No matter what the nature of the government is, its authority is based on matter. [Author's Note: As Napoleon said: "Without an army, there would be no political independence and people's freedom." See Napoleon's Letters, French version 1858- 1869, Volume 3,No. 1800. Therefore, in a revolution, the main goal is either to win the support of military forces or to disintegrate military forces. In the first case, the revolution takes the form of a "coup" and only produces limited chaos. In the second case, it may cause a kind of anarchy. Although the people enthusiastically support the revolutionary ideal, anarchy is beyond their endurance for a long time. When this state is formed, people want someone to help them alleviate this pain. Once this person appears, the follow-up action is to use the energy generated by anarchy to guide him to develop outward in the form of foreign war. This not only controlled its own people, but also established an authoritarian regime, which replaced the original government with the support of military forces.
Ten years before 1789 attacked the Bastille, Gilbert predicted:
"There will be a person. By now, he may still be a nobody. He never became famous through speeches or articles, but meditated in silence. He may not understand his talents yet, and only when he is assigned to display his talents will he realize his abilities. He may be ignorant, but he will seize the public opinion, seize the opportunity, and tell the great theorist what the real founder said to the speaker when he spoke to the Athenians:' I will realize what my opponent said to you.' [Author's Note: Collected Works of Gilbert, (1803 Edition), Volume IV, page 74. ]
This person is Napoléon Bonaparte (1769— 182 1). 17951015 October, his fame spread all over Paris with a grape bomb explosion. "People's eyes are focused on this person. He is a man who dares to do things. He naturally became king. Everyone thinks he should. " [Author's Note: T. Carlyle: Heroes and Hero Worship]
This man is a super egoist and designer, a completely isolated and self-centered person. He only believes in himself and puts everything together. Menival said: "He not only thinks actively, but also pays attention to the details of everything personally ... His genius and superhuman vitality push him forward;" He thinks he has the means and time to deal with everything ... in fact, he did everything himself. "[Author's Note: Memoirs of Menival, (version 1894), Volume 3, page 50-5 1. ]
Croncourt's memoirs are the most fascinating. What he said was similar and more thorough. He wrote: "In order to achieve his goal, he is not afraid of pain, trouble, trouble, and regardless of major issues. Some people may say that he has fully contributed himself to the goal he pursues. Yes, he always devotes all his energy, ability and attention to current actions and discussions. He devoted himself to everything. Therefore, compared with his opponents, he has a huge advantage, because few people can completely concentrate on an idea or an action for a period of time. " [Author's Note: Memoirs of General Clancourt, (English version 1925), vol. 1, p. 93. ]
He is completely wrapped in fate. 18l2, on the way to Moscow, he mentioned this: "I feel that I have been driven to a goal that I don't even know. Once I achieve this goal, it becomes unnecessary, and a bullet can crush me. But before that, even all the forces of all mankind could not fight against me. " [Author's Note: See Oswald Bingler's The Decline of the West (1925 Edition), the first 1 Volume, the first 144 Page. ]
In the eyes of people of his time, his task was to "conquer", but they didn't see that he was really "creating". This is not even clear to him. While destroying an old era, he is creating a new one. Or, as Spengler pointed out, "Napoleon lived a hard life, not for himself, not for France, but for the future." [Author's Note: See Oswald Bingler's The Decline of the West (1925 Edition), vol. 1, p. 363. ]
Most of the wars launched by Napoleon were large-scale wars of conquest. There has been no precedent for this kind of war since the time of Charles. Napoleon deliberately compared himself with Charlemagne.
