Looking at the German intelligence stations throughout World War II, it can be summed up in one word as a failure. At nearly every strategic turning point in the war, German intelligence failed. Germany was also at a disadvantage in terms of intelligence offense and defense against all opponents including Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

The failure of German intelligence can be attributed to several reasons:

1. The adverse influence of Nazi ideology. Whether it is the arrogant idea of ??Germanic national superiority or the reactionary anti-Semitic racial theory, they have undoubtedly caused great constraints and obstacles to Germany's intelligence work. A sense of national superiority made Germany's intelligence agencies rigid in their thinking, divorced from reality, and sloppy in attitude. Extremely stubborn in overestimating oneself and unrealistically underestimating opponents. It has a more distorted view of the outside world than other countries that also pursue chauvinism. So misjudgments always happen. First, they underestimated Britain's tenacious fighting will. After the failure of the British air battle, they were at a loss. Later, Mandarin despised the strength of the Soviet Union. There was almost no serious intelligence preparation when formulating Plan Barbarossa, and there was no reason to believe that Germany could replicate the myth of the Blitzkrieg in the Soviet Union and easily defeat the Soviet Union. It was ridiculous to underestimate the total strength of the Soviet army by a full 100 divisions. The intelligence agency's assessment of America's vast industrial capabilities resulted in Hitler's fury. From then on, the intelligence agencies remained silent and could only try to figure out what was going on, screen and even create intelligence in a catered manner. Due to arrogance, Germany attaches great importance to offensive intelligence and ignores defensive intelligence. The weakening of Germany by anti-Semitism cannot be underestimated. A large number of talented Jews were persecuted, and many academic and technical institutions were crippled by the anti-Semitic frenzy. The G?ttingen Institute of Mathematics, originally the world center of mathematics, completely collapsed. This kept Germany far behind in codebreaking throughout the war. Jewish mathematicians expelled from Germany accounted for 20% of the personnel of British and American code-breaking agencies. For example, William Friedman, who helped the United States decipher the Japanese Purple Code, was a Jew expelled from Germany. As for Germany's persecution of Jewish physicists, the consequence of slandering nuclear physics and quantum physics as Jewish pseudoscience is that Germany cannot develop an atomic bomb.

2. In addition to the negative impact of the guiding ideology of the inefficiency of the Nazi German intelligence system, the competition for power and decision-making processes among intelligence agencies were the main reasons for reducing efficiency and delaying the process. In order to monopolize power, Hitler deliberately dispersed intelligence work: In addition to the Abwehr in Canaris, Germany also had four branches of the General Security Service of the SS system, and Ribbentrop also had a diplomatic intelligence system. The three agencies are overlapping their organizational structures, wasting resources for no reason, and have neither division of labor nor cooperation in business. Be wary of each other's blockade, or even undermine each other. Instead of concentrating on dealing with enemies, time and energy are spent on fighting among ourselves, slandering each other, and creating a barrier. Canaris himself, who was truly proficient in the intelligence business, was distrusted and ostracized. Although Galen's Eastern Front Foreign Military Office, which came from behind, had real materials, it was limited to the low level of tactical intelligence and could not play its maximum role.

3. The historical tradition of the German army has caused contempt for intelligence. As an island country, the UK naturally values ??defense, so it has always given intelligence a high priority. Germany is a landlocked country and is accustomed to attacking when the situation is tense. Therefore, the role of intelligence work cannot be correctly understood and treated. Most of the German officer corps were born in military families and had a feudal hereditary system and natural exclusive monopoly on military affairs. Viewed by intelligence officers as competitors for power. As a result, intelligence personnel were generally disparaged, with the operational staff having the final say and the intelligence staff being suppressed. In terms of personnel selection, low-level and second- and third-rate officers are engaged in intelligence work.

4. All power structures centered on Hitler. This authoritarian system has had serious consequences. Not only did Hitler become the target of competition among officials at all levels and various agencies, but his personal likes and dislikes determined the direction and results of all work. Hitler served as the ultimate user and judge of all intelligence. The huge Germany only allows him to have one brain. Second, even as a person with extraordinary keen intuition like Hitler, it is impossible for him to never make mistakes. And his subordinates would never dare to correct him. On the contrary, they cater to him. Whatever he likes and insists on, they intentionally use intelligence to support and confirm him. Anything he is unwilling to accept, even if it is factual and very important, must be seized and hidden. So the meeting always conformed to Hitler's subjective point of view. In the end, it evolved that Hitler could no longer accept "interference" from information that did not conform to his own thoughts and wishes. To this end, a review team headed by his press secretary Dietrich was set up to not only review intelligence reports, but also newspapers, and never let the head of state see unpleasant news. Later, even Hitler himself became able to digest bad news himself. Later, it actually tampered with the data by itself as if it was talking in a dream. The intelligence agency reported that the U.S.'s monthly ship production was 300,000 tons, but he turned a deaf ear and kept saying that it was only 70,000 tons. When the German army carried out the battle plan to arrest the king and capture members of Badoglio's government in Italy, when Jodel reported that the German army's marching distance was 100 kilometers, Hitler broke into hysteria and roared: "What 100 kilometers? It's only 60 kilometers. .

Later, Hitler completely hid in his own shell and stubbornly refused all news that he did not welcome: When Guderian presented Galen's analysis of the Soviet troop concentration figures, Hitler cursed Galen and the Eastern Front Foreign Military Service. They were all idiots and ordered Galen to be taken to a lunatic asylum. When the air force showed him an aerial photo of an unprecedented large number of Soviet artillery positions assembled in front of the German central group, he simply swept the photo underground in anger. The reports that the agency painstakingly collected lost all effect in the face of Hitler's single mind.