Source: China Phenomenology Network

[Abstract] By discovering the field of non-theoretical life and experience and the method to realize this field-phenomenology of hermeneutics, Heidegger's speech "Philosophical Concept and World Outlook" in19 "wartime research class" laid the foundation of Heidegger's lifelong philosophical thought and was the starting point of Heidegger's ideological road. In this book, Heidegger clarified his new understanding of philosophy, thus drawing a clear line with all the old philosophies including Husserl's phenomenology and revealing the philosophical direction of his life. This important work, regarded as the starting point of his life's ideological experience, has never received enough attention and attention, which has affected our understanding of the characteristics and essence of Heidegger's philosophy, so that we are still on the road that Heidegger refused from the beginning.

[Keywords:] Early Heidegger's phenomenology of life non-theoretical empirical hermeneutics

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Hanna. Arendt wrote in an article commemorating Heidegger's 80th birthday: "As far as Heidegger is concerned, the starting point is not his date of birth (, September 26th, 1889), nor the publication of his first book, but the first batch of courses and seminars he opened at the University of Freiburg as an extra lecturer and Husserl's assistant.19/kloc. Because Heidegger's "fame" was about eight years before the publication of Being and Time,1927; People really ask, if the teacher's reputation among students is not transcendental, ... is it possible that this book is extremely successful? " [1-P293] Heidegger himself said in the footnote on page 72 of the German text of Being and Time: "The author should point out that since the winter semester of 19 19/20, he has repeatedly taught the analysis of the surrounding time and the factual hermeneutics of this existence in his course." It can be seen that Arendt set the starting point of Heidegger's philosophy at 19 19, which is quite correct.

However, the domestic research on Heidegger generally started from 1927, that is, from Being and Time. Professor Jin Xiping's Study of Heidegger's Early Thoughts is perhaps the only book that studies Heidegger's early thoughts, that is, his thoughts of being before and time. Apart from Heidegger's thoughts in The Starting Point of Heidegger's Philosophy 19 19, it has made great contributions to the study of Heidegger's early thoughts in China. Only that the earliest lecture notes included in Heidegger's complete works are those of 19 19 "wartime research class". [2-p2 14] But it is this speech entitled "Philosophical Concepts and Worldview Problems" that is of great significance to Heidegger's research, especially to the starting point or starting point of Heidegger's philosophy. This is not only because some basic ideological factors of Being and Time have been obviously formed here, but also because Heidegger's thoughts after dieKehre have been included in it [3-S. 159] as Ga Dehmel's thoughts, and more importantly, the theme of Heidegger's life thoughts and its handling methods have been revealed in this lecture. However, this important speech has not received the attention we deserve.

This regrettable blank of Heidegger's research in China has affected our understanding of Heidegger's philosophical inclination, nature, characteristics and fundamental purpose to a considerable extent, and affected the in-depth development of Heidegger's research. In the eyes of many people, Heidegger is either an existentialist whom he has repeatedly denied or an inscrutable metaphysical ghost. On the one hand, "living poetically" (actually just a poem quoted by Heidegger) has even become an advertising word for real estate developers; On the other hand, we are getting farther and farther away from Heidegger. When Heidegger became the trump card and magic weapon in all fields of philosophical research and even humanistic research, Heidegger actually became an empty and terrible spell.

However, today's era and Heidegger's philosophy itself require us to treat Heidegger and his thoughts with thoughts, not with the attitude of creating god. Heidegger's thought still has great charm today, not because of his metaphysical thought, but because of his realistic thought and realistic thought. In the final analysis, Heidegger is a thinker of our time.

Although Heidegger called himself a "Christian theologian" in his letter to the student Leuwitt, no one would doubt that he was a philosopher first and an unusual philosopher. The correct way to understand a philosopher, especially an original philosopher, is to look at his understanding of philosophy. Generally speaking, original philosophers are original because they are dissatisfied with the existing philosophy and want to find a new way. The new path of philosophy must be based on a new understanding of philosophy. Without a new understanding of philosophy, a breakthrough or innovation in philosophy is actually impossible. From Plato to Heidegger, the milestone figures in the history of philosophy are milestones because they fundamentally changed the face of philosophy and brought a new philosophy to the world. Their unique understand of philosophy determines that content, method and direction of their philosophy. It's just that not all epoch-making figures in the history of philosophy have a clear statement about their own philosophy. Fortunately for the researchers of Heidegger's philosophy, Heidegger clearly expounded his philosophy in different stages of his ideological development, which provided reliable clues and guidance for future generations to understand his thoughts. His lecture "Philosophical Concepts and World Outlook" in 19 19 wartime research class is the first and most basic clue and guide he provided for us to understand his thoughts. This lecture outlines Heidegger's conception of future philosophy, its methods and goals, and lays the initial foundation of Heidegger's philosophy. In this sense, the importance of this lecture cannot be overestimated.