When he fought the first Italian war (1796- 1797), his goal was to find the enemy in the battle and destroy him. His goal, his invasion of neutral areas, his dependence on rural materials, his maintenance of war expenses by means of expropriation and robbery, and his unremitting pursuit of extracting spoils from occupied areas all shocked his peers. They believe that these rude acts are not legitimate acts of war, but acts of aggression by barbarians. A feeling of disgust, not fear, has been reflected in the cartoons at that time. 1On April 4th, 797, Krokshenke drew a cartoon: The French army was painted as a dragon, spewing smoke, riding a strange and terrible monster on its back and wearing a hat of Asia Minor engraved with the words "Bonaparte". In front of him, two generals led an army to flee for their lives quickly. [Author's Note: See A.M. Broadley: "1795-1821Napoleon in Gunray, Carrica", (191Kloc-0/Edition), Volume I, No.99. This cartoon mercilessly depicts the protagonist in the era of infinite war.
Second, the elements of the Napoleonic Wars.
What we should think about here are several typical elements of the Napoleonic War: First, unified command; Second, command ability and military ability; The third is Napoleon's planning system.
Napoleon believed that unified command was "the primary factor of war" [Author's Note: Napoleon's Letters, 3 1 Volume, 4 18 Page. [Translator's Note: The following quotations in Napoleon's letters are all French versions of 1858- 1860] And remember that in any case, only when political power and military power are completely concentrated in the hands of one person, just like when Napoleon became the first consul in 1800+0. In the usual war, political decision-making is always separated from military action, which makes it impossible to achieve complete reunification. This is the situation under the governor's government. Napoleon was quite touched by this. Therefore, when he took over the command of the Italian legion, he once gave a precise definition of "unified command". 1797 65438+1October 19 He wrote to the governor: "The government should trust its generals; Just allow him to move freely and tell him what he should achieve. " [Author's Note: No.83, Volume I of Napoleon's Letters, if this goal is reasonable, then this definition is perfect. When talking about the oneness of military command, he said: "In military operations, I only consult with myself; But in terms of diplomacy, I am asking everyone's opinion. " [Author's Note: "Napoleon's Letters" Volume I No.399] Regarding the war situation of 1796, he once said: "I have not discussed with anyone in this war situation; If I am forced to coordinate my personal actions with others, I will definitely accomplish nothing. " [Author's Note: No.420, Volume I of Napoleon's Letters]
As long as the environment permits, unified command requires all available troops to concentrate on the main battlefield and be commanded by a general. However, the general tendency of an ignorant or weak government always wants to disperse its power to cover all important strongholds. 1806, king Joseph Bonaparte of Naples took this approach. On June 7, Napoleon wrote to him, bitterly saying, "If you want to keep all the strongholds in your kingdom, all France can't provide you with enough troops." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 3 1, Page 4 16. ]
Unified command is the basis for Napoleon to win many battles. But strangely, it was also a factor that led to his final collapse. Nevertheless, his motto, such as: "In war, man is nothing, only one person is the representative of all" [Author's Note: Leon Lester: Napoleon's Letters (French version 1897)No. 155. 】 "In command, only one bad general can top two good generals", [Author's Note: Napoleon's Letters, Vol. 1 1, No.9 105. To this day, it is as correct and effective as it was when it was first popular.
From Napoleon's talk about "command ability" and "military ability", we can find out what his expectations are for generals and soldiers.
