxue, the workers began to dismantle the steel support measures of the accident beam. During the period, Wang Moxue directed the steel binding operation at the top of the steel cage. Eight workers, including Lin Mouqiong, Liu Moucheng and Li Mouhua, tied stirrups and installed corrugated pipes in the reinforced cage, while Huang, Yang Molun and other workers 10 tied and carried steel bars at the top of the reinforced cage. During the operation, the workers pry the vertical stirrups from time to time to adjust the position, and the workers at the top of the reinforcing cage walk back and forth. At 16:08 17, without warning, the reinforcement cage was completely dumped across the bridge (towards the urban area), eight workers in the reinforcement cage were squeezed into the reinforcement cage, and more than 0 workers at the top of the reinforcement cage 10 fell to the ground with the dumped reinforcement cage.
(2) Emergency rescue situation. After the accident, the site management personnel of the project department immediately dialed 120 and 1 19 for emergency rescue. At around 16: 40, 120 ambulances entered the scene one after another and sent the wounded to Shuangliu District People's Hospital, Shuangliu District Chinese Medicine Hospital, Chengdu First People's Hospital and Huaxi Hospital respectively. 16: 50, Shuangliu District Fire Rescue Squadron and Airport Fire Brigade arrived at the scene and immediately put into rescue work. At 20: 00 15, the last trapped person was rescued and the on-site rescue ended. The accident caused four workers in the reinforced cage to die on the spot, and another four workers in the reinforced cage and nine workers in the upper part of the reinforced cage were injured.
(three) the aftermath, the wounded treatment and direct economic losses. The accident * * * caused 4 deaths and 13 injuries, including 4 serious injuries, 4 minor injuries and 5 minor injuries. On March 25th, the aftermath of the four workers killed in the accident was completed. As of June 17, four wounded were still receiving rehabilitation treatment in the hospital, and the rest had been discharged.
Second, the basic situation
(a) the basic situation of the accident related units.
1. Subcontractor: Zhongqixing Construction Company, the company type is limited liability company.
2. General construction contract: China Railway Second Bureau and Sixth Bureau, and the company type is limited liability company.
3. Project supervision unit: AVIC Engineering Supervision (Beijing) Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as AVIC Supervision Company), and the company type is limited liability company.
4. Construction unit: Sichuan Airport Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Airport Group Company), and the company type is other limited liability companies.
5. Department in charge of industry: Southwest Regional Administration of Civil Aviation. The Southwest Management Station (hereinafter referred to as the Southwest Quality Supervision Station of Civil Aviation), a subordinate institution of the Southwest Regional Administration of Civil Aviation, implements specific supervision work.
(2) Accident project information.
1. Project overview. The airplane taxiway bridge in the accident is a prestressed concrete continuous box girder bridge with a length of 152.804m and a width of 45m (inclined 63.36 1m), and an inclined underpass bridge with a span arrangement of (30.977+2× 39.425+). The substructure of the bridge adopts Ф1.8m pile foundation, dumbbell-shaped pier and U-shaped abutment, and the superstructure adopts cast-in-place single-box 24-room continuous box girder with a beam height of 3.5m The box girder is equipped with five beams corresponding to the abutment. The whole beam body can be divided into two stages: platform 0 to platform 4. The length of the first stage is 78.4m, and the length of the second stage is 62.4m.. When the accident happened, the first phase was being implemented.
2. The scene of the accident inspection. The accident occurred in the superstructure of the taxiway bridge. The reinforcement cage is 63.36 1m long, 3m wide and 3.5m high. The top floor is equipped with double-layer steel bars (diameter 32/28mm), the bottom floor is equipped with double-layer steel bars (diameter 28/32mm), stirrups 14 (diameter 16mm), and there are 23 beams on each side. 2# beam reinforcement and installation measures The bracket installation was started on March 4, 2065 and completed on March 5, 2065. After the acceptance by the general contractor, the installation of beam reinforcement began. By the afternoon of March 2 1 day (at the time of the incident), the main bars of the upper and lower floors of the beam had been bound, the stirrups had been basically bound, and the distribution bars on both sides had not been installed.