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Philosophy has been the core of western culture since ancient times, and it is also the oldest subject in western learning. According to common sense, the concept of philosophy should be the least problematic. It is necessary to review the concept of philosophy seriously, which not only shows that there are great problems in philosophy itself, but also implies that there are fundamental problems in western culture. Putting forward the concept of philosophy again is obviously redefining philosophy; Redefining philosophy is obviously a fundamental dissatisfaction with the old philosophy. If Kant still needs Hume to wake him up from the dream of dogmatism, then the present situation of western civilization is enough to make Heidegger dissatisfied with the existing philosophy, so that he even tells his students that he is not a philosopher and should not be measured by the scale of a philosopher. Even if he is a great philosopher, his actions are inappropriate compared with those of previous philosophers. [Articles 5 to 28]

Heidegger's dissatisfaction with the old philosophy is firstly his dissatisfaction with metaphysics called "the crown of philosophy". Dissatisfaction with metaphysics is not only nothing new in Heidegger's era, but a fashion. After Hegel's death, metaphysics soon became the target of positivism and scientism. This persistent attack reached its peak in logical positivism. This kind of criticism is actually a criticism of metaphysics from a scientific point of view. At the same time, there is another tendency to attack metaphysics, that is, to liquidate and criticize metaphysics from philosophy. Young hegelians's "anthropological turn" can be said to be a new Copernican revolution in the field of philosophy. Philosophy has turned from pure thinking to the realistic conditions for the existence of concrete people and his world. Hegel's left is not concerned with the innate necessary conditions of thought, but with the actual conditions of life and existence (Da Sein). Starting from them, Schopenhauer and Schelling's concepts of will, Feuerbach's concept of sensibility, Marx's concept of objectivity and Kierkegaard's concept of existence all point to concrete and limited facts.

Dilthey issued a death certificate to metaphysics through his Phenomenology of Metaphysics: "Metaphysics cannot exist as science." [7-S.402 ~ 403] Metaphysics dies not only because it is a historical phenomenon, but also because it can't exist forever like all historical phenomena. Not only because its foundation has been disintegrated by modern science. What really makes metaphysics impossible is the contingency and historicity of our existence. "That is, the form of individual spiritual life is in a continuous historical transformation process: it is immeasurable, relative and limited, so it is impossible to unify various experiences in a generally effective way. This is the most profound insight we have gained from metaphysical phenomenology. " [Article 6-406]

Heidegger didn't completely break away from the old philosophy until he wrote his professor's thesis (19 16), and he also regarded metaphysics as the "real lens" of philosophy. [7-S.306] However, around 19 19, his position changed obviously, from a metaphysical careerist to a metaphysical critic. Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics is basically based on Dilthey's "insight". In his view, the problem of metaphysics lies in its "metaphysics", that is, it is completely divorced from the fact of real life and human existence. For him, metaphysics is a fantasy, a myth and a fantasy world. He called metaphysics "the metaphysics of myth and reason" [8-S.70], "fantasy of life and thinking", [8-S.99] "religious ideology and fantasy" and [8-S.0/97] "hypnotic anesthetic". [9-S.25] These accusations actually mean that metaphysics is completely divorced from our real existence and has become a fantasy myth; But when it indulges in "absolute knowledge", it turns a blind eye to our limited life. The fall of philosophy lies in its "resurrection of metaphysics", [10-S.5] rather than rejecting metaphysics. In Heidegger's view, philosophy mainly focuses on life, not "absolute knowledge".

It is no accident that Heidegger criticized the old metaphysics and philosophy from the factual life, that is, human history and secular life. Although Hegel put forward the concept of "life" in Phenomenology of Spirit, romanticism also used it to oppose rationalist philosophy, but it was not until metaphysics died with Hegel's death that the concept of "life" replaced the concept of "existence" and became the main concept of ontology. The concept of "life" has strong plasticity and inclusiveness, which can include the main conceptual factors of traditional metaphysics such as soul, spirit, nature, existence, motivation and creativity. On the one hand, people use it to advocate a new ontology; On the other hand, it is used to oppose the dominant academic idealism, vulgar materialism and positivism. Dilthey endowed this concept with historical and factual contents, which made it break through the mold of metaphysics and become the basic key word of post-metaphysical philosophy.