Regarding the first item, he said: "The indispensable quality of a general is fortitude." "A general should not draw the situation at that time; His message should be as clear as the lens of a telescope. " "A person who sees things from other people's eyes can never command the army reasonably." "Success in war depends on vision and looking for psychological opportunities in battle. In the battle of Austerlitz, if I attack six hours earlier, I will fail. " "Will, character and courage made me." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 22, No.65438 +0804 1. On the contrary, "the lion army under the command of reindeer will never be a lion army again." [Author's Note: Napoleon's Letters Vol.7 No.4855]
As for soldiers, he always stimulates their vanity, strengthens their confidence, and thus alleviates their fears. He will use this self-confidence to turn a cautious animal into a soldier and make this person willing to sacrifice his life for reasons he doesn't usually understand. He said: "People who value their lives more than national honor and respect for their comrades-in-arms should not be a member of the French army at all." [Author's Note: Laskas: Memories of St. Helena, (French version 1823, vol. 6, p. 85)] He made demands on the soldiers, but not by buying them off. He said, "Courage cannot be bought by money." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Vol. 12,No. 10329. On the contrary, he encouraged soldiers to have a sense of honor. "In the war, I rode to the front of the team and shouted:' Raise the flag! This moment has finally arrived! As long as such a shout, French soldiers will act immediately. [Author's Note: Napoleon's Letters, Volume 65438 +07. 14288. He also said: "The 32nd Brigade has always been loyal to me, because after I was in Ronado, I wrote:' I feel relieved to have the 32nd Brigade there. The power of language to people is often amazing. ""In Italy, we are usually one to three, but people have confidence in me. Therefore, the power that determines victory is spirit, not quantity. " "It is not the number of troops that brings strength to the army, but loyalty and heroism that add fighting spirit to the army." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 29, Page 107. He is convinced that personal contact between officers and men is a secret of successful leadership. In one of his daily orders, we can read the following sentence: "A battalion commander can rest only when he is familiar with all the details;" After six months of command, he should know the names and abilities of all officers and men in the camp. " Napoleon was also very concerned about the health of his men. He once wrote: "Disease is the most dangerous enemy." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Vol. 10, No.8832. "It is better to have a bloody battle than to put the troops in an unsanitary place." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 30, Page 176. ]
Regarding ordinary people, he said: "If bravery is the first virtue of a soldier, then patience is the second virtue." [Author's Note: Napoleon's Letters, Volume 1, No.925.] When Napoleon was in St. Helena, Madame Monsanto once asked him what kind of army was the best? "Madam," he replied, "the troops that can win the battle." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 9, No.7527]
As the designer of the campaign, Napoleon's success came directly from his dictatorship. The monolithic rule gave him the right to give political and strategic guidance to the war. This advantage, coupled with his dedication and hard work, enabled him to inject his genius into his plan, sometimes even beyond the understanding of his generals. With the prolongation of the war, his problems become more and more complicated, and his subordinates who lack understanding ability become more and more dangerous. Especially in the battle of Leipzig and the battle of Waterloo, this situation is particularly obvious. He made an excellent dispatch at that time, but he was screwed up by those stupid bailiffs. Therefore, he recalled on St. Helena: "If I had a man named Du Like Lenny as my deputy in the war, I would become the master of the world."
For Napoleon, making a battle plan is like engaging in an accurate artistic work. As he said: "When a war is declared, there are always many things to do, so it is wise to foresee this in advance." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 10, No.8075, I am used to thinking about what I should do three or four months ago. However, I always make the worst estimate. ""In a war, you must estimate, or you will get nothing. "[Author's Note: Napoleon's Letters, Volume 65438 +03. 108 10.] "I am used to taking various emergency measures and never rely on any opportunities." "Can only draw up a well-thought-out plan. Success in the war is possible. "
On one occasion, he revealed the secret of this success to Rodriel. He said: "If I always seem to have an answer to everything, it is because I have thought about it for a long time before doing something;" I have thought about almost everything that may happen in advance. I can know what to say and do when others are caught off guard. This is not a sudden discovery by some genius. I always work: I work when I eat, I work when I watch a play, and I work when I wake up at night. " [Author's Note: Napoleon is at work, (English version 19 14), p. 7. ]
Before Napoleon started every battle, he had to make a strict plan in advance, including several different plans, each of which had a hypothetical situation. This is what Napoleon imagined the enemy might do. This plan is his intention, and different plans contain possible modifications to the plan. Once the plan is put into practice, the remaining problem is to continue to "explore". At that time, there was a search cavalry to discover the enemy's strength and report the enemy's position. But Napoleon was more concerned about his plan than the position of the enemy. When he received the report from the cavalry, the enemy usually changed. So his exploration system includes reconnaissance, espionage, interception of post office letters and so on. Just to confirm or eliminate his original hypothesis. His cavalry or spy, etc. , sent to the direction indicated in advance, in order to clarify the doubt. This is only to confirm or exclude the original hypothesis and obtain the necessary information. In this way, the original assumptions are constantly confirmed or eliminated, and the uncertainty of the plan is minimized. So his plan was simplified and the enemy's plan was discovered. The purpose of Napoleon's exploration is not so much to find out the position of the enemy as to find out its intention.