According to the field investigation, the reinforcing cage is toppled along the beam length direction, and the plane position of the reinforcing bar at the bottom of the beam has no obvious change, while the reinforcing bar and stirrup at the top of the beam are toppled along the beam length direction (transverse bridge direction). The bottom reinforcement, upper reinforcement and stirrup of the dumping cage skeleton have been arranged in place, and there are three unfilled scissors and two groups of Ф 32 steel stirrups (hereinafter referred to as horse stool reinforcement) inside; The upper and lower main bars of the beam have been bound with stirrups, and the main bars at the top of some beams are separated from stirrups, but the distribution bars on both sides of the beam are not bound. The length of the steel pipe frame for the temporary support of the dumping reinforcement cage is12.5m, and the spacing of the vertical rods is1.5m, without support.
3. Performance of relevant units.
(1) Zhongqixing Construction Company. 201165438+1On June 5th, China Enterprise Xing Construction Company and China Railway No.2 Bureau No.6 Company signed the sub-contract for the construction of the flying slipway bridge, with the agreed construction period of 20 1865438+ 10 to 20/kloc. Fu Moya, the legal representative of the company, is the project leader and Wang Moxue is the on-site production leader. Conduct safety education for new employees, and the employees shall accept the technical disclosure from the general contractor. On March 2 1 day, at the suggestion of workers, Wang Moxue, the person in charge of on-site production, agreed to dismantle the steel support measures around 13, and the steel cage at 17 collapsed.
(2) The Sixth Bureau of the Second Railway Bureau. After winning the bid, 2065438+February 27th, 2007, China Railway Second Bureau and Sixth Bureau signed a construction contract with Airport Group Corporation, with a contract amount of 530 million yuan. On April 2, 20 17, Chengdu Shuangliu Airport Project Management Department was established by the Sixth Bureau of China Railway Second Bureau, which consisted of Engineering Department, Quality Department and Safety and Environmental Protection Department. The implementation construction organization design and construction organization design (scheme) compiled by the project department are submitted to the supervision unit for examination and approval, but the scheme measures are not specific and there is insufficient guidance for on-site construction. Safety education and technical disclosure were given to new workers, but the three-level safety education was not implemented as required, and the company-level safety education was replaced by project-level education. Lack of technical disclosure, the specific construction method of horse stool reinforcement is not clear.
(3) AVIC supervision company. 2065438+In March 2007, AVIC Supervision Company signed the Construction Project Supervision Contract with Airport Group Company, stipulating that the chief supervision engineer is Bian Mohai (female). Bian Mohai,1born in August 1957, aged 62, retired. 2065438+On August 6, 2008, the office meeting of the supervision company agreed that Bian Mohai would no longer be the project director, and the project director planned to be changed to Jiang Moujun, but the change procedures with the airport group had not been completed. Bian Mohai is absent for a long time, and the supervision documents are signed by the supervision engineer. There are 10 supervisors in the project supervision department, and a few of them have not obtained supervision training certificates. Since 20 19, the supervision organization has not issued a hidden danger rectification instruction. On March 19 and March 20th, it was found that there were potential safety hazards in the construction of reinforcing cage of taxiway bridge, and the rectification instruction was not issued to urge the construction unit to make timely and effective rectification.
(4) Airport Group Corporation. Zhang Mouyong, General Manager of Planning and Development Department of Airport Group, and Wang, the owner representative of the project site. Failing to promptly correct the supervision unit's failure to provide supervision personnel according to the supervision contract, ignoring the problem that the chief supervision engineer is not on duty for a long time and some supervision personnel are on duty without a license.
(5) Southwest Civil Aviation Quality Supervision Station. Six people were prepared and four actually arrived. Among them, the deputy stationmaster did not go to work after returning to Tibet, and two supervisors hired auxiliary personnel for the civil aviation professional engineering quality supervision station to undertake the supervision tasks of airport construction projects in Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan and Tibet. From April, 20 17 to March, 20 19, the stationmaster Xu Mouxin and the supervisor Zheng conducted 40 times of quality and safety supervision and inspection on this project, issued 8 copies of on-site supervision and inspection opinions, and put forward 59 rectification problems, but ignored the problems such as the long-term absence of the chief supervision engineer and some supervisors taking up their posts without certificates.
Third, the cause analysis of the accident
(1) direct cause. In the steel binding operation of Project 2# beam, the temporary support measures were removed manually in advance without completing the binding of waist bars and stirrups at the construction site, resulting in insufficient overall stability of the beam steel skeleton, and the longitudinal instability and collapse of the beam steel skeleton caused by the construction interference of the steel skeleton operators.