Young Heidegger's philosophy inherited this post-metaphysical philosophy tradition. Until the mid-1920s, when he talked about existentialism, he used the concept of "life" instead of "existence". Here, Dilthey's influence is very obvious. However, Heidegger's philosophy has another origin, that is Husserl and his phenomenology. Heidegger frankly admitted: "Husserl gave me eyes". [10-s.5] However, this talented student is not satisfied with seeing with the teacher's eyes. It was also from 19 19 that his differences with Husserl became increasingly open and obvious.

For Heidegger, phenomenology is a method; As a phenomenological method, its essence is manifested in the famous slogan "Back to the thing itself". Although this slogan was first put forward by Hegel rather than Husserl, it was Husserl who made it widely known as a new philosophical goal. However, for Husserl, "returning to things themselves" is actually returning to consciousness itself; In Heidegger's view, "returning to things themselves" means returning to life itself. The problem is, as Dilthey pointed out, we always live in our lives; Or, in Kierkegaard's words, how can we have the problem of returning to life itself if we can't get rid of it?

This is still caused by metaphysics. Metaphysics pursues "absolute knowledge" and "absolute truth", which makes it only pay attention to the "pure present" and impersonal universe kingdom, while ignoring the individual life living in a special and limited time and situation, which Heidegger calls "false life". This metaphysical attitude towards life was also called "theoretical" by Heidegger in the "wartime research class" lecture of 19 19. But the word "dasTheoretische" also has narrow sense and broad sense in that speech. The narrow sense of "theory" basically refers to the theory expressed in scientific thinking and cognition, that is, the "theory" that we understand as "scientific theory" in our daily life. "Theory" in a broad sense means that epistemology, philosophical psychology and reflective phenomenology make all pre-scientific experiences thematic. Heidegger mainly used the concept of "theory" in the latter sense.

This theory understands life as the life of a static and impersonal ordinary person (Dassmann). There is neither time nor situation in life, so there is no history nor super-history. Limited, mortal life has become an eternal abstraction. Heidegger used the word larva to describe this abstract life. The word Larvanz comes from Latin larva, which means ghost and mask. The word Lar vanz is used to describe life, which shows that the life that has been themed or abstracted by theoretical attitude is just a ghost wearing a mask, not a real life at all, but a self-alienation of life. [8-S. 140, 13-S. 15] This alienated life lives in the average and publicity of ordinary people, and it is pitiful and obvious to judge their own success or failure by taking ordinary people (actually no one) as right and wrong; But it has no world of its own. In short, "life misjudges itself; It uses the appropriate scale (non-quantitative scale) but fails to grasp itself. " [8-S. 103] and this also means that metaphysics or existing philosophy basically stays in the theoretical field, but has not entered the pre-theoretical life field at all.

This makes philosophy on the verge of death, and Heidegger has a clear understanding of it. In the lecture of 19 19 "wartime research class", he bluntly pointed out: "We are standing at the crossroads of methodology, which will determine the life and death of philosophy; We stand on the edge of an abyss: either we fall into nothingness, that is, absolute materiality, or we try to jump into another world, or more accurately, we enter this world for the first time. " [ 1 1—s.63]

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At that time, many philosophers felt the crisis faced by philosophy to varying degrees. For example, Amelia SK (1875-1915), a neo-Kantian who died in World War I, also thought that "the problem here is the life and death of philosophy". [12-s.89] When Husserl wrote the famous philosophy as a strict science, he obviously felt the crisis of philosophy. Although there are sharp differences between phenomenology and neo-Kantianism, they both pursue philosophy as primitive science. The so-called "primitive science" means that it is a science that pursues the most primitive, fundamental, first and last things. In this sense, it is primitive science or scientific science, that is, all sciences are derived from it, not the other way around.