Three. Principles of the Napoleonic Wars
Although Napoleon often talked about the principles of war, he never listed them. Once, he said to Saint-Cyr, "If I can find free time one day, I will write a book that accurately describes the principles of war and provide it to all soldiers. So war is as easy to learn as a science. " [Author's Note: Memoirs of Saint-Cyr, (French version 183 1), Volume 4, page 148. It's a pity that he didn't keep this promise. But studying his campaign, we can find the following points: (1) He always relies on attack; (2) He thinks that speeding up can save time; (3) Implementing an effective strategic attack; (4) He insisted on concentrating superior forces on the battlefield, especially on decisive attack points; (5) He carefully considered his own protection system.
Attack:
Regarding the attack, Napoleon once said: My thoughts are the same as Frederick's. One should always attack first. He also said: "It would be a great mistake to allow others to attack themselves." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 27, No.21428. ] "If you want to turn war into attack, like Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, gustav adolf, Du Lunni, Eugene and Frederick, you must learn from them. This is the only way to make you a famous soldier and understand the secrets of the art of war. "[Author's Note: Napoleon's Letters, Volume 3 1, Page 4 18. ]
However, unlike karl xii, he was not a reckless general. He said, "At the beginning of a battle, one should think carefully about whether he should move forward. However, when he decides to attack, he should push it to the final limit. " [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 32, page 209. He added that if a person decides to invade a country, he should not be afraid of attacking, but should look for enemies everywhere and fight them.
Although Napoleon did not invent pursuit, it can be said that he systematized pursuit, because he combined pursuit with fighting and became part of his tactics. 180510 June 17, at the Battle of Ulm, he sent envoys to Molat.
Maneuver:
Colin wrote: "In the Napoleonic Wars, speed was a necessary and basic factor." In order to emphasize this point of view, he quoted Telford's exposition on this subject in the book The Change of War:
"Movement is the soul of the Napoleonic Wars, just as decisive battles constitute its tools. Napoleon made his troops move at the planned speed ... by increasing their own speed ... by marching in haste to make up for the deficiency. These are his proverbs. He said:' marching is war',' the talent of war is the talent of sports', and' the army that is good at sports will surely win.' [Author's Note: Changes in War, (English version 19 12), p. 254. ]
Napoleon's other two statements reinforced this view. He said: "In the art of war, just like in mechanics, time is an important factor between weight and strength." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Vol. 18,No. 14707. "In the war, the loss of time is irreparable; All the reasons given for this are inappropriate, because delay can only make the action fail. " [Author's Note: Napoleon's Letters, Volume 12, No.9997, is unfortunate for Napoleon at this point. The two delays of the subordinate generals made him lose a battle for the first time (in Leipzig) and a victory for the second time (in Lini). On the other hand, in the Battle of Ulm, his men said, "The emperor discovered a new method of fighting. He used our legs instead of bayonets. " [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon,No. 1 1 Volume, No.9392]
Sudden attack:
Napoleon's surprise attacks were rarely tactical, but almost always strategic, except for the unexpected concentration of his troops on the battlefield. Famous examples are: 1800 Battle of Marengo, 1805 Battle of Ulm, 1806 Battle of Jena, the first stage of the Battle of Waterloo, that is, the Battle of Lini. 1814 65438+17 October, Napoleon wrote to Stein and said, "Strategy is the art of using time and space. I don't cherish the latter as much as I cherish the former. Space can be regained, but time is lost forever. "
Concentrate:
In order to fight a decisive battle, Napoleon reduced all auxiliary actions to a minimum in order to concentrate the greatest possible strength. Colin quoted him as saying: "The army must be assembled and the greatest possible strength must be concentrated on the battlefield." [Author's Note: Changes in the War, p. 243. ]