(2) Indirect causes.
1. Labor Subcontractor Zhongqixing Construction Company. First, the management personnel commanded in violation of regulations, and arranged for workers to dismantle the temporary support measures in advance when the waist tendons and stirrups of the 2# beam were not bound, resulting in insufficient overall stability of the steel skeleton of the beam, and the construction interference of the steel skeleton operators caused the longitudinal instability and collapse of the steel skeleton of the beam; Second, the "Construction Organization Design (Scheme)" and safety technical disclosure requirements have not been implemented, and the spacing between the reinforcement bars of the horse stool is too large and it is not effectively connected.
2. The general contractor of the construction is China Railway Second Bureau and Sixth Bureau. First, the investigation of hidden dangers in the construction site was not carried out, and the safety hazards such as excessive spacing of horse stool poles set up by labor subcontractors and invalid connection were not found and corrected; Second, the safety risk identification is not sufficient, the risk control measures are not implemented in place, the stability of the beam reinforcement cage is not identified and evaluated, the measures in the construction organization design (scheme) are not specific, and the on-site construction is insufficient; Third, safety education and technical disclosure are not in place, three-level safety education is not implemented as required, and company-level safety education is replaced by project-level education, and technical disclosure is lacking.
3. Supervision unit AVIC Supervision Company. First, there was a lack of supervision and inspection on the construction site, and it was not found in time that the labor subcontracting unit dismantled the temporary support measures and erected the horse stool in advance without authorization, and the safety hazard was too large and it was not effectively connected; Second, the supervision personnel were not equipped according to the construction project supervision contract, the chief supervision engineer was not on duty for a long time, the professional supervision engineer replaced the chief supervision engineer for a long time, and some supervision personnel took up their posts without a license. Third, the safety technical measures in the construction organization design (scheme) compiled by the general contractor are not strictly controlled. Fourth, supervision and inspection become a mere formality. Since 20 19, there has not been a hidden danger rectification instruction. On March 19 and March 20, it was found that there were potential safety hazards in the construction of reinforcing cage of taxiway bridge, and the rectification instruction was not issued to urge the construction unit to carry out timely and effective rectification.
4. The construction unit Airport Group Company. Supervision and inspection is a mere formality, the supervision unit fails to provide supervisors according to the supervision contract, the chief supervision engineer is not on duty for a long time, and some supervisors are on duty without a license.
5. Industry Supervision Department (unit) Southwest Civil Aviation Quality Supervision Station. First, the supervision and management system is not perfect, the supervision tasks, contents and standards are not clear, and the supervision and management personnel can not meet the supervision needs; Second, the chief supervision engineer has been absent for a long time, and some supervision personnel have no certificates.
After investigation, it was found that the "3.2 1" collapse accident of the apron and taxiway project of the traffic center of Shuangliu International Airport was a production safety liability accident with a high level of accident.
Four, the handling of the relevant responsible personnel and responsible units.
(1) Suggestions on the investigation of criminal responsibility personnel.
Wang Moxue, construction site manager of Zhongqixing Construction Company. Illegal command led to an accident, suspected of committing a crime, and has been transferred to judicial organs.
(2) Suggestions on the handling of relevant responsible personnel.
1. Fu Moya, legal representative and project leader of Zhongqixing Construction Company. Inadequate supervision and inspection of the project, project management personnel command in violation of regulations, and do not follow the operating procedures, and will be fined 40% of the annual income of the previous year.
2. He Mokui, the project construction manager of China Railway Second Bureau and Sixth Bureau, is responsible for the safety management of the superstructure construction of the flight taxiway bridge. If the management of the construction site is not in place, and the subcontracting unit fails to discover and correct the potential safety hazards such as dismantling temporary support measures and erecting horse stools in advance without authorization, it shall be given administrative sanctions and fined.
3. Chen Mou, the project director of the project department of the Sixth Company of China Railway Second Bureau, is responsible for project safety management and safety education and training for new workers. If the investigation of hidden dangers on the construction site is not in place and the safety technical disclosure of operators is not in place, administrative sanctions and fines shall be imposed.
4. Fei, Zhong * * * party member, deputy project manager of China Railway Second Bureau and Sixth Bureau Company, is responsible for project management. If the safety management of the project is not in place and the safety control measures are not implemented in place, administrative sanctions and fines shall be imposed.