However, as the first and last thing that philosophy of primitive science pursues, or what is its starting point and end point? For neo-Kantianism, it is a fact of knowledge and science; For Husserl, this is a conscious fact. For Heidegger, there is no doubt that it should be a fact of life. This is the first difference between him and Husserl. For Heidegger, philosophy is phenomenology, and phenomenology is the study of life itself. Although it is a philosophy of life on the surface, it is actually the opposite of the world outlook. The world outlook is to objectify life and fix it at a certain point in the life of a culture. On the contrary, phenomenology is by no means closed, because it absolutely permeates life, and it is always temporary. "[4-Page 17]

This conclusion is certainly not arbitrary, but there are considerable reasons. As mentioned above, as the original science of philosophy, it is not derived from itself. If it is a derivative, it can't be primitive science. As a primitive science, it is different from all scientific theories. It is not a theoretical science, but a pre-theoretical science, because it has no presupposition and no premise, otherwise it will fall into an infinite retrogression of logic and cannot become the original science. Because of this, its foundation can only be displayed intuitively, or pointed out, but not proved. However, traditional metaphysics regards philosophy as a theoretical scientific model, and holds that philosophy, like other sciences, has presupposition, but the presupposition of philosophy is self-presupposition. Therefore, philosophy has a circulation, which is the essential feature of philosophy. People regard this circularity as "an index of possible real philosophical problems". [1 1-S.95] But in Heidegger's view, "this kind of cycle is a theoretical cycle, which is a theoretical difficulty." [ 1 1—s.95]

As an original science, philosophy not only needs no presupposition, but also can never be presupposed, because it is not a theory, [1 1-S.97] but a self-understanding and explanation living in its authenticity. It is not a rational cognitive activity, but a survival activity of life itself. The so-called "self-presupposition" means that philosophy, as a life activity, takes life itself as its theme. Life is the first thing and the last thing. Philosophy with it as its theme, its ontological position determines that it can not but have circular structure or circularity. In addition, if philosophy is the original science, then its subject and object-life can not be the life that has been abstracted by theory, but the life before theory. The book Philosophical Concepts and World Outlook is to outline the concept of future philosophy according to the subject object and methodology of philosophy. In short, it is the philosophy of the future. Its main object is pre-theoretical life, and its methodological approach is phenomenology of hermeneutics.

Heidegger was not the first person to regard philosophy as the original science. This is actually a tradition of western philosophy. This is true from the first philosophy and metaphysics in ancient Greece to transcendental philosophy, epistemology, absolute science and transcendental phenomenology in modern philosophy. The difference is that these different philosophies in history have one thing in common, that is, they all stay in the theoretical field. However, Heidegger's original science is a non-theoretical philosophy. It regards the non-theoretical life field as the original foundation of philosophy, and on this basis, it puts forward the basic problems of philosophy again. [13—s. 15] Moreover, since life itself is non-theoretical as a philosophy in the original science and its research field, the corresponding methods must be non-theoretical. The phenomenology of hermeneutics is such a non-theoretical method. This is indeed a real revolution in the history of western philosophy. Before Heidegger, some philosophers turned their philosophical eyes to pre-theoretical things, but their methods were still theoretical, so they could not really enter the field of pre-theory.

Heidegger transformed phenomenology into hermeneutic phenomenology instead of directly using Husserl's reflective phenomenology, because the latter is still a theoretical method. Any theory will make people completely invisible in the primitiveness of the world experience of pre-science. Theory has always concealed the experience of the pre-scientific world in advance by its way of looking at and approaching. Heidegger called this theory's rule over the pre-scientific world "the rule of theory" not only in academic activities, but also in daily life, and proposed that "the rule of theory must be broken". [1 1-S.59] But this is by no means advocating that theory takes precedence over practice, because the distinction between theory and practice itself is a manifestation of the dominant position of theory, and advocating that practice takes precedence over theory has not stepped out of the dominant position of traditional philosophy since ancient Greece. "The dominant position of theory must be broken" means that the theory itself cannot enter the pre-theoretical field. [ 1 1—s.59]

Because of this, method is a matter of life and death in philosophy. Traditional theoretical methods can't approach the pre-theoretical things at all. Before Heidegger, Dilthey took life as the theme of philosophy, aiming at metaphysics blindly surpassing but divorced from life itself, and called the experience reflecting our original relationship with the world "Erlebnis". It is not something related to representation and concept like feeling and perception, that is, it is not something that belongs to the category of cognitive ability, but the vitality of the life itself of the former subject. Not the experience of the subject, but the experience of the former subject, or the experience of life. Experience is also consciousness, but it is not based on the subjective consciousness of modern epistemological philosophy, but only the mode in which the content of consciousness is endowed in time. ② Young Heidegger also regards experience as the main pre-theoretical life phenomenon. It's just that the concept of experience is vague, and people often regard it as a psychological thing and the subject of psychology. But this is precisely the way to treat the phenomenon of pre-theoretical experience in the way of theoretical reflection. Even Dilthey's philosophy of life is still valid on this issue.