Here, there is a major difference between the meanings of "set" and "concentration". 1806 On August 8th, Napoleon wrote to the King of Naples and explained the former. He said in the letter: "The art of deploying troops is also the art of waging war. You should deploy your troops in this way. No matter what the enemy does, you should be able to assemble your troops in a few days. " [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Vol. 13,No. 12629. Therefore, concentration refers to the distribution of troops or divisions in a war zone, while concentration refers to actions on the battlefield. 1806 On February 4, 2004/kloc-0, Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph and said, "Your army is too scattered. The action you should take is to concentrate your troops on the battlefield in one day. " [Author's Note: Napoleon's Letters, Volume 12, No.9808] The assembly area of the army, including the marching and resting areas, will gradually shrink when the enemy approaches, and finally all the columns can be concentrated in a few hours. This is because, "the first principle of war is to wait until all the troops are concentrated on the battlefield before fighting." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 32, Page 277. At the same time, because the art of military command is that when the number of troops is at a disadvantage, it can turn the disadvantage into an advantage on the battlefield. In other words, if an inferior army can be assembled correctly, it can usually defeat an army that is superior in number but cannot be assembled correctly.
Protection:
1September, 793 16, Napoleon was a penniless captain. By a completely accidental opportunity, he became the artillery commander of an army in jacobins during the siege. 1815 June18, as the emperor of France, surrounded by the guards, he withdrew from the battlefield of Waterloo. During the long period from 1793 to 18 15, Napoleon hardly fought a purely defensive war.
It is true that in Leipzig (18 13), in La Rossiri (18 14) and in Azize (18 14), he was forced to make a defensive war. Moreover, because of the poor quality of the serenade, we had to take strategic defense in the whole war of 18 14. However, in this battle, there are still a series of fast marching and fierce attacks. However, although Napoleon absolutely avoided planned defensive warfare, all his offensive actions were based on protection. His explanation of this point is: "The art of the whole war is to make a reasonable and thorough defense first, and then make a quick and bold attack." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Vol. 13,No. 10558. ]
The basis of this protection system is to establish a safe combat base behind the army. As a base, it is either a fortress or a fortified town. It can't be attacked by the enemy because of warehouses, arsenals, hospitals, etc. Our troops must gather here, which is the basis of the operation. When the troops advance from the battle base, the task of the cavalry in charge of protection is to cover up the plan and the movement of the troops, just like his task of exploring the cavalry. As mentioned above, the exploration cavalry should detect the enemy's plan so that he can modify his own plan. When the protected cavalry can't hide the advance of the troops, such as the March before the two battles of Jena and Aher, the troops must move quickly to ensure the secret.
In a word, Napoleon's views on defense and attack are complete and unified. He said: "A defensive war cannot exclude an attack, just as an offensive war cannot be without defense." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 3 1, Page 347. ] "If your troops are mediocre, change more soil." [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 14,No.1211. This means digging ditches to enhance their self-confidence. This also applies to isolated teams, because "this is the operational principle, and all teams and troops must dig fortifications. Whenever you occupy a position, this should be the first step that must be taken. " [Author's Note: The Letters of Napoleon, Volume 5, No.4083 ... However, for a corps, it is different. As early as August 1793, before Napoleon became an artillery commander in Toulon, he wrote: "In Sun Tzu's Art of War, it is an axiom that people who hide in trenches will be defeated. Experience and theory are consistent at this point. " Napoleon condemned static war.
Fourth, the shortcomings of the Napoleonic Wars.