5. Zheng, a member of the Party Group and Project Manager of the Sixth Bureau of China Railway Second Bureau, is the first responsible person for project safety production. Those who fail to perform their duties, identify major hazards of the project, implement risk control measures, check the safety of the construction site, discover major safety hazards on the construction site in time, conduct three-level safety education as required, and make technical disclosure shall be given administrative sanctions and fined.
6. The project is under the responsibility of Yang Moudong, a member of the party group and chief engineer of China Railway Second Bureau and Sixth Bureau. The review of the Project Construction Organization Design (Scheme) is lax, and the supervision and inspection on the construction site are ineffective, so administrative sanctions and fines are imposed.
7. Dong Mokun, legal representative and general manager, party member, China Railway Second Bureau and Sixth Bureau. Failing to supervise and inspect the safety production of the project, a fine of 40% of the previous year's income will be imposed.
8. Jiang Moujun, project supervision engineer of AVIC supervision company. During the period of not obtaining the qualification of chief supervision engineer, it is undocumented to replace the signature of the chief supervision engineer for a long time. The unclear safety technical measures in the construction organization design (scheme) are not strictly reviewed, the supervision and inspection on the construction site are absent, and the hidden dangers found in the inspection have not been given rectification instructions for a long time, and they are fined.
9. Ma Mouming, deputy general manager of 9.AVIC Supervision Company, is in charge of safety production. Failing to provide supervisors as required, failing to comply with the problems of poor supervision and inspection on the construction site, etc., and fined them.
10. Wang, deputy manager of Jian 'an Business Department of Airport Construction Company of Airport Group Corporation and representative of project owner. Safety inspection is a mere formality, the chief supervision engineer of the supervision unit has been absent for a long time, and some supervisors have been dereliction of duty without a license and have been subject to administrative sanctions.
1 1. Zhang Mouyong, General Manager of Planning and Development Department of Airport Construction Company of Airport Group Corporation. Supervision and inspection are not in place, the chief supervision engineer of the supervision unit is absent for a long time, and some supervisors are given administrative sanctions for oversight.
12. Zheng, project director of quality supervision station in southwest area of civil aviation. Administrative sanctions shall be given to the chief supervision engineer of the supervision unit who has not been on duty for a long time and some supervisors who have not been on duty without a license.
(3) Suggestions on handling the unit responsible for the accident.
1. Zhongqixing Construction Company. Management personnel command in violation of regulations and arrange workers to dismantle temporary support measures in advance; Failing to implement the requirements of construction organization design (scheme) and safety technical disclosure, and setting the distance between horse stool poles is too large and not effectively connected, a fine will be imposed.
2. The Second Railway Bureau and the Sixth Company. The safety management on the construction site is not in place, the hidden danger investigation is not implemented, and the hidden dangers of excessive spacing and invalid connection of horse stool poles erected by labor subcontractors are not found and corrected; Safety risk identification is not in place, risk control measures are not implemented in place, the stability of beam reinforcement cage is not identified and evaluated, specific measures are lacking in construction organization design (scheme), and on-site construction guidance is insufficient; Safety education and technical disclosure were not in place, and three-level safety education was not implemented as required, and company-level safety education was replaced by project-level education. If the technical disclosure is missing, it will be fined.
3.AVIC supervision company. Failing to supervise and inspect the construction site, and failing to discover in time the potential safety hazards of dismantling temporary support measures and erecting horse stool reinforcement without authorization by the labor subcontracting unit; Not according to the "construction project supervision contract" with supervision personnel, chief supervision engineer is not on the job for a long time, professional supervision engineer for a long time to replace the chief supervision engineer to sign, hire undocumented supervision personnel; The general contractor's "construction organization design (scheme)" is not strict with specific safety technical measures; Supervision and inspection are a mere formality. 20 19 has not issued a hidden danger rectification instruction so far, urging the construction unit to rectify hidden dangers and imposing fines on them.
4. It is suggested that the Airport Group Company make a written inspection to the Provincial State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and report it to the Municipal Emergency Bureau for the record.
5. It is suggested that the quality supervision station in the southwest of civil aviation make a written inspection to the Southwest Regional Administration of Civil Aviation and report it to the Municipal Emergency Bureau for the record.
This article comes from car home, the author of the car manufacturer, and does not represent car home's position.