To have a clear understanding of methodology, we must have a clear understanding of the nature of the objects we are dealing with. Heidegger analyzed "Is there anything? (Gibtesetwas？ The experience of this problem shows that we can only approach the non-theoretical field through non-theoretical methods. According to the general psychological theory and consciousness theory, this kind of experience is a psychological event or consciousness activity that we can treat objectively as a physical event that happens in front of us, that is, we regard experience as something that happens in front of us. Heidegger used the word Wohlgang to refer to this theoretical attitude of taking experience as the object of psychological or consciousness theory reflection. (3) However, the experience of the above inquiry is actually not a psychological or spiritual event, not an event that happened in front of me as a reflector, not the object of my reflection. However, as long as we treat experience with the traditional reflective attitude we are used to, then experience can only be regarded as an objective event that occurs within consciousness.

Although Husserl himself still holds this theoretical attitude, the methodology of "returning to things themselves" in phenomenology needs a pre-reflective and pre-theoretical attitude. This is the attitude of hermeneutics. It requires us not to reflect on experience as we do on an external object, but to understand it in a hermeneutic way, and to see and listen in an understanding way, because the so-called "thing" in phenomenology is to show our own phenomena. Once we adopt this pre-theoretical hermeneutic attitude, we will find that the above experience should not be the object of opposition to reflection, but should be an event that we are ourselves and an event that is carried out with our vitality. Of course I am responsible for this incident, but this "I" is not the self in the sense of "self" in my proposition, so I won't reveal this. What I have experienced is only the experience of questioning something, which is "the life of doing something." [1 1-S.68] has nothing to do with self-reflection in subjective philosophy; Not me as executor. Only when experience is regarded as an established fact, I, as the executor, will be regarded as one pole, and experience itself will be regarded as the other. The experience of asking questions is not something opposite or in front of our reflection consciousness, "it belongs to my life". [ 1 1—s.69]

Heidegger deliberately emphasized "mine" here, just as he later used the concept of "Jemeinigkeit" in Being and Time, not out of any subjective position, but to emphasize life and its experience, that is, the particularity, finiteness and timeliness of existence. The essence of pre-empirical theory lies in the particularity of its existence mode, which is ultimately due to its most primitive timeliness. This temporality does not belong to the temporality of psychology or inner consciousness, but to the temporality of non-theoretical experience. In essence, experience is a foreign object, not a group of people. Ereignis means "what happened" in German. Just as Heidegger wrote Vorgang as Vor gang here, it is certainly meaningful to write Er eignis as Ereignis. First of all, he wants to imply that all people's experience comes from their own particularity or self-nature, that is, to emphasize the particularity and self-nature of experience. Eregnis is "a unique life, not just this". [1 1-S.75] According to the German philosopher Feng? Herman explained that the root eignis here refers to Eigene (unique), not Eigentum (attribute). The prefix Er means "original" and "original". [13—s.5 1] It can be seen that Heidegger used the word Eregnis to emphasize the special possibility of uncertain life and experience, not a particularity or a special person. It is a theoretical method, not a non-theoretical attitude, to regard particularity as not an uncertain possibility, but a set characteristic or something with the same characteristics. ①