Why didn't Napoleon win the final victory and establish a peace that was beneficial to France and acceptable to the other side? Tracing back to the source, his war guidance has three serious shortcomings. The first point is military, and the command is too centralized; The second point is political, which is his unrealistic policy; The third point is the grand strategy, that is, the method he used to complete the policy is inappropriate, which can only lead to a truce at most.
Conductor:
As for the first point, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, his principle of individual unified command made him invincible, but in the end, this principle became the factor of his failure. How did this happen?
The answer is twofold: first, if the war drags on, it will become very extensive and complicated, and the troops participating in the war will be considerable. Therefore, without a well-organized general staff, it is impossible for a person to effectively manage the war, and even a genius can do nothing. Secondly, his enemies gradually realized that they lacked cooperation in the past, so they could not unite against Napoleon. If they don't unite, they will be defeated by Napoleon one by one. In this way, during the summer truce at the Battle of Leipzig, they finally concluded the Reichenbach Treaty and unified it. There is a provision in this treaty: the allies-Russia, Austria, Prussia and Sweden-agree that under no circumstances should their troops risk fighting alone with the troops under Napoleon's personal command. No matter which troops meet him, they should retreat immediately until all the troops are assembled on the battlefield and then unite against him. In this way, the fangs of Napoleon's offensive strategy were pulled out.
Napoleon's headquarters consists of two unrelated departments: the office of the chief of staff and the general staff. The former is led by Marshal Bertil, namely Prince Neuchatel; It includes a secretariat, the emperor's entourage and a group of liaison officers. [Author's Note: Some are generals, some are colonels, and some are captains. They have a special mission. Convey Napoleon's orders to the marshal in a battle or battle. The latter usually includes three assistant chief of staff, whose duties are similar to those of modern quartermaster, plus a surveying and mapping team.
Colonel Vicky wrote: "These staff officers simply can't participate in the intelligent work of the emperor. Napoleon didn't believe them and only asked them to obey them seriously. Strictly obey my orders, only I know what I should do. This is his order to Bertil. "Bertil thinks that the existence of this kind of personality obliteration is a very natural thing." My position in the army is zero. I accepted the reports of the marshals in the name of the emperor and signed orders on his behalf, but I personally did not exist. "Bertil's letter to Sirte in March 1807. 1807 65438+ 10/8 When Bertil wrote to Nye, he also said, "Marshal, the emperor needs neither advice nor a battle plan. No one can know his thoughts. Our responsibility is only to obey. " [Author's Note: Napoleon is at work, (English version 19 14), p. 24. Wiki added: "The Emperor himself said that the General Staff Department is the least needed part of the High Command." [Author's Note: Napoleon is at work, page 14o- 14 1. Worse, this arrogant attitude was passed on to his marshals.
Duke Fezezal once commented. He said: "No matter what command method is used, his orders must be carried out ... This habit of overreaching, this determination not to admit the impossible, and this infinite confidence in success were the reasons for our victory at first, but in the end it had a fatal impact on us."
Some historians believe that the emperor did not win in his later battles because of his poor health or physical decline. This statement lacks evidence. The truth is that the reason for his failure and success is his vitality. [Author's Note: See Memoirs of General Colanhalt, vol. 1, pp. 135, 14 1, 245. It's not that he is lazy. It is because of this vitality that he believes that he can be both commander-in-chief and chief of staff. When skilled staff officers are needed, they are nowhere to be found. Crankett tells us that in 18 12, "the staff can't foresee anything, but on the other hand, the emperor wants to do everything himself and issue every order." Therefore, no matter who, even the chief of staff, dare not be responsible for issuing an extremely unimportant order. "[Author's Note: Memoirs of General Clankett, (English version 1925), Volume 1, Page 155. ] Dai Adi Liben said: 18 13 years, the work efficiency of employees is lower than that of the previous year. Moreover, "in general, in this battle, the whole army has become a complex and imperfect machine, and it is impossible to establish a cooperative relationship ... The difficulties caused by a large number of movements are difficult to overcome even if Napoleon concentrates all authority. "