It can be seen that it is not enough to define only non-theoretical objects. The reason why methodology is very important to future philosophy is that any non-theoretical phenomenon, once handled by theoretical methods, will become theoretical. For example, Husserl's pre-scientific life world is like this. In Heidegger's philosophical concept and worldview, the example of the podium is specially used to illustrate the related problems. He said that when he walked into the lecture hall, he saw the platform where he was going to give lectures to the students, not a square brown plane, nor a big wooden box made of small wooden boxes. What the students see is the platform where the teacher gives them lectures. Seeing the podium is a kind of Umwelterlebnis, which belongs to the world around the lecture hall. The key point here is that neither teachers nor students first see brown square planes, then further see that they are many square wooden boxes, then further see a countertop, and finally conclude that this is a platform for scientific speeches like labeling what they see; But the first thing I saw was the podium. The idea that people first see isolated perceptual materials or perceptual impressions and then synthesize them into one thing is a theoretical approach, which actually adds a layer of thinking, theoretical thinking or reflection between what they see and what they see. The theory here (dasTheoretische) does not refer to one scientific theory or another, but refers to the reflective observation of things, which hinders the approach of hermeneutic understanding of what the surrounding world has experienced and experienced. Hermeneutics, on the other hand, really follows the requirement of "returning to the thing itself", and directly shows its own thing itself by watching the intermediary without theory. When we walked into the lecture hall, the podium showed its unique significance to the world around us in its meaning. Therefore, the understanding of hermeneutics and the explanation of understanding are not the technical operation of the subject on the object, but just "purely look into the experience", [11-s.71] to see the meaning of what you see.

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In Heidegger's view, in our experience of the world around us, the most primitive and basic things are not purely emotional things, but meaningful things. This is just the opposite of traditional philosophy. Traditional philosophy holds that we always see the same perceptual things first, or have perceptual perception first, and then add meaning to them like labeling. Heidegger, on the other hand, thinks that we always see a podium, a book or a teacup first. In other words, the first thing we encounter is something meaningful (Bedeut samkeit). This means that the experience of encountering it is also the experience of hermeneutic understanding. We live in the meaning of things from the beginning, and directly encounter meaning without the intermediary of the perceptual object layer. We will never encounter purely emotional experiences (that is, meaningless things). Besides, we don't look at a thing in isolation, and things are always related to the way I contact things. Heidegger still took the podium as an example, saying that what he saw was not an isolated podium, but a podium that was "too high for me". [11-s.71] That is to say, the meaning of something meaningful is related to my meaningful thing Umgang. Saying "the podium is too high for me" means that it prevents me from using it. In other words, I think the podium (meeting it) contains an hermeneutic understanding of the meaning of things around the world, which belongs to this kind of seeing (meeting) rather than being added. Obviously, the analysis of things and instruments behind Being and Time is based on this.

The importance of Heidegger's thought lies not only in his connection of the meaning of things with our daily activities, but also in his fundamental subversion of the view of what is the most direct and primitive thing in western philosophy for two thousand years. In the past, whether it was materialism or idealism, one thing was consistent, that is, perceptual perception was the most direct and direct thing. In Heidegger's view, "meaningful things are the first things." [11-s.73] The most direct world is the surrounding world as the implied world, not the perceptual world. It is not the surrounding world that is mediated by the perceptual world, but the opposite. The world around us is not the sum of things and objects, but the sum of various meanings, and things become things around us because of it, rather than purely emotional objects. We live in the world around us, and everything that is meaningful to us is meaningful to us because of this overall significance. Meaning is like a welfare. In its sense, things have opened up an esweltet.

As mentioned above, for Heidegger, returning to the thing itself is actually returning to life itself, and the most primitive and basic thing can only be life. But this kind of life, of course, does not mean life in the biological sense; Reality is not only the isolated subjectivity of consciousness, but also the integrity of the relationship between self and the world, and the integrity of various life and experience relationships in the historical process. This whole is the world, and we live in it, not outside it. The fundamental reason why the previous philosophy failed to really return to the thing itself was to treat the non-theoretical thing itself with theoretical methods, that is, to observe the thing itself from the outside to approach the thing itself, which backfired and turned the non-theoretical thing into the object of theory. Therefore, whether we can really return to the matter itself depends on the fundamental change of the method, that is, we must find and adhere to a non-theoretical method. This is the fundamental reason why Heidegger must abandon his teacher Husserl's reflective phenomenology and put forward hermeneutic phenomenology. In his view, phenomenology of hermeneutics or phenomenological hermeneutics is a non-theoretical method that can really return to things themselves, that is, to grasp non-theoretical things non-theoretically.

In the eyes of ordinary people, "non-theoretical method" itself is a paradox, because method is always associated with theory or science. If Heidegger still admits that philosophy is the original science, how can his philosophical method not be theoretical? Indeed, if we understand the method as the operation mode of operators other than things, then the method must be theoretical. However, the understanding of hermeneutics is not the experience of going out of life and entering the surrounding world, but the experience of living in the surrounding world with vitality. What hermeneutics explains is not the object of hermeneutics, but becomes clear and harmonious.